Protecting the Spiritual Environment: Rhetoric and Chinese Buddhist Environmentalism by Clippard, Seth Devere (Author) et al.
Protecting the Spiritual Environment:  
Rhetoric and Chinese Buddhist Environmentalism  
by 
Seth Clippard 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved April 2012 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Huaiyu Chen, Chair 
Hava Tirosh-Samuelson 
Stephen Bokenkamp 
Hoyt Tillman 
Ben Minteer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
May 2012  
  i 
ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation analyzes the way in which leaders of certain Taiwanese 
Buddhist organizations associated with a strand of Buddhist modernism called 
"humanistic Buddhism" use discourse and rhetoric to make environmentalism 
meaningful to their members. It begins with an assessment of the field of religion 
and ecology, situating it in the context of secular environmental ethics. It 
identifies rhetoric and discourse as important but under acknowledged elements in 
literature on environmental ethics, both religious and secular, and relates this lack 
of attention to rhetoric to the presence of a problematic gap between 
environmental ethics theory and environmentalist practice.  This dissertation 
develops a methodology of rhetorical analysis that seeks to assess how rhetoric 
contributes to alleviating this gap in religious environmentalism. In particular, this 
dissertation analyzes the development of environmentalism as a major element of 
humanistic Buddhist groups in Taiwan and seeks to show that a rhetorical analysis 
helps demonstrate how these organizations have sought to make 
environmentalism a meaningful subject of contemporary Buddhist religiosity. 
This dissertation will present an extended analysis of the concept of "spiritual 
environmentalism," a term developed and promoted by the late Ven. Shengyan 
(1930-2009), founder of the Taiwanese Buddhist organization Dharma Drum 
Mountain. Furthermore, this dissertation suggests that the rhetorical methodology 
proposed herein offers offers a direction for scholars to more effectively engage 
with religion and ecology in ways that address both descriptive/analytic 
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approaches and constructive engagements with various forms of religious 
environmentalism. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The field of religion and ecology is growing and will likely gain in 
importance as climate change and other environmental problems receive attention 
from all sectors of society.  As one of the most widespread religions in the world, 
Buddhism will also receive increased attention for how its tenets and practices can 
offer guidance and resources for addressing environmental problems.  The role of 
Buddhism in the modern world has already become quite important as scholars 
continue to explore the intersections between Buddhism and modern sciences and 
social sciences.
1
  The intersection between Buddhism and environmental sciences 
is no exception.  In response to environmental exigencies, scholars have devoted 
significant efforts towards exploring Buddhist environmental ethics.  This project 
though is necessarily a constructive one, since, as scholars like Lambert 
Schmidthausen and Ian Harris have shown, Buddhism possesses no intrinsic 
environmental ethic.  However, in order for a practical ethic to be articulated, it is 
important to clarify and explore with great care and precision the ways in which 
Buddhists qua Buddhists are responding to environmental issues.  By so doing we 
can better understand how and why environmentalism is made meaningful to 
Buddhists.  Scholars engaged in analysis and description will thus have more 
                                                 
1
 Particularly popular are investigations into Buddhism and cognitive science.  
See works such as B. Alan Wallace, ed., Buddhism and Science: Breaking New 
Ground (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Mathieu Ricard and Trinh 
Xuan Thuan, The Quantum and the Lotus: A Journey to the Frontiers Where 
Science and Buddhism Meet (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2001); and Dalai 
Lama, The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergense of Science and 
Spirituality (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006). 
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well-defined their subject matter by making a community’s beliefs and practices 
more tangible.  From this point scholars engaged in the constructive work of 
developing Buddhist environmental ethics can proceed to articulate an ethics that 
is both meaningful to Buddhists today and intellectually sound.  The contribution 
I am aiming to make in this dissertation is invite discussion between these two 
scholarly projects—the analytic and constructive, regardless of whether scholars 
are engaged in one or both projects.  As Bauman, Bohannon, and O’Brien argue, 
many scholars of religion and ecology are motivated by practical concerns; “This field 
exists not just to develop theories and ideas, but also to contribute to the activist cause of 
building a more sustainable world.”2  A scholar’s constructivist interest in the field can 
take the form of outright activism to the desire to make religious environmentalism a 
discourse that reflects the shared concern of religious communities that has the goal of 
affecting public policy and human behavior.       
With these observations in mind, in this dissertation I seek to do the 
following:  First, I will define the main arguments and approaches towards 
discussing and analyzing Buddhist environmentalism.  From a review of the 
current literature I will show that the work in Buddhist environmentalism (which I 
take as encompassing Buddhist eco-philosophy and ethics) follows the routes 
already laid out by work by Christian theologians and secular environmental 
philosophers.  I will argue that this results in a lack of attention to unique aspects 
of Buddhist philosophy and the distinctions between different Buddhist cultures.  
I show that that without attending to the contextual details of a specific instance of 
                                                 
2
 Gottlieb, Greener Faith, 8. 
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religious environmentalism, we are unable to elucidate what factors serve to link 
the environmental interests to religious interests.  Towards suggesting a remedy to 
this deficiency, I propose adopting a rhetorically informed approach to 
understanding religious environmentalism.  Then, I will elucidate how the 
Buddhist community under analysis utilizes ritual, practice, and discourse to 
create a meaningful rhetoric of Buddhist environmentalism.  I will attempt to 
show that approaching religious environmentalism according to the following 
model enables scholars to better understand how religious environmentalisms 
work; that is to say, by understanding how religious communities come to 
articulate the religious nature of environmental concern, this project seeks to 
contribute to both empirical research on religion and ecology and more 
constructive projects represented by environmental ethics.  
In consideration of the fact that Buddhism and ecology emerged out of the 
larger field of Religion and ecology, chapter two will begin by introducing the 
dominant approaches to the field of religion and ecology and highlight how the 
guiding questions of the field and the responses to those questions result in 
varying understandings of the field, not only by taking a different approach to 
how the connection between religion and environmentalism is debated but how 
the way in which religion is understood differs.  This chapter will show how 
issues such as whether environmental ethics should aim for a nonanthropocentric 
worldview, making nonanthropocentrism a central problematic in religious 
environmentalism, and the gap between ethical theory and practices that reflect 
those theoretical foundations has been taken up by scholars of religion.  In 
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addition, this chapter addresses the interface of science, environmentalism, and 
ethics particularly as scholars discuss the way in which scientific and ethical 
discourses of nature impinge upon one another.  In the following section, the 
chapter turns to the varieties of approaches to the field of religion and ecology, 
outlining the focuses on cosmology, community, and non-mainstream religious 
traditions.  Chapter two concludes with a short description of how religion and 
ecology plays out in the context of two traditions: Confucianism and Judaism. 
Chapter three addresses the degree to which religious environmentalism 
turns on how discourses of nature, environment, and religion develop out of 
multiple contexts and seeks to demonstrate that the way in which the motivation 
of a religious environmental ethic is deeply rhetorical.  This chapter offers a 
model of rhetoric rooted in a notion of persuasion, but the way in which the model 
functions is explained by reference to three concepts: audience, identification, and 
framing.  This model of rhetoric is inspired by Kenneth Burke and his interpreters 
and articulates the main methodological approach of the dissertation.  This 
chapter applies these notions to environmental philosophies of Bryan Norton and 
Arne Naess.  The work of these two philosophers provides a way to illustrate how 
environmental rhetoric can move environmentalism beyond the theory/practice 
gap and incorporate ontological and metaphysical elements of environmentalism 
that are common to religious environmentalism.  This chapter concludes with an 
inquiry into religious environmental rhetoric and returns to the examples 
discussed in chapter two, Confucianism and Judaism, to show how rhetorical 
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analysis rearranges the way in which the environmental concerns of a tradition are 
established, altering the predominant contours of the field. 
Chapters four and five focus specifically on Buddhist environmentalism.  
Chapter four provides a survey of Buddhism and ecology, highlighting the 
dominant concepts and approaches to articulating a Buddhist environmental ethic.  
These approaches follow the dominant paradigm of a concern with worldview, 
cosmology, and nonanthropocentrism that characterizes most religious 
environmentalism, and the critiques of these approaches show the practical 
difficulties that are entailed.  In order to further emphasize the importance of 
attending to contextual factors of specific Buddhist communities, this chapter 
offers two case studies of Buddhist environmentalism in contemporary Thailand 
and Singapore.   
Chapter five narrows the focus of the dissertation to modern contemporary 
Chinese Buddhist environmentalism.  The first section lays out the differences 
between Buddhism and environmentalism as they developed in China and Taiwan 
from the middle of the 20
th
 century on.  The following section first describes the 
major characteristics of humanistic Buddhism (renjian fojiao 人間佛教) and 
juxtaposes it to engaged Buddhism (both forms of Buddhism being associated 
with contemporary Buddhist environmentalism) and then presents the 
environmental beliefs of two organizations that either do not emphasize the 
practice (Zhongtaishan) or do not incorporate many elements of Buddhist 
environmental rhetoric into their discourse (Life Conservationist Association).  
Finally, the chapter offers an analysis of the way in which Taiwanese scholars 
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have assessed the discourse of Chinese Buddhist environmentalism, identifying 
the key concepts and terms.   
Chapter six focuses on three humanistic Buddhist organizations that not 
only carry out significant or moderately significant environmental campaigns, but 
also promote environmentalism as a specifically Buddhist concern through the use 
of rhetorical appeal— Fagushan 法鼓山 (Dharma Drum Mountain/DDM), Ciji 
gongde hui 慈濟功德會 (Ciji), and Foguangshan 佛光山 (/Buddha Light 
Mountain/FGS).  Since two in-depth studies of FGS and Ciji have recently been 
published, I will focus on each organization’s efforts towards advocating 
environmentalism and what practices each advocate.  I will provide a brief 
overview of DDM’s overall vision known as the five-fold spiritual renaissance 
campaign, particularly its focus on education and Chan meditation, in addition to 
its environmentalist mission.  This chapter begins with an extensive analysis of 
the term “spiritual environmentalism” developed by Ven. Shengyan 聖嚴 (1930-
2009) of Dharma Drum Mountain (DDM).  After earning a doctorate in Japan in 
Buddhist literature, Shengyan went to the United States to promote Chinese 
Buddhism and teach Chan meditation.  Over a decade after his first trip to the 
United States, Shengyan coined the term xinling huanbao 心靈環保 (‘spiritual 
environmentalism’ or ‘protecting the spiritual environment’) and made that term 
the central teaching in his project of Chinese Buddhist renewal.  Questions that 
are addressed in this section include: How does the concept of xinling huanbao 
influence and inform DDM members’ relationships to mainstream environmental 
practice?  How is protection of the natural environment understood to be 
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spiritual/Buddhist practice?  Most of the analysis in this section centers on the 
term xinling huanbao, since this term has been extensively developed as the 
linchpin of Shengyan’s teaching and the mission of DDM.  The basics of DDM’s 
environmentalism are contained in the notion of spiritual environmentalism.  
Moreover, this term has begun to be used, albeit sparingly, by leaders of other 
Buddhist organizations, suggesting the possibility of spiritual environmentalism 
becoming the basis of a robust Chinese Buddhist environmentalism. 
The next section takes up the environmental rhetoric of Ciji.  Ciji was 
founded in the 1960s by Venerable Zhengyan 證嚴 (b. 1937), the only Taiwanese 
Buddhist leader discussed in this dissertation to have been born in Taiwan.  Major 
emphasis is placed on the way in which Zhengyan reinterprets notions like 
recycling and environmentalism, as well as her emphasis on traditional values 
such as the family generally associated with Confucian culture.  The chapter 
concludes with an examination of the environmental rhetoric of Ven. Xingyun 星
雲 (b. 1927), founder of FGS.  His environmental rhetoric rests upon his 
interpretation of the Western Pure land, but is altered somewhat through his 
application of humanistic Buddhist notions of the Pure land. 
 The conclusion will address some of the implications this dissertation has 
for future work in religion and ecology, going so far as to offer rhetorical analysis 
as a methodological precondition for scholarship on religious environmentalism.  
This dissertation responds to the perceived failure of environmental ethics to have 
a significant impact on policy and large scale changes in environmental values 
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and behavior.  Scholars have noted the increase in religious participation in 
communities throughout the world, referring to the phenomenom as the 
desecularization thesis (in opposition to the previously offered secularization 
thesis which held that societies are becoming less religious.)
3
  If desecularization 
is proceeding apace as some scholars suggest, then the influence of religious 
communities on social movements like environmentalism cannot, nor should not 
be ignored.  But just how a traditionally secular concern is made meaningful in 
religious terms for specific communities tend to not be found in articulations that 
are primarily philosophical and metaphysical.  The basic position argued for in 
this dissertation is that scholars of religion and ecology should attend to the 
rhetoric of environmental concern and not assume that the articulation of 
environmental concern should proceed directly from a single tradition’s doctrinal 
or theological commitments.  By examining the rhetoric of a specific religious 
community, scholars can begin to tease out the way that the layered identity of 
religious groups is addressed in discourse.  Beginning with rhetoric maintains a 
productive balance between theory and practice that also offers possibilities for 
merging the two.   
 Regarding terminology, for consistency, I have used the Pinyin versions of 
all Chinese names, even though some figures have established other 
transliterations.  I use the term “Pure land,” except in cases where it refers to the 
                                                 
3
 See Peter L. Berger, ed., The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion 
and World Politics (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999).  
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Pure Land school of thought or where a specific Pure land is being referred to 
(e.g., Amitabha’s Pure Land).  
  10 
Chapter 2 
IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: THE FIELD OF RELIGION AND 
ECOLOGY 
Scholarly work in the connection between various religious traditions and 
environmentalism (e.g., Christianity and ecology or Buddhism and ecology) is 
typically listed as a subfield of a larger discipline commonly referred to as 
religion and ecology.  We might say that these subfields emerged out of the larger 
field of religion and ecology, but it might be more correct to say that the field 
itself emerged out of the work being done on each tradition, since articles 
pertaining to environmental stances in particular religious traditions appeared 
before any formal recognition of a field known as religion and ecology.  In this 
chapter, for the purposes of offering a coherent analysis of the general themes and 
issues relating to religion and ecology, I will begin by introducing the dominant 
approaches to the field.  I will situate the field within the context of secular 
environmental ethics and then highlight the guiding questions of the field.  This 
will involve first looking at implications of and reasons for distinguishing 
between key concepts like nature, ecology, and environmentalism.  Then, I will 
offer a short history of the field and address two issues that pertain to religion and 
ecology scholarship: the role of science and the theory/practice gap.  Next, I will 
look specifically at three ways in which the area of study is labeled as a field—
religion and ecology, religion and nature, and religious environmentalism.  This 
discussion will attempt to offer some definitional clarity to a field which has 
flourished in part because of its ambiguity.  Finally, I will offer a short reading of 
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two traditions, Judaism and Confucianism, to illustrate some of the issues 
discussed in this chapter and provide a basis for comparison with Buddhism in 
chapter three.     
2.1 Sorting the terms 
 
 The difficulty of describing the field to which the current study belongs is 
immediately apparent from the lack of agreement on what name it—religion and 
ecology, religion and the environment, religion and nature?  What exactly is being 
studied and what methods are evoked in the process?  Generally speaking, we can 
say that the object of study includes how religious belief and practice impact 
ecosytems and the non-human world and the ways in which the non-human world 
impinge on human religiosity.  But this definition adds little clarity.  The religious 
influence on ecosystems, the elements of nature that are represented in religions, 
and the history of human ill-effects on the natural world due to behaviors 
resulting from human religiosity: these three call upon anthropological, 
philosophical, ethical, historical, and theological resources so broad that it would 
make little sense to place them under one single academic field.  Perhaps the 
various scholars working in the field acknowledge those scholars with whom they 
are in dialogue, suggesting a sense of unity.  The various names given to the field 
noted above, then may reflect different preferences in terminology and not 
radically different guiding questiongs.  But the issue is more than simply a 
difference in preferences, since the various labels contribute to how scholars 
address and conceptualize methodological and theoretical bases of critical inquiry.  
  12 
A recent publication entitled Grounding Religion: A Field Guide to the 
Study of Religion and Ecology can be considered the first attempt to offer an 
overview of the field with attention to the methodologies in use.  The editors note 
that religion and ecology is a “deeply interdisciplinary” and “constantly evolving 
field of study.”4  As an emerging field it is probably too early to tell what 
direction(s) works in the field will take.  There is great flexibility in this 
ambiguity, and such ambiguity is sometimes taken to be the strength of the field.
5
  
Mary Evelyn Tucker describes the situation thus: 
In the humanities, important multidisciplinary fields of study are 
emerging in environmental history, literature, and philosophy.  Religion 
and ecology can be situated as a new field of study in the humanities that 
is similarly multidisciplinary in outlook and concern.  From the 
perspective of this field, based within religious studies or theology, the 
contributions of religions to environmental studies and policy may be 
clarified.
6
 
According to this account, the field is conceived as multidisciplinary but also 
seems firmly placed within religious studies.  In either case, issues of 
methodology and theory present their own academic challenges, as they often do 
for the study of religion in general.  As one step toward more clearly delineating 
the boundaries of the field, Bauman, Bohannon, and O’Brien take care to discuss 
                                                 
4
 Whitney A. Bauman, Richard R. Bohannon II, and Kevin J. O’Brien, eds., 
Grounding Religion: A Field Guide to the Study of Religion and Ecology 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 4. 
  
5
 Bron Taylor, “Exploring Religion, Nature, and Culture—Introducing the 
Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture,” Journal for the Study of 
Religion, Nature and Culture 1:1 (2007), 5-24. 
 
6
 Mary Evelyn Tucker, Worldly Wonder: Religions Enter their Ecological Phase 
(Peru, Illinois: Carus Publishing Company, 2003), 32 (emphasis in original). 
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ways of defining both religion and ecology.  The practice of defining the key 
terms as a way of animating discussion within an academic field should not be 
disregarded or taken lightly.  J.Z Smith’s comments on the term ‘religion’ are apt 
here: Religion “is a second-order, generic concept that plays the same role in 
establishing a disciplinary horizon that concepts such as ‘language’ plays in 
linguistics or ‘culture’ plays in anthropology.  There can be no disciplined study 
of religion without such a horizon.”7  The field of religion and ecology likewise is 
in need of a disciplinary horizon if the work in this field is to be disciplined.  This 
does not mean its interdisciplinary and constantly evolving nature must be 
limited, but it is helpful for scholars to work within set boundaries, if only to be 
constantly transgressing them.  In order to practice the critical work of scholarship 
in the field of religion and ecology, it is more than helpful to have some working 
definition of these terms and not bury the issue by using ‘ecology,’ 
‘environmental,’ ‘environmentalism,’ and ‘ecological’ all synonymously.  To 
complicate matters, the “first-order” terms—‘religion,’ ‘nature,’ ‘environment,’ 
and ‘ecology’—escape simple definition.8  By first examining the complexity 
involved in obtaining working definitions of these first-order terms, we can better 
                                                 
7
 Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious,” in Critical Terms in 
Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1998), 281-282.   
 
8
 My use of the qualifier “first-order” to refer to religion here may seem in direct 
contradiction to J.Z. Smith’s identification of ‘religion’ as a “second-order term.”  
However, Smith was referring to the field of religious studies, in which case 
religion very well can be considered second-order.  When the focus is the field of 
religion and ecology, religion itself becomes a first-order term. 
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appreciate the difficulties and problems in establishing the focus of the field of 
religion and ecology. 
2.1.1 Religion 
‘Religion’ has typically referred to the various ‘world religions’ (e.g., 
Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Daoism, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, and 
Judaism), along with a variety of indigenous traditions.  Several scholars working 
in this field have set out to clarify how they understand ‘religion.’  Bron Taylor 
offers a helpful discussion of how to situate ‘religion’ in the field, and he is keen 
to make space for modes of individual or communal experience that are not 
considered part of any established religious tradition (e.g., paganism, wicca, deep 
ecology, and surfing.)
9
  Taylor opts for a “family-resemblance” approach to 
religion to avoid suggesting there is an essence to religion which “leaves in play 
and open to contestation the definition of religion, and even challenges whether 
choosing a definition is important.”10  Roger Gottlieb also offers a rather broad 
definition of religion, appealing to Tillich’s description of religion as ultimate 
                                                 
9
 In his introduction to the Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, he offers an 
adaptation of David Chidester’s definition of religion, stating religion is “that 
dimension of human experience engaged with sacred norms, which are related to 
transformative forces and powers and which people consider to be dangerous 
and/or beneficent and/or meaningful in some ultimate way.” See Bron Taylor, 
“Introduction,” in Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, ed. Bron Taylor (New 
York: Continuum, 2005), x (emphasis in original).  
 
10
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concern (Gottlieb alters this phrase to read “ultimate significance”).11  But he also 
adds a functional definition stating that religions supply humans with norms and 
rituals which regulate human conduct and communication.   
Bauman, Bohannon, and O’Brien discuss the importance of defining 
religion, noting that “[d]efinitions of religion matter to scholars of religion 
because they work as filters through which we see things.”12  This is perhaps true 
whether scholars are working on religion singularly or on specific traditions, in 
which case it is important how scholars define that specific tradition or group 
(e.g., what is ‘Christianity’, ‘Buddhism’, or ‘Indigenous’).  However, the 
importance of defining religion perhaps lies more in its relevance to normative 
projects that seek to assist in forging partnerships between different religious 
communities to collectively address environmental issues.  Bauman, Bohannon, 
and O’Brien argue that many scholars of religion and ecology are motivated by 
practical concerns; “This field exists not just to develop theories and ideas, but 
also to contribute to the activist cause of building a more sustainable world.”13  
The implication is that scholarly work can create a common vocabulary upon 
which different religious communities can build coalitions despite having 
different theologies, practices, and belief commitments.   
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For scholars working on a single tradition, the map of religion is perhaps 
less complicated, but questions still persist regarding how one will delimit that 
tradition.  The questions of what religion is seem to be relevant mainly in the 
cases where scholars, like Taylor, are trying to create space for people whose 
environmental commitments resemble religious commitments. Questions such as: 
Is there a common facet of the tradition that all adherents value, or is each 
tradition as internally complex as the larger field of religion are relevant and 
important to the scholar.  But scholars should not lose sight of the fact that 
defining religion can also lead to the reification of religions (or religion) as 
autonomous agents.  The error in this is that it is rather people who are acting, 
writing, engaging that are the real subjects of the field.  As Robert Campany has 
persuasively argued, speaking in terms which attribute agency to religious 
traditions elides the fact that it is people who act, people who identify in different 
ways and to different degrees with the tradition.
14
  We should then attribute the 
interdisciplinarity, change, and constant expansion of the field to the the influx of 
different perspectives of human actors.   
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 But if we consider the work of scholars of other fields (anthropology, 
sociology, etc.), perhaps the definition of religion is not so critical.  When the 
religious community being studied has already been identified, does ‘religion’ as 
an etic category still matter?  In a case where the subject is Appalachian American 
Pentacostals, does ‘religion’ come pre-packaged?  The claim that religion and 
ecology is simultaneously rooted in religious studies and interdisciplinary means 
that either religious studies is an interdisciplinary field (or as some might say a 
“transdisciplinary field”—incorporating many fields under one heading) or that 
religion and ecology extends well beyond the practice of religious studies.  This 
issue would fruitfully be sufficiently addressed on its own terms, but the question 
need not be resolved for work to be done in the field.  Roger Gottlieb seems to 
have overcome the issue by addressing ‘religious environmentalism’ rather than 
‘religion’ which highlights religion as a phenomenon modifying human behavior 
and not a reified entity.  He focuses on the way a religious community practices 
environmentalism.  Comparisons can then be made with environmental work 
carried out in non-religious communities and non-environmental work carried out 
in religious communities.  Comparisons can then be made to determine how 
strongly the environmental work done resembles or is understood to be religious 
practice or ritual, and whether it is inspired by religious values or beliefs.  The 
important point to keep in mind is that uses of the phrase ‘religion and ecology’ 
often tend to treat religion as an agent, leading to meaningless statements about 
what religion can do to help the environment or how religions cause 
environmental degradation.      
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Defining religion is important to the extent that one’s concern is with 
analyzing a global movement of religious environmentalism.  Environmentalism, 
like religion, can be discussed both generally and with reference to particular 
instances.  The two are not unrelated.  But it is not necessary to begin with a 
definition of religion or even offer one in order in order to make significant 
contributions to the study of religion and ecology.  And, following Bron Taylor, it 
is possible that an overemphasis on religion will lead to a myopic view of what 
religious environmentalism could be.  As the Chinese philosopher, Gongsun long 
公孫龍 observed, a white horse is not a horse.  The former cannot be reduced to a 
category of the latter.  Likewise, religious environmentalism need not be viewed 
only as a subcategory of either religion or environmentalism.     
2.1.2 Nature 
Another term whose meaning is difficult to demarcate is ‘nature.’  Bron 
Taylor defines nature as “that world which includes – but at the same time is 
perceived to be largely beyond – our human bodies, and which confronts us daily 
with its apparent otherness.”15  Gottlieb describes ‘nature’ as “the earth’s system 
of living beings and the support systems for them.”16   
Perhaps the most extensive treatment of the concept nature in its 
contemporary context is Kate Soper’s What is Nature?  Soper attempts to provide 
an inclusive analysis of how nature is conceived in environmentalism and argues 
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that in all discussions of nature, there is a fundamental sense of separation 
between humanity and nature that is “axiomatic to Western thought.”17  But Soper 
soon complicates this basic assumption by highlighting ways that we use the word 
‘nature’: in a cosmological sense, where ‘nature’ refers to everything that is (and 
so something of which we are a part) and in a human sense (human nature), a use 
that suggest both a continuity with ‘other natures’ while still claiming a difference 
(human nature is qualitatively different from non-human nature).  She states, “We 
also use it in reference to that totality of being of which we are a part.  We have 
thought, that is, of humanity as being a component of nature even as we have 
conceptualized nature as absolute otherness to humanity.  ‘Nature’ is in this sense 
both that which we are not and that which we are within.”18   
To delineate the implications in contemporary terms of this conundrum, 
Soper identifies two dominant ways the term ‘nature’ has been used in 
environmental discourse—a “realist,” “nature-endorsing” use of the term 
exemplified in ecology and the green movement and an opposed “culturalist,” 
“nature-skeptical” use characteristic of post-modern discourse.19  The division 
between these two is not whether there is a human-nature distinction, but in “the 
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way it is to be drawn.”20  That is, the distinction is related to the way each camp 
deploys ecological discourse, which Soper has divided into three modes: 
metaphysical, realist, and lay (or surface).  The first places humanity within 
nature as a part of nature, the second “refers to the structures, processes, and 
causal powers that are constantly operative within the physical world, that provide 
the objects of study of the natural sciences,” and the third pertains to “the nature 
of immediate experience and aesthetic appreciation; the nature we have destroyed 
and polluted and are asked to conserve and preserve.”21  These three modes of 
discourse are “interlocking” but each reflects a way in which nature is uniquely 
conceived, represented, and made the basis for argument in one way or another. 
John Hedley Brooke examines how such a problematic term as ‘nature’ 
has remained so resilient.  He shows that part of ‘nature’s’ staying power is built 
around the various dichotomies nature is a part of (nature/culture, nature/nurture, 
nature/art, etc.) but that much of the difficulty in speaking about nature is caused 
by the collapse of these dualities following the advent of modern science (which 
Brooke traces to Bacon and Newton).
22
  Brooke concludes by suggesting that one 
other reason for the persistence of nature in our contemporary discourses is due to 
the authority that comes with speaking for nature.  Carrying Brooke’s argument 
one step further, we might say that the ambiguity of what nature is and what 
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nature means is part of its power and appeal.  This is to say, because of the wide 
appeals to ‘nature’ and the wide of appeal of ‘nature,’ the term persists as an 
anchor of discourse and a flashpoint for debate.        
2.1.3 Ecology, Environment, Environmentalism 
Finally, it is necessary to look at what is meant by ‘environmentalism’ and 
‘ecology.’  There are several reasons for raising this question.  The most obvious 
is that most scholars use the label ‘religion and ecology,’ rather than ‘religion and 
nature,’ ‘religious environmentalism,’ or ‘religion and the environment.’ 
Secondly, according to Soper’s analysis most scholars addressing the relationship 
between religion and nature would fall into the realist, nature-endorsing camp she 
associates with ecology.  Third, by identifying a nature-endorsing position with 
ecology, we can address the question of what exactly scholars are studying when 
they work in the field of religion and ecology.  John Clark makes the distinction 
between ‘environmentalism’ and ‘ecology’ as follows:  
The term environmentalism is sometimes used to refer to a 
traditional, instrumentalist view that conceives of “nature” as that which 
surrounds human beings, and reduces the natural world to an assemblage 
of resources that ought to be used wisely for the benefit of humanity.  The 
term “ecology” may accordingly be reserved for a more critical and 
transformative perspective that reconceptualizes the place of humanity 
within the larger system or whole.
23
   
 
Peter Hay, in his inclusive work Main Currents in Western Environmental 
Thought, notes the tradition of distinguishing ecology from environmentalism, 
whereby the former is associated with revolutionary, deep-structure change and 
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the latter pertains to reformist, managerial changes.  But he goes on to argue that 
he will treat them as synonyms for two reasons: first, people involved in the green 
movement do not make sharp distinctions between the terms, and second, the 
movement described as “environmental” or “ecological” lacks definitive 
boundaries.
24
  Soper, too, does not choose to distinguish between 
ecology/ecological on the one hand, and environmentalism/environmental on the 
other.  However, we might point out that the three meanings of nature that she 
offers as interlocking map onto the two parts of Clark’s distinction: Clark’s 
‘environmentalism’ being related to Soper’s realist and lay uses; Clark’s 
‘ecology’ being related to Soper’s metaphysical use.  But I believe there is a good 
deal we can learn about the various green projects by looking at the distinctions 
and the intellectual context of those distinctions.  The focus on rhetoric that I take 
in this dissertation dictates that even though words may be used interchangeably 
in ordinary discourse that does not mean there is no interest motivating the use of 
each term.      
According to the website of the Ecological Society of America, “Ecology 
is the scientific discipline that is concerned with the relationships between 
organisms and their past, present, and future environments.”25  Similarly, most 
reference works define ecology as the science of or scientific study of the 
relationships between organisms and their environments.  Although McIntosh 
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amply demonstrates that the meaning of ecology is fluid and is frequently used in 
popular senses, he also shows that it is rooted in science and akin to biology, with 
the popular uses being derived from the scientific meaning of the term which 
emphasizes the interrelationship of entities.
26
  Despite showing that ecology has 
yet to achieve a singular definition and that many ecologists have likewise been 
interested in and have contributed to issues pertaining to environmental ethics and 
policy, his history of the discipline clearly demarcates ecology as a branch of 
biology focused on the relationships among populations and communities of plant 
and animal species within an ecosystem.  Finally, there is the argument that when 
anyone is referred to as an ‘ecologist’ it nearly always refers to a person 
conducting research on some field of biology.
27
  The association of ecologist with 
scientist is rarely challenged.  Based on these descriptions we can establish the 
dominant meaning of ecology as a branch of biological science.
28
     
The matter cannot be so easily settled, though, since as is often pointed 
out, the etymology of the term ‘ecology’ derives from the root oikos (household) 
and  -ology (the study of ) or logos (the logic of).  Based on this etymology, 
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ecology can be defined as “the study of the household” or the “logic of the 
household.”  The comparison with “economy” (oikos -nomos, or “the 
management of the household”) shows that household is used as a metaphor to 
describe a close association of things and beings functioning in mutual 
cooperation.  Of course, Haeckel intended this implication when he coined the 
term ecology.  But for current purposes it is important to note that this 
metaphorical tenor  of the term ‘ecology’ in scientific discourse can be utilized in 
a variety of ways and was early on used in discourses other than science and 
continues to be so used to this day.  We cannot, then, simply say that ‘ecology’ is 
solely a scientific term, but we can acknowledge that the use of ‘ecology’ in 
scientific discourse is deeply situated and systematized, whereas its non-scientific 
uses are less systematized and defined.     
Environmentalism, unlike ecology, is not similarly situated so deeply in 
physical scientific research or study.
29
  One description of environmentalism 
reads:  
Environmentalism is an intellectual, moral, and political movement that 
arose in response to global environmental crises.  Although it had its 
precursors in forestry preservation and national parks campaigns of the 
twentieth century, the contemporary movement is distinguished by a 
perception that there is a global complex, interrelated web of 
environmental problems that pose a threat to the health, well-being, and 
perhaps the very existence of humanity…Environmentalism can be 
understood as a theoretical position (a view about the nature and causes of 
the environmental crisis), as a moral position that poses the question of 
what our relation to nature ought to be, and as a social and political 
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movement aiming to bring about a society capable of living within 
environmental limits.
30
 
 
The above definition demonstrates that even though environmentalism has its 
roots in activism and is both a social and political movement, it also encompasses 
questions of human/nature relationships that could be described as “realist” 
(theoretical) and “surface” (moral), in Soper’s sense of the terms.  And it seems 
that the theoretical position of environmentalism is one that can be informed by 
research in ecology (the scientific discipline), without having to relabel itself 
‘ecology.’  Perhaps the use of the term ‘ecology’ as opposed to 
‘environmentalism’ is a historical matter.  Since ‘ecology’ predates 
‘environmentalism’ by several decades, it is only natural that this is the term used 
to reference concern for environmental problems such as pollution.  However, it is 
also possible that the scientific tone of ‘ecology’ offers a sense of objectivity that 
‘environmentalism,’ which is generally understood to have become popular 
during the counter-culture movement of the sixties, does not.   
We should also look briefly at the term ‘environment,’ as it is the basis for 
‘environmentalism.’  The questions asked about the word ‘nature’ can perhaps 
likewise be posed about ‘environment.’  James Proctor argues that ‘environment’ 
has only in the last century and a half been used as a synonym for ‘nature’ and 
with this new meaning of environment comes “a parsing out of environment into 
natural or cultural surroundings, both of which are significant but dissimilar 
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enough to warrant distinction.”31  What Proctor pushes for is a recovery of the 
meaning of environment that deals with connections:  
If there is one thing I want to reclaim about environment, it is the 
vision of connectedness articulated…Connections matter empirically, 
morally, and politically.   The best of our knowledge of nature, of 
scientific inquiry, and of religious wisdom is the sense of connectedness 
they offer.  The worst of environment in the contemporary sense is the 
binary disconnect it presumes by its very utterance.
32
   
 
We see in Thompson’s definition of ‘environmentalism’ that he does not 
use the term ‘environment’ but only ‘environmental.’  Taking seriously Proctor’s 
proposal, we can ask whether Thompson’s definition of environmentalism, being 
rooted in environmental issues, suggests a singular concern with nature or the 
natural world, or can the environmental concern behind environmentalism be 
based on a perceived threat to states of connectedness?  If the latter, then 
environmentalism no longer has the exclusive reference of protecting nature, but 
of acting to protect connectedness in a variety of different milieus—“natural” or 
“artificial.”  The scope of these two different understandings of environmentalism 
could be quite significant.  In the case of religious environmentalism, we need to 
first look at how each tradition that articulates environmental concern relates the 
idea of environment to their own practices and belief, if they do so at all.   
Thus, although there are ways to distinguish between ‘ecology’ and 
‘environmentalism,’ these distinctions are not absolute.  It is nevertheless helpful 
to recognize that ecology tends to be more connected to scientific discourse than 
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environmentalism, and this tendency can help us become aware of what discourse 
scholars are employing based on the terms they use.      
  
2.2 A Short History of the Field  
Based on the preceding section, we can see how a main problem in the 
nascent field of religion and ecology is hermeneutical.  Is the field a branch of 
environmental ethics or religion?  What is the aim of its scholarship?  Part of the 
problem lies in the ambiguity of the secular project of environmental ethics itself.  
What are the metaethical issues in environmental ethics?  What forms of ethical 
reason best fit it?  Is environmental ethics a new form of ethics, as some have 
suggested?  While most scholars are motivated by the desire to effect some 
tangible change, what kind of change do they envision or believe is necessary?   
As a formal academic field, environmental philosophy is the product of a 
number of developments.
33
  It emerged out of the environmentalism that grew 
with the counter culture movement of the 1960s and 1970s.  But it was also part 
of the growing field of applied ethics that arose during this period and other 
developments in academic philosophy.  Environmental ethics has traditionally 
been explained by labeling thinkers as holistic or individualistic, anthropocentric 
or nonanthropocentric.  There is no shortage of surveys of the field: Roderick 
Nash’s The Rights of Nature and Donald Worster’s Nature’s Economy offer 
historical overviews, first pitting conservationists such as Gifford Pinchot against 
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preservationists like John Muir, then turning to the land ethics of Aldo Leopold, 
and culminating in the rise of the biocentric and holistic philosophies of Baird 
Callicot and Holmes Rolston, III.  Another way to organize the field is along the 
philosophical lines of utilitarianism, deontological ethics, virtue ethics, and 
consequentialism.  Or they may sort the list of positions according to the primary 
object of moral concern, (in the case of ethics) yielding the labels (in the case of 
ethics): animal rights, ecojustice, biocentric ethics, and ecocentric ethics, or (in 
the case of philosophy): deep ecology, social ecology, ecofemininsm.  All these 
approaches reinforce the notion that what is most at issue is establishing what 
environmental ethics is and what the most defensible ethical position is.  But 
common to nearly all of them is the issue of the moral standing of nature.  This 
issue has often been addressed according to two types of worldview: 
anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric. 
2.2.1 The Non/anthropocentrism Debate    
The term ‘nonanthropocentrism’ characterizes a worldview in which 
humans are not considered to be the center or only subject of moral concern.  This 
is in opposition to anthropocentric worldviews that consider humans to be the 
only morally considerable entities based on either a perceived biological or 
psychological uniqueness, or based on religious perspectives that understand 
humans to be at least partially apart from the natural world.  As suggested by the 
typology above, anthropocentrism does not preclude the development of an 
environmental ethic.  However, the most noted advocates of a holistic-
nonanthropocentric worldview—J. Baird Callicott and Holmes Rolston, III—have 
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argued that without the move to a nonanthropocentric worldview human behavior 
will continue to be substantially self-referential and, thus, humans will be unable 
or unwilling to make the changes necessary to, as they argue, maintain the 
stability and integrity of the ecosystem.  This last argument is based on the work 
of Aldo Leopold, who argued in his magnum opus, A Sand County Almanac, that 
“a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
ecosystem.  It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”34  This debate is crucial to 
understanding how religion and ecology has developed, since many scholars have 
sought to uncover or articulate a nonanthropocentric environmental ethic from the 
philosophical resources of a given religious tradition. 
The interest in nonanthropocentrism as an alternative to the dominant 
anthropocentric worldview is partially based on Lynn White, Jr.’s 1967 article 
“The Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” which claimed that Christian 
anthropocentrism led to a disenchantment with nature allowing for humans to see 
it as merely a resource available for human exploitation.  The proposal of a 
nonanthropocentric worldview seeks to reorient human thinking about the human-
nature relationship and incorporate claims by ecologists that humans are part of a 
larger whole (the ecosystem) that operates on the principles of balance and 
stability.  Since the first formulations of this position in the late 1960s, it has 
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become the dominant paradigm in environmental ethics.
35
  In addition to turning 
focus away from an exclusive concern with human society, nonanthropocentrism 
has been made the basis of a comprehensive worldview that encourages 
ecologically-informed behavior and articulates justifications as to why such 
behavior is also in the best interest of human society.   Furthermore, 
nonanthropocentrism can account for the metaphysical implications of ecology, as 
Callicott’s article by the same name describes.        
Both Callicott and Rolston base their nonanthropocentric ethics on the 
land ethic of Aldo Leopold.
36
  Leopold offers the land ethic as the next 
development in human ethical evolution (a concept that demonstrates the 
influence of Darwin).  Leopold surmises that humans must enter into a new 
relationship with the land based on the realization brought about by ecological 
science that humans are a part of a vast network of energy flows, a network that 
sustains not only the human community, but all communities of species.  The 
upshot (as Leopold says) of this is that the land must become the primary focus of 
ethical concern, over and above human concerns about land use, whether they be 
recreational, agricultural, or habitat-related.  Callicott and Rolston seek to flesh 
out the philosophical implications of Leopold’s land ethic.  They argue that the 
land ethic is different from traditional ethical thought; it is a new kind of ethic.  
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The difference of the land ethic can be located in its nonanthropocentric focus.  
Nonetheless, both philosophers rely on aspects of traditional ethical reasoning 
(Hume’s moral sentiment for Callicott, and deontology for Rolston) to make their 
arguments.   
Despite the common basis of Callicott and Rolston’s 
nonanthropocentrism, there are some significant differences.  The most obvious 
difference is on the issue of intrinsic value.  Intrinsic value is the idea that a thing 
has value in and of itself.  One of the earliest references to a theory of intrinsic 
value of nature can be located in the work of Albert Schweitzer and developed by 
Paul Taylor.  Taylor makes the Kantian claim that a thing has intrinsic value if it 
is an end in itself, and then he argues that all living things are ends in themselves.  
Taylor’s approach, often labeled as biocentrism, attributes value to individual 
beings.  This differs from the land ethic, which Callicott states is “holistic with a 
vengeance.”37  For Callicott the rights and values of individual entities are 
necessarily secondary to the value of the land.  But Callicott does not prefer the 
term ‘”intrinsic value;” he opts for “inherent value.”38  The difference is based on 
the fact that value is a human concept.  Things do not have value in and of 
themselves, but only in reference to human thinking.  Callicott’s claim derives 
explicitly from Hume’s concept of moral sentiments, by which value and ethical 
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norms are based on emotional responses.
39
  Although some might argue that 
Callicott’s axiology is therefore anthropocentric, he counters that it is merely 
anthropogenic.  The ethic that is developed from the moral sentiment is still 
nonanthropocentric.   
Rolston disagrees.  He argues that the natural world has intrinsic value.  
There is value in the objects of the natural world regardless of the human gaze.  
He develops this argument in his work Conserving Natural Value, where he 
moves through progressive arguments for the value of certain groups of entities 
culminating in the claim that the world has intrinsic value.  The argument is 
strong, in fact, until this last claim.  Rolston reasons, for example, that a bird 
consumes water, which contributes to its well-being.  Since the water itself is 
valuable to or valued by the bird, the water is valuable.  The bird is also an agent 
of values as it has its own sense of well-being.  Therefore, the bird has intrinsic 
value.
40
  This is an axiological condition that exists independently of human 
presence.  Where there is the valuing of something in-itself, there is intrinsic 
value.   
Rolston’s approach is pleasing to many people, because he seems to avoid 
the charge of relativism that can be made of Callicott’s position.  Callicott’s 
theory of inherent value can be said to be relativistic since it is rooted in the 
capriciousness of human emotion.  Callicott (following Hume) argues that while 
this may be true in theory, the fact that basic ethics are so widely adhered to 
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confirms that there is an ethical foundation to the human experience.  Rolston’s 
position seems to sidestep this charge by claiming a suprahuman foundation for 
ethics.  And, in fact, that is the problem with Rolston’s position.  It suggests that 
the human concept of value exists beyond human existence.  Value exists 
regardless of the existence of that from which value is made intelligible.  As a 
secular ethical philosophy, this is simply untenable.  Rolston’s argument is only 
possible if one also accepts a theistic perspective, that there is a deity which is the 
source of value.  So we might say that Rolston’s nonanthropocentrism is founded 
on a theocentrism.   
Eric Katz has offered a different reading of the anthropocentric/ 
nonanthropocentric debate.  Katz argues that nonanthropocentrism does not need 
to be understood as an absolute ethical claim.  Nonanthropocentrism does not 
need to be philosophically justified on the grounds of its ability to ascribe moral 
considerability to the natural world; that is, as axiologically true.  Rather, 
nonanthropocentrism is “true” in the sense of its being functional.  For example, 
Katz argues that implementing environmental policies in Third World nations 
runs into a conflict between protecting biodiversity and the just pursuit of 
economic development.  “When the nonanthropocentric framework is introduced, 
it creates a more complex situation for the deliberation and resolution...This 
complication...actually serves to simplify the decision.”41  Katz’s argument is also 
that nonanthropocentrism is more effective at changing and influencing human 
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behavior than anthropocentric ethics are since it moves the focus of concern 
beyond the individual.  Therefore, one should subscribe to a nonanthropocentric 
worldview as the most useful approach to addressing environmental problems.  
Katz, moreover, critiques appeals to intrinsic value as upholding an 
anthropocentric ethic.
42
   
Katz’s position has merit in its move to reframe the debate in terms more 
conducive to environmental policy.  The protracted debate on intrinsic value 
between Callicott and Rolston, as well as the debate on nonanthropocentrism 
among various environmental philosophers has contributed to the sense that there 
is no way to move forward with a philosophically-informed environmental policy 
until these debates have been settled.  Katz’s position offers an argument upon 
which action can be based on a nonanthropocentric worldview without first 
having to resolve all the philosophical issues therein.  However, Katz’s approach 
still binds environmental policy to nonanthropocentrism, leaving little room for 
other perspectives. 
2.2.2 Critiques of the dominant paradigm 
Although we can point out how anthropocentrism and the land ethic have 
been dominant themes in environmental ethics, we are still no closer to taking a 
stance on what the goal of environmental ethicists is.  In order to advance the 
discussion, Willis Jenkins takes up the questions: What are environmental 
ethicists trying to achieve?  What should an environmental ethic do?  He 
identifies three “practical strategies” in environmental ethics—the strategy of 
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nature’s moral standing, the strategy of moral agency, and the strategy of 
ecological subjectivity.
43
  He states,  
Organizing the field by its practical strategies differs from the usual 
taxonomic device of sorting theories according to their place on an 
anthropocentric /nonanthropocentric continuum.  Parsing the field instead 
by morphologically distinct uses of practical rationality lets those discrete 
strategies sketch evaluative markers of adequate moral reasoning, and thus 
a formal shape to environmental ethics.
44
   
 
Jenkins’s analysis envisions environmental ethics as “a domain marked out by 
several distinct strategies, each proposing a kind of practical rationality with its 
own criterion of adequacy.”45  Characterizing environmental ethical positions as 
strategies of practical rationality highlights the emphasis Jenkins places on the 
practicality of environmental ethics (how environmental ethics can move a 
community to action).  In Jenkins’s words, “For an environmental ethic to be 
‘practical,’ in other words, its readers must come away with some moral sense to 
their involvement with the extra-human world.”46  Jenkins’s emphasis on the 
practical nature of environmental ethics is based on 1) his understanding of the 
field as a form of practical ethics (akin to bioethics and business ethics) and 2) the 
notion that for environmental issues to be meaningful to individuals in religious 
terms, these issues must be framed in some way that connects them to religious 
practice.  Thus, he builds upon the work of environmental pragmatists, but argues 
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that their notion of what is “practical” is convoluted and fails to account for 
different ways environmental issues are framed.
47
   Jenkins argues that by 
focusing on specific environmental problems and defining what is practical as that 
which is directly relevant to the issue at hand, environmental pragmatists fail to 
account for other forms of practical rationality by which people come to view 
environmental issues as meaningful.  Before evaluating this charge, let us look 
more at the environmental pragmatist position. 
2.2.3 Environmental pragmatism 
The environmental pragmatist approach to environmental philosophy is 
based on the pragmatism of Dewey, James, and Peirce, and further developed by 
philosophers such as Bryan Norton, Andrew Light, Eric Katz, Anthony Weston, 
and Ben Minteer.  The thrust of environmental pragmatism is to get past the 
debates regarding the basis of the attribution of moral considerability to the 
natural world and non-human beings.  As Ben Minteer notes, environmental 
pragmatism offers a “third way” for environmental philosophy, a way beyond the 
dichotomies of use/conservation and anthropocentrism/ nonanthropocentrism.
48
  
The key is to address specific problem-areas in a democratic fashion, to address to 
the needs and concerns of communities involved.   
One of the earliest developments of the pragmatist position was made by 
Bryan Norton in Toward Unity Among Environmentalists.  Norton first discusses 
the way in which environmental issues have traditionally been addressed through 
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the thought to be mutually exclusive positions of wise use vs. conservation.  This 
dichotomy is typified in the early 20
th
 century figures, Gifford Pinochet and John 
Muir.  Norton argues that the fracturing and subsequent inability of 
environmentalism to direct environmental policy is the result of an overemphasis 
on establishing environmental first principles.  Norton demonstrates that despite 
the principles upon which various environmentalists base their actions, the actions 
themselves (the policies supported) are nearly always the same.  Based on this 
fact, Norton argues for a contextualized approach that seeks to first address 
environmental policy on the basis of a consideration of the various interests 
involved.  The justification for the interest need not be an issue.  Norton’s 
philosophy is derived from Leopold’s land ethic, but he reads it differently than 
Callicot or Rolston.  For instance, Norton argues that Leopold’s land ethic was 
anthropocentric.  Norton makes an important distinction between “strong 
anthropocentrism” and “weak anthropocentrism,” according to which the latter 
means that humans have the tendency to prioritize human welfare, but does not 
exclude consideration of the welfare of the non-human world.  Norton argues that 
Leopold acknowledged several land ethics addressing a variety of interests—
recreational, agricultural, ethical, biological, aesthetic, etc.  The context of 
specific environmental issues should determine how these different ethics can be 
reconciled, not environmental principles.   
This approach offers a way to conceive of religious approaches to 
environmental issues, as well.  Since there are a variety of religious beliefs, there 
will be a variety of positions on the theological or philosophical basis of human-
  38 
nature relations.  However, if religious leaders focus on the outcome of addressing 
policy (e.g., reducing carbon emissions), they can represent a vast majority of the 
human population with a unified consensus.  The justifications for why that 
position is theologically “mandated” or important can be articulated to each 
community in its own religious language.  The basic idea (and the one that I argue 
for in this dissertation) is that scholars of religion and ecology should attend to the 
rhetoric of environmental concern and not assume that the articulation of 
environmental concern should proceed directly from a single tradition’s doctrinal 
or theological commitments.  In terms of environmental ethics, metaphysical 
arguments tend to miss the point.  Andrew Light argues that, as environmental 
ethics is a field of applied ethics, metaphysical arguments do not translate into 
public discourse and therefore fail to contribute to improved environmental 
behavior.  Light compares “rationalist motivational internalism” to 
“methodological environmental pragmatism.”  The former assumes that “the truth 
of a moral requirement guarantees compliance for those who understand it.”49  
The linchpin for “rationalist motivational internalism” in religious 
environmentalism tends to be metaphysical proofs of the interconnectedness of all 
beings.  Methodological pragmatism, alternatively, would not “re-engage the 
meta-ethical and metaphysical debates of environmental ethics, but rather to 
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impress upon environmental philosophers the need to take up the question of what 
would motivate humans to change their attitudes, behaviors, and policy 
preferences toward those more supportive of long-term environmental 
sustainability.”50  
The larger issue for scholars of religion and ecology relates to the 
development of methodologies for how to negotiate these two realms of discourse 
(the interreligious and intrareligious).  Previous work on comparative religions 
does not offer many choices.  Environmental pragmatism, however, in attending 
to context and rhetoric, can provide a sophisticated and relevant model of how 
this negotiation can be theorized. For environmental pragmatists, the question of 
whether nature is morally-considerable or whether anthropocentrism contributes 
to environmental destruction can be resolved in other arenas.  And this is where 
Willis Jenkins’s critique of how environmental pragmatists define what is 
pragmatic appears to miss the point.  He argues that Rolston’s attribution of 
intrinsic value to the natural world is a form of practical rationality and being 
practical, he moves the debate back into the theoretical sphere.  However, debates 
over whether Rolston’s position is a form of practical rationality does not play 
into the specific policy issues that environmental pragmatists want to address.  If 
we distinguish between practical ethics and applied ethics, we can better locate 
Jenkins’s critique.51   
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If we take environmental ethics as a form of practical ethics, then we 
would do what the pragmatists suggest: take a specific environmental case and 
discern which philosophical tools contribute to a solution.  If we are working from 
an applied ethics model, then we’d first need to clarify our philosophical position 
and then attempt to apply it to specific cases.  Jenkins’s critique of environmental 
pragmatism is that it elides many ways of framing a problem, and this may be true 
if the pragmatists are interested in formulating theories to apply to environmental 
issues.  But the pragmatist approach, being civic in nature and taking the 
democratic process as a given, seeks to involve as many people in the decision-
making process as possible so that the outcome, being mutually agreed upon, can 
be put into practice.  That is the basis for what ‘practical’ means in environmental 
pragmatism.  For Jenkins, if Rolston’s intrinsic value theory makes environmental 
issues meaningful for certain communities and individuals and so motivates them 
to address such issues, it can be practical.  This approach can contribute to solving 
the problem of the disjuncture between theory and practice by reading theory as a 
form of practice.  But this understanding of practice may not trigger 
environmental action; it has the potential to be practical but is not practical in 
itself.             
                                                                                                                                     
labels environmental philosophy a form of applied philosophy, but from Jenkins’s 
survey of the field, it seems correct to say that some philosophers take an applied 
approach while others a practical approach.  Of course, the distinction could lead 
to the same posturing caused by Naess’s coining of the phrase “deep ecology” as 
opposed to “shallow ecology”, but perhaps the differing role of the philosopher in 
each approach might mitigate this.  In applied philosophy, the philosopher 
appears to hold a position of authority viz. the community, whereas with practical 
philosophy the philosopher is one participant among many.   
  41 
The above critique should not detract from what is most important in 
Jenkins’s approach, and that is to demonstrate that concern with practicality is an 
undercurrent in both secular and religious environmental thought.  The inherent 
practicality of environmental ethics has been asserted by those associated with 
environmental pragmatism and other environmental philosophers, as well.
52
  This 
means that while there may be lively and crucial debates regarding the normative 
content of various ethical theories (what environmentalism should do), one 
driving force of these debates is the question of how to articulate an ethics that 
will have the strongest impact on environmentalism.  Consequently, if we 
recognize that much of what is offered as environmental ethics is theoretical in 
nature, then it is useful to inquire into two sets relationships: the first between 
theory (the content of environmental ethics) and practice (the goal of 
environmental ethics) and the second between science, as the source of 
environmental information, and religion, as a source of environmental values.  
This inquiry will help us 1) identify the weakness between environmental theory 
and practice and 2) located the layers of environmental discourse that are 
rhetorically poignant.   
 
2.3 The Theory/Practice Gap 
Many environmental philosophers representing different strands of 
environmental philosophy discussed above argue that the goal of environmental 
ethics and philosophy is to provide a basis for environmentalism/environmental 
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practice.  Yet why has environmental philosophy seem to have failed to have a 
significant impact on policy and behavior?
53
  Although the theory/practice gap 
has been addressed by a few scholars, one difficulty that is apparent is in the 
various ways the terms ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ are defined and employed.  For 
example, Anna Peterson addresses several levels of the connection between 
theory and practice in religious environmentalism.  She critiques the dominant 
conception of the relationship between theory and practice: “Environmental 
ethicists need to abandon the idealist assumption of a simple and unidirectional 
relationship between ideas and practice, in which practice is always derivative or 
secondary to ideas and believes that if we get the ideas right, then the practices 
will follow.”54  She asks why the professed ideas and values of environmental 
concern are not always reflected in peoples’ actions.  The values and ideas people 
have about the environment approximates what she means by ‘theory;’ theories 
are organized sets of ideas and values.  Moreover, theories are abstract and rarely 
based on ‘practice,’ which Peterson takes to mean “what people do.”  Arguing 
that ethics based on theories and ideas does not contribute much to changing the 
world, Peterson advocates a practice-based ethics that emerges out of a change in 
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how we live, a change which reflects, here drawing on David Abram, “true or 
right relationships with the more-than-human world.”55  Elsewhere she describes 
environmental ethics “as a type of lived ethics,” whereby “moral systems” are 
“applicable to and livable in” concrete situations.56  Her challenge to make 
environmental ethics a more active force in environmentalism is laudable, but it 
seems that the “talk” still precedes the “walk” (to use the colloquialism she titles 
the paper with.)  How can we establish right and true relationships with nature, or 
establish a practical ethic without first establishing what a true relationship with 
nature is?  Peterson does note that the emergence of a practice-based ethics is 
dialogical, with practice and thought evolving together, but it’s difficult to see 
how we can practice environmentalism without ideas about what that kind of 
action entails.  So the problem is not so much with Peterson’s vision of a practice-
based ethics, but with her broad interpretation of “theory” as environmental ideas 
and values.         
Mick Smith takes up the theory/practice question in developing his “ethics 
of place.”  He begins with a critique of “dominant forms of moral theory” 
(utilitarian, axiological, deontological), arguing that they are all implicated in the 
rationalization of theory, whereby theory becomes a tool of abstraction that 
reinforces environmentally destructive modes of living.  The relation between 
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theory and practice which follows from ethics as an abstract tool is “a relation by 
which theory claims to encapsulate and represent the essential features of moral 
activities and then reapply them.”57  Smith objects to ethics so conceived: “The 
moral considerability of nature need not be a matter of discovering abstract 
criteria by which one can judge such valuations right or wrong in any absolute 
sense.  Rather, ethical values need to be explained and justified in terms of their 
context and origins, their production and their reproduction in particular social 
and environmental circumstances.”58  Drawing on Bourdieu’s notions of habitus 
and theory as reflexive practice, Smith advocates an ethics of place founded 
mutually on the cultivation of an ecological habitus, “a practical sense of what is 
significant and fitting and when and where it is so,” and the ability of theory to 
articulate this ethics, “to frame and construct a ‘moral field’ by re-emphasizing 
and re-inscribing elements of the prevailing social relations, giving voice to some 
aspects of the social (and natural) environment while repressing others.”59  
Smith’s contextualized ethics of place restructures the theory/practice relationship 
by reinterpreting what theory is and should do in a way that is more useful for 
scholars and philosophers, those individuals whose work is given to articulating 
theories.  But, like Peterson, Smith’s notion of practice is still based on a 
preformulated notion of what makes for good environmental practice—a notion 
that includes experiencing nature and developing right relationships with natural 
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subjects and excludes following the dictates of technical, industrial society, but 
goes little further in offering a tangible account of specific environmental 
practice.     
Jenkins emphasis on the practical rationality of environmental strategies 
implies that there is an intimate connection between theory and practice.  He 
suggests that the theorizing of environmental philosophers can be the basis of 
practice-in-action.  In this way, practice is reinterpreted to mean something like 
praxis, or the link between thought and action.  This approach has been explored 
by Habermas, who addresses the theory/practice dichotomy by positing certain 
“interests of knowledge” as the linking factor between theory and practice.60  For 
Habermas, there are interests which underlie the pursuit of knowledge (empirical, 
hermeneutical, and emancipatory) and connect the context of knowledge with the 
possible application of this knowledge.  So these interests structure the way in 
which theories influence norms (here meaning practice).  Combining the 
‘technical’ and the ‘theoretical’ through the common root techné, Habermas 
argues:  
Technical questions are posed with a view to the rationally goal-directed 
organization of means and the rational selection of instrumental 
alternatives, once the goals (values and maxims) are given.  Practical 
questions, on the other hand, are posed with a view to the acceptance or 
rejection of norms, especially norms for action, the claims to validity of 
which we can support or oppose with reasons.  Theories which in their 
structure can serve the clarification of practical questions are designed to 
enter into communicative action.
61
 
                                                 
60
 Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1973), 7-9. 
 
61
 Ibid., 3. 
  46 
   
The analysis illustrates the practical character of theory, a method of discerning 
what we know and how that knowledge can inform action.  In effect, ideas have a 
force (which Peterson mostly discounts) that can help clarify the contours of a 
given situation through the operationalization of terms and concepts which 
structure the way a situation can be perceived.   
This notion of theory is not too different from how Smith defines theory 
vis-à-vis “moral fields.”  But in order to achieve a practice-based ethics, one that 
arises from attending to the environmental issues as problem-driven situations 
facing a community, we must not succumb to first privileging certain actions over 
others (the error Jenkins attributes to environmental pragmatists), which is no 
different from the application of ideas or theories to situations (the error Smith 
attributes to current forms of moral reasoning).  This latter, the application of 
theories to moral situations violates the requirements of developing a 
contextualized ethics since the moral demands of the situation become the object 
of domination by an external subject, which is to say that the moral contours of a 
given situation need to be considered in the decision making process.  
Furthermore, for a practice-based ethics and a practiced-based use of theory, we 
need to avoid allowing every idea free reign in the process of moral decision-
making.  That is to say, although Rolston’s secular intrinsic value theory can be 
considered a form of practical rationality, it need not play out in situations where 
individuals motivated by this view are absent.  By defining either theory or 
practice too broadly, we will be unable to discern the boundaries of specific 
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contexts and situations and thus unable to achieve articulation of what actions fit 
the ethical and moral exigencies of a specific situation. 
Relating theory to practice takes on different contours when we turn more 
specifically to religious environmentalism.  The communities of religious 
adherents tend to be more defined than the “public” with respect to their views of 
the world, society, values.  At the very least, there is a common vocabulary (or 
grammar) already in place.  The challenge is to know how to draw on that 
vocabulary to frame the environment as a religious issue.  This will not ensure 
that all religious people will subsequently become environmentalists, but it offers 
a way of addressing whole communities rather than the individuals that make up 
the general populace.  The theories that are advanced, are, pace Peterson, drawn 
out of the values a religious community holds.  The practice aspect of the 
equation is the carrying out of actions by adherents motivated by the way in 
which the values (theories) are linked to those practices.  The key here is in the 
way the linkage between theory and practice is articulated.  It is possible that 
these communities will be in touch with other communities leading to the 
development of networks of environmentalists who are driven by a sense of 
“mission.”  At least this is the hope of advocates of religious environmentalism.  
Such a resolution of the theory/practice gap does not resolve the problem that 
Peterson or Smith are engaging, but it does suggest that the problem is in part due 
to the scale on which they are working.     
Two difficulties with basing environmentalism in religion can be 
immediately detected.  One concerns the impact religious environmentalism can 
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have on environmental policy.  There are religious lobby groups that do hold 
sway in policy-making, but by making environmentalism a religious issue people 
may feel that it is something that only pertains to their participation in the 
community.  Just as many mainstream religious communities do not engage in 
political action, they would hold the same position with regard to their religious 
environmentalism.  The other difficulty is perhaps larger in scope: the science-
religion connection. 
 
2.4   Religion, Science, and Nature 
I will not attempt to recount the science-religion debate here, but will 
confine myself to looking at how nature alters the landscape of the religion-
science interface.  With respect to the practical orientation of environmentalism, 
there is the question of how environmental/ecological science affects policy.  
Leslie Alm shows how environmental policy and science are poorly linked and so 
the science often doesn’t directly affect the development of policy.  He attributes 
this to several factors, one of which is the complexity of the policy-making 
process in the United States.
62
  However, another challenge to incorporating 
scientific research into the policy process lies in the way that science is perceived.  
On the one hand, science is considered indispensable to understanding 
environmental issues.
63
  On the other hand, science only offers probabilities based 
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on collected data, which counters the desire of policymakers to have an irrefutable 
objective standard of information and simply noting the relative uncertainty of 
scientific data can allow opponents to various policies to undermine confidence in 
the supposed objectivity of the scientific evidence.
64
  These two aspects of the 
role of science in policy-making combine to problematize the use of science in 
environmental policy-making.  Scholars have responded by calling on other 
groups of social actors to influence policy, one of these being religious 
communities and leaders.  If the lines are drawn relating facts to science and 
values to religion, then any consideration of policy which characterizes it as more 
in line with questions of value should lead us to assume that religious 
environmentalism would have a greater impact on policy than environmental 
science.  Conversely, Bryan Norton argues that we cannot and should not separate 
facts from values, since this does not reflect the way that ordinary individuals 
speak about their concerns.  Facts are motivated by values and values are 
strengthened by facts.  My point here is that the separation might in some cases be 
effective depending on the issue and the way a given audience has arranged their 
values to address the issue.  It is possible that addressing an issue by relating it 
more to the values of a religious community can communicate the importance of 
the issue more effectively.   
  Leaving policy aside, one way to approach this triangulation of religion, 
science, and nature is by way of cosmology.  For centuries, it has been common to 
view nature as a source of knowledge revealing universal laws.  Proponents of 
                                                                                                                                     
 
64
 Ibid., 53-59. 
  50 
natural theology relied on the “Book of Nature” as a source of divine revelation; if 
humans understood how the world worked, then they would gain insight into the 
nature of God, the creator of the world.
65
  Although beginning in the 18
th
 century 
natural theology was eclipsed by the rise of the natural sciences and religious 
questions were mostly relegated to a sphere of metaphysics and ethics, the notion 
that the natural world operates according to and participates in a moral system 
discernible by humans has once again become a common theme for some 
religious thinkers.  This reemergence of natural theology (if we may call it that) is 
primarily due to the adaptation and interpretation of concepts associated with 
ecology and ecosystems science.  Thinkers such as Sallie MacFague, Thomas 
Berry, and Tu Weiming have all proposed that the natural world (or the universe) 
possesses a moral sense and structure.  They argue that, in light of increased 
environmental degradation over the last several decades, humans no longer 
maintain the right relationship with the Earth.  They propose that to counteract 
environmental destruction, humans must recognize our place within the natural 
world and reclaim a harmonious relationship with the natural world.  There are 
both problems and merits to this approach.  The merits from an environmentalist 
perspective lie in the use of popular environmental concepts of harmony and 
balance to construct a rhetoric of environmental concern that is appealing to both 
environmentalists and those who are sympathetic to environmentalism but do not 
identify with the traditional left-leaning socio-political orientation of many 
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environmental groups.  The problems with this approach likewise reside in the 
way ostensibly scientific ideas are appropriated and employed in different 
discourses.  This appropriation of ecological science by environmental 
philosophers and eco-theologians has been criticized in two separate but 
interrelated ways. 
One form of the critique states that science is as contingent as any other 
form of knowledge so that drawing universal implications from scientific 
concepts overextends the bounds which may legitimately be addressed by science.  
Stephen Toulmin charts the history of Western cosmological thinking and argues 
that scientific cosmologies are (among other things) myths that serve to order the 
world.  This role of scientific cosmologies follows on the demise of natural 
theology, the field of knowledge which had hitherto been the transmitter of 
cosmological visions.  Toulmin questions the wisdom of viewing the sciences as 
able to deliver pronouncements on the universe as a whole.  He points out that 
science is comprised of multiple disciplines, each having its own context and set 
of questions, “[e]very scientific discipline is marked by its own specialized modes 
of abstraction; and the issues to be considered in each discipline are so defined 
that they can be investigated and discussed independently—in abstraction from—
the issues belonging to other disciplines.”66  The implications of this 
contextualized understanding of scientific knowledge for views of nature affect a 
good many theorists of religion and ecology.  When science or any one science is 
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turned to to explain “the universe” this is qualitatively different than suggesting 
science can assert a law universally; “the fact that a law is a universal one implies 
nothing about the universe-as-a-whole.”67  Scientific discourse operates behind a 
veil of objectivity in which the observing subject, the spectator, is presumed to be 
absent.  This is part of the strength of science as a form of knowledge.  Langdon 
Gilkey notes that “[s]cience is our most reliable and, on one level, our most 
fruitful way of knowing”, but that “scientific inquiry represents an abstraction 
from all that is there, from the richness of the nature that it seeks to 
know…Therefore, when science speaks of the whole—of what ‘is really there’ or 
of ‘all that there is’—it is, strictly speaking, no longer science, though a scientist 
may well be doing the speaking.”68  This limitation of science—that it is not able 
to speak of “all that there is” and still be science—implies that scientific 
cosmologies are either incomplete in scope or must be understood as something 
other than objective.   
Gilkey suggests that we view science as hermeneutical in nature since 
scientists must interpret scientific data as historical and cultural subjects, thus 
yielding scientific theories that are equally products of cultures and histories.  His 
interest is to inquire whether a scientific understanding of nature reveals the 
fullness of nature’s reality (to which he answers it does not), and if not, then is a 
religious understanding of nature possible in the modern world (to which he 
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answer it is).  In order to “make sense” (in the way that David Abram uses the 
term to mean “to make real” or “tangible”)69 of nature, Gilkey argues that we 
should have a hermeneutic trifecta of science, philosophy, theology since each 
approach addresses certain questions the other two cannot.
70
  Gilkey is not exactly 
suggesting a Kantian distinction between science and religion, in which each 
addresses questions that are of no concern to the other.
71
  Rather, he is offering an 
epistemological model of how to approach nature.  Of course, this model is only 
meaningful to a religious individual (and perhaps only to a Jew or Christian), but 
he demonstrates the implications of the limitations of using science to ask 
questions about the meaning of nature and humanity’s relation to nature.      
The other critique is directed at the elaboration of ecological concepts for 
the purpose of establishing a moral metaphysics (secular or religious).  Several 
scholars have questioned the comparison between ecological science and religious 
cosmologies or metaphysics of balance and stability which seeks to demonstrate 
that a religious tradition is inherently or adventitiously ecological.
72
  Mark Sagoff 
observes,  
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Ecological science has moved away from the foundational beliefs that 
nature possesses hidden order—that there are ecological “systems” or 
“communities” the “structure” of which “naturally” or by definition 
excludes human influence.  The environmental movement nevertheless 
continues to to look to science to support its faith that there is a hidden 
order in nature that human beings disrupt because of our “wrongness”—
notably our greed or ignorance or intransigence.  Environmentalists invoke 
science to defend traditional religious views about the relation of humanity 
to nature at a time when science questions those theoretical assumptions.
73
 
 
Toulmin likens the use of scientific theories or terms to support cosmological 
assertions to taking a jig-saw puzzle piece out of the puzzle; it becomes 
meaningless.  He continues by offering a constructive approach: 
Our cosmological ideas about the universe, and about the place of 
humanity within that universe, cannot simply ignore [s]cience; instead 
they must surely be framed in terms that make the best possible sense 
when viewed in the light of our scientific results, without overextending 
the scientific concepts in question.  We cannot afford to embrace the 
results of all the specialized scientific disciplines naively and uncritically; 
but neither can we dismiss them as completely irrelevant, in principle to 
the whole cosmological project.  Rather, we need to look for a middle 
way: considering with more discrimination just what scientific concepts 
and hypotheses are directly relevant to cosmological issues, and with what 
qualifications they can be given wider application.
74
 
 
Toulmin’s suggestion of a middle way seems to be realized in his discussion of 
the mutual ethical implications of ecological science and ecological philosophy, 
that both address the question of how humanity is to live upon the earth.  But the 
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position that he argues most cogently posits hardly any legitimacy for the use of 
scientific concepts outside of their context. Toulmin explains, “[e]xtrapolating the 
restricted concepts and hypotheses of any science, from the self-limited domain of 
phenomena proper to the discipline onto a universal or cosmological scale, will 
therefore be to take an unjustified leap from ‘appearances’ to ‘realities,’ and so 
involve an illegitimate reference.”75  To take scientific theories out of the specific 
disciplinary context and reapply them to another discipline (scientific or not) 
deprives the term of that which makes it scientific.  And if a term’s scientific 
context is the root of its theoretical and practical authority, when it is merely 
transferred to another set of questions, it carries no more weight than any other 
concept used to represent ‘reality.’ 
Robert Kirkman develops a similar critique of the use of terms and 
concepts developed within ecological science by environmental philosophers, 
particularly the strand of environmental philosophy he dubs “speculative 
environmentalism.”76  He states that “they [ecological theories] are useful in their 
contexts, but it is not at all clear that they have relevance in other contexts.  
Indeed, many of the models used by ecologists cannot be usefully borrowed by 
other ecologists studying a different level of living interaction, let alone buy 
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philosophers seeking to inform an ecological worldview.”77  The reason for 
denying the usefulness of cross/interdisciplinary borrowing lies in the history of 
the concept.  As Kirkman explains:  
Ecological concepts and theories have been refined and delimited 
by more than a century of scientific inquiry.  While metaphysical 
organicism is universal in scope, whatever elements of organicism remain 
in ecology are not only tempered by their mixture with other metaphors 
but are also limited to a heuristic role in conceptualizing particular 
terrestrial ecosystems.  The power and authority of an ecological theory 
has been tempered and limited in this way.  Once it has been refined to fit 
a particular context, the organic metaphor cannot be lifted back out again 
and carried to other domains—or merged with metaphysical organicism—
without losing much of its specificity and, as a consequence, all of its 
authority.
78
 
 
Kirkman’s primary concern is to rethink how environmental philosophers 
approach their work.  Unlike Toulmin, he does not try to find the common ground 
between ecological science and philosophy.  Rather, he attempts to show that 
because environmental philosophers have tried to articulate an all-encompassing 
theory of what kind of worldview would solve the environmental crisis, they have 
tended to adopt scientific concepts to bolster the apparent objectivity of their 
theory, making it seem as irrefutable as scientific “fact.”  The proper role for 
environmental philosophers is to facilitate public discussions of environmental 
issues and critically evaluate the arguments put forth for various positions, no 
matter how much or how little science is involved.  Here we must be careful to 
note whether the use of ecology by advocates of religious environmentalism, for 
example, is conveying scientific information or if it is using ecology in the 
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metaphorical sense to suggest an intimate connection between entities as a way of 
promoting a sense of companionship with the nonhuman world that can serve as 
the basis of a nonanthropocentric environmental ethic, an ecological ethic some 
would say.  The line between these two uses is certainly a fine one, and it may not 
always be clear just which usage the author is intending.  I believe we can safely 
assume that the more the author refers to stability of an ecosystem, the greater the 
likelihood that they are pushing a connection between scientific ecology and a 
more metaphysical ecology.  This leads to the second common critique of using 
scientific ideas to support ethical positions.  
Another critique of the application of scientific ecology to 
environmentalism is the degree to which environmental philosophers are truly 
integrating the most current scientific paradigms. Many environmental ethicists, 
both religious and secular, work from the assumption promoted by early and mid-
20
th
 century ecologists that nature, in a natural state, is inherently harmonious and 
stable.  From this assumption they argue that if we model human ethical behavior 
on nature, human societies will naturally achieve harmony among themselves and 
with the larger natural world.  This paradigm has been challenged to the point of 
being refuted, with works like Daniel Botkin’s Discordant Harmonies arguing 
persuasively that while there are varying spheres of regulation within natural 
systems, there is no static harmony that rules overall: “Wherever we seek to find 
constancy we discover change.”79  The concern for environmental philosophers 
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advocating the land ethic is how to apply Leopold’s claim that “what is right” is 
based on whether it supports the stability of the ecosystem.  If there is no stability, 
how do we define environmental value?  Callicot has responded that we simply 
emphasize the integrity of the ecosystem, which encompasses both equilibrium 
and disequilibrium.  In terms of religion and ecology, the concern is how to 
respond to the impact of the new ecology on the belief that the stewardship ethic 
is focused on maintaining the harmony of the ecosystem.  What are the 
theological implications of the claim that all is in flux? 
Lisa Sideris argues that when scholars of religion advocate the 
compatibility of scientific and religious worldviews by referring to the shared 
characteristic of harmony and balance evident in both ecology and religion, they 
are ignoring a host of facts about ecosystems that concern instability, predation, 
and flux. Sideris argues that Darwinian evolution and its concepts of natural 
selection have been ignored by many ecotheologians and environmental ethicists 
in favor of pre-Darwinian views of nature: “ecological theology tends to give 
priority to the concept of ecology—and a particular interpretation of ecology—
rather than evolution.”80  Ecotheologians like McFague, Reuther, and Moltmann 
ignore the “ugly” aspects of Darwinian evolution, in favor of the implications that 
humans are part of the web of life, a web characterized by harmony.  This leads 
these thinkers to advocate imposing harmony on nature, thus “saving” or 
“redeeming” nature, a move which Sideris argues violates basic ecological 
principles.  The term ecology is used by these theologians and philosophers as a 
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stand-in for notions of harmony, order, community, and stability.  But these 
“ecological paradigms…are not only too vague, but too one-dimensional as well.  
They continue to capture only one aspect of nature.”81  Sideris’s argument 
questions the adequacy of referring to an ecological theology or environmental 
ethic as scientific if it ignores Darwinian theories; if these philosophies are based 
on science, they are only partially so.
82
  
Nonetheless, the fact that anthropogenic effects on the environment have 
put an “end to nature” is not refuted by claiming that natural systems at times 
experience instability, by claiming that there has never been a ‘nature’ that 
corresponds to human perceptions.  Daniel Botkin, in fact, while arguing that 
there is no stability in nature, still insists that humans understanding this 
instability is critical to establishing a harmony between humanity and the non-
human world.
83
  Peter S. White goes even farther and argues that there is balance 
at the level of the multipatch scale, but this balance is contingent upon regularly 
occurring disturbances.
84
  White’s analysis that humans should understand the 
balance in change leads to conclusions similar to Botkin’s—humans need to 
maintain a balance in the degree to which they affect ecosystems, whether or not 
there is an inherent stability or balance to natural environments.  So, there is still 
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plenty of room for scholars to consider what kind of ethics (secular and religious) 
would promote behavior that does not threaten or harm those processes that are 
marked by stability.   
I argue that the human/nature relationship that scholars of religion and 
ecology are addressing is primarily informed by what Rappaport calls a “cognized 
model” of the environment.85  This is an understanding of the environmental that 
is based on not only natural objects (this objective view Rappaport calls the 
“organizational model”) but on human values and beliefs.  So, while Sideris 
argues that ecotheologians are incorrect in the way they characterize how a 
Christian sees the environment, I would counter that Sideris fails to account for 
the fact that these thinkers (and others in Judaism, Buddhism, etc.) are first of all 
concerned with understanding how a Christian sees the environment.  This is the 
move that Anna Peterson emphasizes and the one which is of prime importance in 
any attempt to articulate a religious environmental ethic.  Sideris’s own proposal 
for a Christian ethic of care draws heavily upon Rolston (whose theocentrism is 
somewhat in line with a cognized model) and ultimately is roughly similar to 
what Peterson proposes. 
Finally, one of the most prominent criticisms of environmental theology 
and ethics derives from the so-called failure to observe the distinction between 
“is” and “ought,” also called the naturalistic fallacy—asserting that the “is” of 
nature provides a legitimate, normative “ought” for human behavior.  Sideris, for 
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her part, clarifies that she does not regard this problematic among the thinkers she 
critiques but states that they are simply relying on the wrong “is” to derive their 
“ought.”86  Other scholars see this is an intractable problem for environmental 
philosophers.    The implications for religion are that scholars no longer have the 
freedom to invoke natural harmony as the metaphysical correlate of a religious 
cosmology.  This issue is more pressing for the Abrahamic traditions for which 
the created order is the result of divine action.  But it is also important for Chinese 
worldviews which have been influenced by centuries of correlative thinking and a 
system of cosmic order based on the heavens (tian 天), Dao (dao 道), or the 
supreme ultimate (taiji 太極).  However, some scholars have argued that 
Buddhism is well-equipped to respond to this observation of nature-as-flux, since 
a central tenet of the tradition is that all things are impermanent.
87
    
In the next section, I will examine the intersection between the secular 
approach outlined above and approaches to constructing an environmental ethic 
within the field of religious studies (hereafter referred to as religion and ecology).  
I will look at how cosmological and normative religious studies approaches 
integrate or rely on nonanthropocentrism and why such approaches may reject or 
downplay its significance.   
 
2.5 Religion and Ecology 
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2.5.1 Anthropological beginnings 
Studying the intersection of religion and the environment need not begin 
with looking at the field of religion and ecology, because the intersection has 
already been a subject of inquiry for some anthropologists for decades.  In fact, 
we might even argue that anthropology began as the study of religious views of 
nature, taking E.B. Tylor’s theory of animism as our starting point.  But this does 
not capture the sense of ecology as the study of relationships between objects in 
an ecosystem.  Even with this qualification, it can be argued that the field began 
with the work of Roy Rappaport and his study of the Tsembaga.  Rappaport 
argues that religious rituals of the Tsembaga are crucial in regulating their 
resource use.
88
  Other anthropologists who took similar approaches include 
Marvin Harris and Åke Hultkrantz.  Leslie Sponsel refers to this branch of 
anthropology as “ecological anthropology.”  This work differs from what is 
associated with the field of religion and ecology primarily in the absence of any 
normative component to the work.  Interestingly, Sponsel argues for greater 
involvement by anthropologists in activist issues: “a major challenge for 
anthropologists and other academics is to reach beyond basic research to actually 
apply knowledge and engage I advocacy to help protect indigenous religious 
freedom and its sacred places as well as the environmentally friendly nature of the 
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spiritual, cultural, and historical ecology of the overwhelming majority of such 
societies.”89   
The field of religion and ecology developed much later than that of 
environmental philosophy and environmental ethics, although the earliest work in 
both fields is contemporaneous (e.g., the articles by Lynn White and Christopher 
Stone).  Therefore, scholarship in the field of Religion and Ecology has inherited 
many of the debates from environmental ethics.  This heritage is due in part to the 
legacy of Lynn White’s seminal article in 1967, which has delimited the ways in 
which scholars of religion think about the connection between religion and 
ecology/environment.
90
  The first responses to environmental issues with 
reference to religion came from theologians refuting or agreeing with Lynn 
White.  Afterward, articles appeared pertaining to every religious tradition that 
wrestled with the question of anthropocentrism as it pertains to the worldview of a 
given tradition.  The dominant trend has been to side with White, as well as 
prominent environmental philosophers Holmes Rolston, III and J. Baird Callicott, 
in advocating a turn away from anthropocentric worldviews.  But this move in 
environmental ethics has tended to divorce environmental ethics from 
environmental policy and resulted in making environmental ethics a discussion 
that takes place only among environmental philosophers.  In religion and ecology,  
this move has resulted in the attempt to show by hook or crook that the religious 
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tradition one worked on was truly nonanthropocentric.  As the conversation 
developed, religionists (theologians and other scholars of religion) turned to the 
arguments made by environmental philosophers and ethicists to build their own 
positions.   
Another aspect of much of the early work on religion and ecology 
highlights ethics as the way in which religions can contribute to environmental 
thought.  The importance of examining the anthropocentric bias of a religious 
worldview has hardly been ignored, and several attempts are made to advocate a 
nonanthropocentric approach to religion, with the religious traditions of India and 
China pointed to as particularly appropriate examples.  However, the main 
positions offered primarily by Christian and Jewish theologians refer to the 
stewardship ethic or an ethics of care.  One obvious aspect of these two ethical 
responses is that they are decidedly anthropocentric.  Since both Christianity and 
Judaism maintain a special relationship between humanity and God, 
representative scholars are reluctant to entertain the possibility of a 
nonanthropocentric religious ethic of the environment.  To favor interests of the 
natural world over human interests, for many, is tantamount to paganism.
91
  Even 
Lynn White, a historian and not a theologian or philosopher, for all his invectives 
concerning nonanthropocentrism, concludes by endorsing an ethic of care based 
on the figure of St. Francis of Assisi.   
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Although there is a tradition of indiscriminate usage of the concept of 
ecology, and while a satisfactory definition of the term may be difficult to obtain, 
to use the term as a stand-in for interrelatedness or harmony makes the supposed 
dialogue of religion and ecology less a conversation of “dual logics” and more a 
semantic sleight of hand.  I will look at three labels below—religion and ecology 
(emphasizing worldviews and cosmologies), religion and nature, and religious 
environmentalism—and characterize them based on the ways in which those who 
use the term to characterize their research approach this intersection between 
religion and ecology/nature/environmentalism.    
2.5.2 Worldviews and the Anthropocentrism Debate  
 The anthropocentrism debate has understandably given rise to questions of 
worldview. As humans continue to explore ways to address the environmental 
crisis—delimited by problems such as depletion of resources, severe pollution of 
water, air, and soil, the unquantifiable effects of anthropogenic climate change—
scholars, scientists, activists, and community leaders are seeking ways to 
encourage humans to reorient their behavior towards more environmentally 
beneficial lifestyles.  A religious response is becoming more common.  Perhaps 
this helps frame environmentalism as related to one’s “ultimate concern,” or 
perhaps religion offers a source of community building along the lines of which a 
larger community can be created out of smaller religious communities, all of 
which share a common environmental concern.  But what are the guiding 
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questions of this inquiry, and what are the aims of those involved?  The central 
problematic as articulated by Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim reads: 
In trying to reorient ourselves in relation to the earth, it has become 
apparent that we have lost our appreciation for the intricate nature of matter 
and materiality.  Our feeling of alienation in the modern period has extended 
beyond the human community and its patterns of material exchanges to our 
interaction with nature itself.  Especially in technologically sophisticated 
urban societies, we have become removed from the recognition of our 
dependence on nature.  We no longer know who we are as earthlings; we no 
longer see the earth as sacred.
92
  
Elsewhere Tucker and Grim are more explicit about the contributions 
religious traditions can make to the enterprise of stemming the currents of 
environmentally destructive practices that have become so common in the past 
several decades.  However, this passage is instructive because it illustrates what 
has become the basic focus of the religion and ecology field—humans must 
reconstruct a relationship with the earth/natural world based on the perception of 
the earth as sacred.  But is this perception acceptable in every tradition?  Is it 
possible for all religions, as Tucker claims, to enter an ecological phase? And if so, 
what would this entail for any singular religious tradition—any one of which is a 
complex of extensive historical, philosophical, social, and cultural factors?   
Tucker, Grim, and Tu Weiming have followed Thomas Berry’s lead in 
emphasizing that a change in worldview needs to take place.  They couple this 
assertion with the observation that worldviews and cosmologies are intimately 
related, advancing the notion that the “ecological phase” of religion will arise out 
                                                 
92
 Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim, series forward to Confucianism and 
Ecology: The Interrelation between Heaven, Earth, and Humans, eds. Mary 
Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1998), xvi-xvii. 
  67 
of the recognition that the universe is a matrix of interrelatedness.
93
  This 
recognition will give rise to a change in consciousness regarding the human place 
in the world.  They argue that “[d]ialogue between religion and ecology 
can…assist in awakening a renewed appreciation for the intricate cosmological 
web of life in which we dwell.”94  Such a change in consciousness will be 
supported by cosmologies which undergird many Asian religious traditions, 
although these scholars argue that the same resources are present in Judaism, 
Islam, and Christianity, as well.   
            Some work has been done to downplay the seeming incompatibility of 
religion with nonanthropocentrism.  From a theological approach ecofeminist 
theologians Sallie McFage and Rosemary Radford Reuther have attempted to 
account for ecological science by developing theologies that support holistic 
positions emphasizing the role of human action in maintaining and respecting the 
stability and harmony of the ecosystem.  Although they ultimately advocate a 
modified stewardship ethic or ethics of care, they push the envelope of what 
might be considered doctrinally acceptable in the degree to which human interests 
are delimited by the health of the ecosystem (a concept that has begun to undergo 
some significant revisions).  Needless to say, they draw heavily on Rolston’s 
work to push their ecotheologies towards a more nonanthropocentric position.  
Similar work has been done in Jewish theology by Arthur Waskow.  Also, both 
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Jewish and Christian theologians have turned to their mystical traditions as 
resources for developing a nonanthropocentric theology.  Whether employing 
concepts of nonduality found in Meister Ekhart and Kabbalah will resonate 
broadly with Christians and Jews remains to be seen. 
            It is worth mentioning one approach which distinguishes worldviews and 
religions.  Richard Foltz observes that the growing interest in the environment by 
scholars of religious studies reflects the recognition that questions of values and 
worldviews are important to environmental discussions.  But Foltz states that the 
label religion and ecology may not, in fact, be the most accurate label for this new 
academic field, “since ‘ecology’ is term that religious studies scholars use 
differently than biologists, and ‘religion,’ despite explanations to the contrary, is 
likely to produce “unnecessary (and, in this case, undesirable) category 
restrictions in the minds of many people.”95  Most of the chapters in Foltz’s book 
follow the same world religions taxonomy, but he includes chapters on 
Ecofeminism, Deep Ecology, and Third World cultures to show how worldviews 
can speak in terms approximating religious discourse but outside of the specific 
discourses of the world religions. 
2.5.3 Religious Cosmologies and Narrative 
Not every stance on religion and ecology takes ethics to be central.  There 
is a current of scholarship that views cosmology as the central issue in articulating 
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the connection between religion and the environment.  Cheng Chungying offers a 
definition of environmental ethics that highlights the importance of cosmology: 
As the goal of an ethics of the environment is to understand how human 
beings should relate to the environment via a true understanding of the 
environment, we may see how a metaphysical inquiry into the structure 
and process of the environment also constitutes a teleological inquiry into 
the nature of the environment in relation to man.
96
  
Cheng’s definition implies the normative claim that apprehending humanity’s 
relationship to the environment has some positive transformative effect.  
Cosmology, then, for some scholars provides a bridge between the structure of the 
universe and the human place in that universe.  This position is rooted in the work 
of Thomas Berry and has been developed by scholars of Christianity, 
Confucianism, and Buddhism.  Berry’s central point, as he states in his work The 
Dream of the Earth, is that humans need a new narrative.
97
  The old Judeo-
Christian narrative of human superiority is exclusively anthropocentric and, 
therefore, no longer viable as a source of human meaning.  The narrative that 
Berry advocates, dubbed the “universe story,” is a cosmic narrative based on 
evolution.
98
  This story, Berry contends, will evoke awe and wonder in humans 
when confronted with the immensity of the world in which humans are but one 
inhabitant.   
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Berry is clearly responding here to the criticisms made by White and 
others regarding the anthropocentric bias of the Christian tradition.  Berry 
suggests that the alternative narrative must be evolutionary in nature and illustrate 
how humans are one specific development among a vast array of different beings 
that make up the cosmos.  Berry does not see that such a cosmic, evolutionary 
narrative compromises a belief in the sacrality of life, since Darwinian evolution 
need not imply the lack of a spiritual essence of existence.  As a Catholic priest, 
Berry’s position does not deviate from that endorsed by the Church.  But he does 
seem to venture beyond the prescribed catechetical ground by extending the 
implication of his new narrative to include a cosmic holism.  In this respect, Berry 
come close to the position of Rolston, and to a lesser degree Callicott.  
            Mary Evelyn Tucker, a student of Berry’s and scholar of Confucianism, 
has been a main proponent of the cosmological argument.  She finds that such an 
approach is wholly consistent with the way in which Neo-Confucianism, 
particularly the philosophy of Wang Yangming, describes the relationship 
between ethics and human spiritual development.  Tucker emphasizes that it is 
imperative for humans to have a transformation of consciousness, through which 
they come to realize that their individual existence is intimately related to the 
existence of all other things in a cosmic whole.  Following the arguments made by 
Neo-Confucians, this realization of cosmic oneness will lead humans to inevitably 
act in accord with nature, nature here being construed in a cosmic sense.  The 
apparent upshot of this cosmological approach is that is does what most secular 
philosophers are wary of: it derives ethical “ought” from an ontological “is.”  But 
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this is not a problem for Tucker, Berry, and others, since the universe has its own 
laws.  When humans act in the interest of the whole, they are doing what is right.  
Actions issuing from the point of view of cosmic realization are considered to be 
naturally in accord with the structure of the universe.  Since humans are part of 
nature, their understanding of this oneness means that their actions will uphold the 
stability and integrity of the [eco]system, to paraphrase Leopold.  
            Max Oelschlaeger and Anna Peterson have both attempted to chart a 
course incorporating the secular position, religious ethical position, and religious 
cosmological position.  Oelschlaeger suggests, in Caring for Creation, that 
narrative is the key to formulating a religious articulation of an environmental 
ethic, “[t]here are no solutions for the systematic causes of ecocrisis, at least in 
democratic societies, apart from religious narrative.”99  His approach is 
reminiscent of Berry’s, but he differs in the way he defines narrative.  For 
Oeschlaeger, narrative is an element of language.  The narrative is the source of 
the ethical imperative and not simply an onto-cosmic description.  Moreover, the 
narrative contextualizes the metaphor he bases his argument on—“caring for 
creation.”  Religious narrative carries a cosmological orientation since narrative is, 
for Oeschlaeger a part of religious discourse.  Arguing that “[r]eligious discourse 
enables the sacred canopy, the overarching structure that grounds human 
beingness in a meaningful cosmos,” Oelschlaeger claims that the legitimating 
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narrative of creation justifies and catalyzes ethical concern for the environment.
100
  
In religious discourse, the environment attains cosmological ethical relevance.  
Oelschlaeger, like Gottlieb, is focused on those who share in the Judeo-Christian 
creation narrative, although he argues that every individual, religious or not, 
shares some kind of belief in a creation of some sort.  This claim is weak in the 
context of Oelschlaeger’s argument, since he repeatedly refers to the creation 
story in Genesis as his ideal case.  But the argument is strong in the way he links 
religious narrative, meaning, interest, and action.  He notes that humans often 
justify their ideological positions in the context of narrative; therefore, 
highlighting a common narrative regarding the natural world, as an object that 
warrants our caring concern, is the best way to ensure and motivate consensus on 
environmental issues.  Oeschleager is focused on the cognitive effect of 
cosmological narrative, but the thrust of his argument lies in the rhetorical impact 
that the narrative can have.  The importance of rhetorical discourse to 
Oeschlaeger’s argument is a feature that I will take up in the next chapter.  
            Anna Peterson follows up on Oelschlaeger’s narrative approach and 
incorporates a variety of views of what being human means, but focuses on 
revisioning a Christian theological anthropology.  She argues that narrative is 
crucial to theological anthropology, the religious understanding of what it means 
to be human.  Drawing on the same concepts of humans as members of a larger 
“household” found in secular nonanthropocentric views, Peterson argues that 
Christianity needs a revised narrative of human situatedness in the world.  Such a 
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narrative is crucial to revising the Christian theological anthropology and bringing 
it in accord with a Christian ethics of care.  Peterson’s narrative is built upon the 
foundation of a revised theological anthropology.  From her analysis of alternative 
notions of self—drawing on non-Christian traditions, evolution, and theories of 
relationality, Peterson argues for a “chastened constructionism” that sees the 
human being as a product of its relations, limited by its corporeality, “in and of 
the world.”101  Not only is our understanding of what it means to be human 
revised, but our understanding of the nature of the world is also altered.  The role 
of narrative is that it can contextualize and make this revised anthropology 
consonant with a lived ethics; narrative offers a way to make ethics real and 
meaningful so that humans have guidance for how to live in this new-found 
universe.   
            Peterson’s position is the most well-articulated and well-reasoned 
compromise between the inherent anthropocentrism in Christian theology and the 
nonanthropocentrism of contemporary environmental ethics and ecological 
thought.  The limitations of her approach for a broad construction of religious 
nonanthropocentrism derive from the fact that her ethics of care is centrally 
located in Christian theism.   
2.5.4 Religion and Nature 
            Needless to say, the focus on cosmology and worldview is not the sole 
approach for scholars of religion and ecology.  Bron Taylor, author of Dark 
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Green Religion and editor of the Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, moves 
away from the “greening of religions” approach to highlight what he terms “dark 
green religion.”  He claims that previous scholarship has tended to marginalize 
certain people and does not adequately account for the pervasiveness of a new 
religious worldview independent of the established world religions.
102
  The 
predominant approach that has characterized the field in forums such as the series 
of “World Religions and Ecology” conferences at Harvard (1996-1998) and the 
Religion and Ecology Group in the American Academy of Religion, according to 
Taylor, tends to emphasize mainstream religions and traditions.  Taylor points out 
that because the published volumes that were the product of the conferences, “did 
not consistently look to the margins, where religious innovation tends to be most 
intense,” they failed to live up to the goal of “a creative revisioning” set forth in 
the series forward of each volume.  Using a “family resemblances” approach to 
religion, he seeks to promote a less normative approach to the field than that 
characteristic of the cosmological/worldviews model.  Rather than addressing the 
recognized world religions, he seeks to establish “dark green religion” as an entity 
independent from animism and the ‘greening’ of world religions.  Therefore, he 
argues that by only addressing the question of how established world religions can 
construct and articulate an environmental ethic (the normative approach), we fail 
to recognize and thus be able to describe the rise of ‘dark green religion’ as a 
socio-political force in the contemporary world.  Taylor’s work broadens the 
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scope of inquiry and also tempers the tendency to reduce religious 
environmentalism to a branch of religious environmental ethics.  To be clear, 
Taylor does not reject the contributions made by scholars working on the various 
‘world religions.’  But he does argue that this approach fails to account for a vast 
and growing number of individuals who interact and respond to the natural world 
in “religious modes” (awe, reverence, etc.) but who do not identify with one of 
the major world religions or with any religious organization or institution.                  
            Following these critiques, Taylor advocates the use of “religion and 
nature,” partly because this distinguishes his approach from the mainstream 
religions approach of religion and ecology and also because of the interpretive 
possibilities in using ‘nature.’  He examines the history and implications of 
various labels given to the phenomenon of religious concern for/with nature such 
as ‘nature religion’ and ‘green religion,’ to which he adds his own term “dark 
green religion,” which he explains partially through a fourfold taxonomy 
consisting of “Gaian Spirituality,” “Gaian Naturalism,” “Spiritual Animism,” and 
“Naturalistic Animism.”103  These four forms of dark green religion represent 
different modalities of the human-nature relationship; none of them, however, are 
founded on the worldviews of mainstream religions.  Taylor’s work suggests that 
one’s worldview is integrally related to one’s beliefs about the value and 
importance of the natural world and one’s environmentally-related behavior.  But 
by arguing for the rise and importance of dark green religion as a social force, he 
offers a way to think about religion and nature that is at once practical and 
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intellectual.  That is to say, there are beliefs, characteristics, and practices of dark 
green religion that can be identified and analyzed, but he also attempts to show 
that many environmentalists at all levels of social activism base their activism in a 
religious view of nature.  In this sense the influence of religion on 
environmentalism takes on a new relevance, although the way we think about 
religion will need to broaden.  
2.5.5 Religious Environmentalism 
Roger Gottlieb has also offered an alternative path for understanding the 
field, which he labels “religious environmentalism.”  He defines religious 
environmentalism as “one part of a global movement that seeks to integrate the 
most creative, humane, and hopeful parts of both secular society and religious 
tradition.”104  His argument is clearly normative in nature, as he attempts to show 
how religion broadly construed, possesses the resources for advancing 
environmental policy measures through tapping into the democratic process, but, 
like Taylor, he emphasizes the need to attend to experience and motivation among 
communities for promoting and incorporating environmental concern into their 
religious and communal vision.  Gottlieb’s work is unique in that it shows that 
religion can affect the environmental movement without having to affect a change 
in consciousness first.     
            Roger Gottlieb’s normative approach is similar to Katz’s work.  Gottlieb 
argues that couching environmental ethics in the discourse of religious concern is 
the best way to develop an effective environmental ethic.  Gottlieb emphasizes 
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that the religious aspects of environmentalism offer a way of thinking about 
“human beings as more than simply their social or physical selves,” which makes 
humans (or rather human behavior) the focus of religious environmentalism.
105
  
This focus on human beings suggests an anthropocentric focus to his work, but 
this anthropocentrism is rather of the sort that Norton calls “weak 
anthropocentrism” since religious environmentalism is anthropocentric to the 
degree that religions are anthropocentric.  Gottlieb directs his attention away from 
the concern with philosophical values, per se, and towards the role religion plays 
in society.  He laments what he sees as a turn away from ‘nature’ and ‘creation’ to 
‘the environment,’ as this turn signals a loss of the sense of the sacred in nature.106  
He is especially concerned with how religious discourse adds depth and urgency 
to what are commonly assumed to be social issues.  He essentially states that the 
environment is de facto a religious issue, since for religious communities to fulfill 
their stated commitments to promoting human well-being, they must address the 
environment.  Furthermore, Gottlieb argues that religion has been a valuable part 
of American democracy since the country’s inception, and so religious 
perspectives are vital to the process of policy articulation and implementation.                   
The role religion plays in environmentalism in the religious environmentalism 
approach strikes a middle-ground between the cosmology/worldviews approach 
and Taylor’s “dark green religion.”   
                                                 
105
 Ibid., xii. 
 
106
 Ibid., 31. 
  78 
His book, A Greener Faith, is culturally relevant to mainly North America 
and mainly addresses a Christian/Jewish American audience.  In the chapter “Five 
Faces of Religious Environmentalism,” Gottlieb’s five representatives are all 
North American, three Christian, one Jewish, and one Native American (Sioux).  
But he discusses Buddhist groups in Taiwan and Sri Lanka, an indigenous African 
religious group in Zimbabwe, and mentions other religion-associated 
environmental campaigns outside of North America.  These descriptions 
correspond to the institutional focus that is inherent in the cosmology/worldviews 
approach.  Religious institutions have the authority to validate and promote the 
worldviews that are considered dominant for a particular religious tradition.  The 
religious traditions that Gottlieb references, whether they be Christian, Buddhist, 
or indigenous, are promoted by religious institutions and have status as “world 
religions.”   
            But alternatively, Gottlieb refers to ‘spirituality’ as a mode of religious 
being that reflects an individual’s own religious sensibilities.  Concurring with 
Taylor, Gottlieb notes that, in many cases, people refer to experiences of 
reverence, awe, and mystery being based in experiences of nature.
107
  This might 
seem to be crossing into the realm of mysticism, but Gottlieb argues:  
It must be stressed that that language of love, awe, and reverence, 
of nature’s capacity to heal and comfort, are not, as some might suppose, 
simply the province of poetic and private individuals…Rather, for many in 
the environmentalist community, these kinds of experiences of nature are 
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essential to why they became active environmentalists, and to why they 
continue the struggle throughout their lives.
108
            
Gottlieb’s work is a good example of how and why religious ethics should 
account for environmental concerns without becoming entwined in ontological 
and metaphysical intricacies and without becoming overburdened by definitions 
of religion.  Like Taylor, he provides ample evidence for the pervasiveness of 
environmental concern in religious communities and in the individual human 
concern for nature that goes beyond the organized and often mainstream religious 
community.  One lacunae of the work, though, is in its focus on religious 
environmentalism in North America.  He certainly refers to groups globally, but 
the way in which he defines religious environmentalism places it in the wider 
phenomenon of environmentalism, alongside (and sometimes overlapping with) 
secular environmentalism.  But this definition of environmentalism, with its focus 
on the individual and the kinds of campaigns environmentalists engage in, raises 
the question of alternative religious environmentalisms, perhaps alternative, 
localized environmentalisms.  This is not intended as a critique but is a natural 
outcome of a work that seeks to address such broad concepts and phenomena as 
religion and nature without confining itself to a single tradition.   
            Nonetheless, I find Gottlieb’s approach appealing because it creates space 
for both mainstream world religions and alternative religiosities or spiritualities to 
be addressed under one heading: religious environmentalism.  The use of the 
phrase ‘religious environmentalism’ is also felicitous in that it does not pit 
religion against environmentalism or nature, but seeks to circumscribe a mode of 
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engaging in environmentalism that is informed by religious beliefs and practices, 
however those may be defined.  It is superior to the worldviews approach, since 
worldviews are not often easily articulated or understood by individuals not only 
because they consist of sometimes unexamined beliefs and ideas, but also because 
any one individual may operate according to a bricolage of worldviews, not all of 
which are religious.    
2.6 Examples from Judaism, and Confucianism 
In the following section, I will briefly present how two religious 
traditions—Judaism, and Confucianism—have been analyzed with reference to 
the religion and ecology approach.  This comparison should reveal that focusing 
on worldview alone, if one attends to the uniqueness of each tradition does not 
lead to a unified view of what is to be done; that is to say, there is no common 
path for the greening of the world’s religions.  By illustrating the differences 
between a Jewish ecology and Confucian ecology, I hope to show that for each 
religious tradition, scholars should attend to the operative concepts and practices.  
Not every religion contains the same resources nor do those resources interact in 
the same way.  At the risk of misapplying a scientific concept: the chemistry 
internal to each tradition that might offer a solution to environmental problems 
must be seen in the conditions relevant to that mixture.   
2.6.1 Confucianism 
Confucianism provides a good example of how scholars use the 
worldviews/ cosmological approach to articulate the contours of a specific 
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tradition’s environmental ethics.  Confucianism presents an interesting case, too, 
in that the degree to which Confucianism is a religion on par with Western 
traditions is uncertain, with the question “who is a Confucian” being difficult to 
answer.  On these grounds we might suggest that Confucianism is one part of a 
larger Chinese worldview.  Following this model, there is some work which treats 
Confucianism alongside Daoism.
109
  Finally, one of the major contributors to the 
cosmological position, Mary Evelyn Tucker, is a Confucian specialist.   
In general the major concepts that scholars have offered as the foundations 
for a Confucian environmental ethic are qi 氣 (material force) and Dao 道 (way). 
These concepts entail a nonanthropocentric view of the world or, to use the term 
advocated by Tu Weiming: ‘anthropocosmic.’  These approaches affirm the Neo-
Confucian vision that Heaven, Earth, and humanity (tian di ren 天地人) are 
ontologically unified by the shared principle and that all things are permeated by 
qi. However, apart from achieving sagehood by virtue of this transformative 
vision, how this translates into a practicable ethic is unclear.  The presumption 
here is that a cosmological vision of ontological unity provides the basis out of 
which ethical behavior arises, and that one’s actions are the natural result of one’s 
ability to see this unity.   
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In Confucian terms, cosmology connects ‘that which is above form’ 
(xing’er shang形而上) to ‘that which is below form (xing’er xia形而下).  The 
connection between xing’er shang and xing’er xia suggests that the universe, 
although diverse, is ontologically whole, an argument usually made with 
reference to the presence of “principle” (li 理) in all things.  Whether or not this is 
true of all Confucian thinkers, the ontological holism of the cosmos based on li 
allows scholars like Tucker and Tu to claim that how we ought to relate to the 
universe is based on the ontological structure of the universe.  That is to say, in 
Confucian approaches to environmental ethics, the is/ought dichotomy, as averred 
in Western environmental philosophy, is unproblematic.  The positions of Tucker 
and Tu, then, approache the inherent value arguments of Holmes Rolston, III, in 
the sense that inherent value in nature exists by virtue of the fact that all things are 
part of an ontological whole.  A transformative realization of this wholeness 
becomes the goal and method of Confucian environmental ethics.   
As further illustration of the how goal and cultivation are collapsed into 
one, Mary Evelyn Tucker identifies two aspects to Neo-Confucian philosophy, a 
‘transformative ethics and naturalist cosmology’ as integral to the Neo-Confucian 
worldview.
110
  The naturalist cosmology reaffirms the interconnectedness of all 
things and the transformative ethics arises out of a recognition of this 
interconnectedness.  Based on this foundation, she claims that self-cultivation is a 
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deepening of the “basic sense of connection” between heaven, earth, and humans, 
a deepening that is compared to “planting and nourishing seeds” and other organic 
metaphors.
111
  
From these descriptions, we can see how Tucker contextualizes the 
discourse of environmental ethics in the language of Neo-Confucian ethics.  Since 
the images used to describe self-cultivation are naturalistic, the process of self-
cultivation increases the sense of interconnection between one’s self and the 
natural world.  It is unclear, though, how ‘seeds of virtue’ are nourished, nor is it 
shown how self-cultivation leads to the kind of transformation harmonizing self 
and cosmos.    
Responding to debates in contemporary environmental ethics regarding 
the distinction between anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric ethics, Tu 
Weiming argues that Confucianism is ‘anthropocosmic.’  This term 
‘anthropocosmic’ implies that humans are situated in a triadic relationship with 
the universe, or Heaven and Earth (tiandiren天地人).  Tu also states that “the 
Confucian way is a way of learning, learning to be human.  Learning to be human 
in the Confucian spirit is to engage oneself in a ceaseless, unending process of 
creative self-transformation, both as a communal act and as a dialogical response 
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to Heaven.”112  This statement contains hints of both anthropocosmism and 
anthropocentrism.  In fact, the beginning seems decidedly anthropocentric.   
In addition to the characterization of Confucianism as ‘anthropocosmic’, 
Tu emphasizes the Confucian focus on apprehending the unity of Heaven, Earth, 
and humans.  He refers to ‘forming one body’ with Heaven and Earth as a way to 
describe the process of moral cultivation: “In the metaphorical sense, then, 
forming one body with the universe requires continuous effort to grow and refine 
oneself…Selfish desires are forms of self-centeredness that belittle the authentic 
human capacity to take part in the transformation process of Heaven and 
Earth.”113  Tu’s language in this passage clarifies why Confucianism is not to be 
construed as anthropocentric.  Anthropocentrism prevents humans from achieving 
unity with Heaven and earth.  To verify the anthropocosmic (or 
nonanthropocentric) position of Neo-Confucianism, both Tu and Tucker, along 
with several other scholars, turn to Zhang Zai’s “Western Inscription”:      
Heaven is my Father and Earth is my mother, and even such a 
small creature as I finds an intimate place in their midst.  Therefore, that 
which extends throughout the universe I regard as my body and that which 
directs the universe I consider as my nature.  All people are brothers and 
sisters, and all things are my companions… The great ruler [the emperor] 
is the eldest son of my parents [Heaven and Earth], and the great ministers 
are his stewards.
114
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Zhang Zai’s passage is directed towards human society and the moral activity of 
the sage.  The wording of the first section of the “Western Inscription” is 
undeniably consonant with an ecologically holistic vision, one that supports Tu 
and Tucker’s anthropocosmic claim.  The metaphysical orientation of the text, 
then, can be said to fit the anthropocosmic mold.  Nonetheless, that ecological 
holism is neither the primary focus nor the concern of the text is clear when one 
looks at the whole text.  The duty that Zhang Zai claims is incumbent upon him is 
to care for all humans regardless of what segment of society they occupy.  The 
ethical thrust of this passage is clearly anthropocentric.  
If a unified cosmology in which humans are one part of the whole is the 
framework of Confucian ecology, the main operative components of this 
framework which relate Neo-Confucian metaphysics to the world of form are qi 
and Dao.  In a sophisticated and fascinating discussion of Chinese environmental 
ethics, Cheng Chungying states, “To understand the Tao and to follow the Tao is 
the essence of the ethics of the environment.”115  But in order to follow the Dao 
one must understand qi.  “It is in understanding [qi] that one can see and grasp the 
subtleties of the environment vis-à-vis human beings.  It is only on this basis (i.e., 
understanding the [Dao] as [qi]) that one is capable of formulating an ethics of the 
environment…”116  Tu employs the concept of qi to explain that one’s connection 
with the world, the potential of ‘forming one body’, is no mere metaphysical 
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claim.  The condition of qi being the unifying material-force of all beings entails 
that all beings are connected.
117
  
Despite the encouraging vision that Tu and Tucker paint, basing an 
environmental ethics on Confucian cosmology is a project rife with difficulties.  
At the top of the list is the observation that despite the deeply engrained 
Confucian worldview, China’s environmental history reveals a tendency towards 
environmental overuse and devastation. Mark Elvin’s magisterial work, The 
Retreat of the Elephants, clearly demonstrates the failure of attending to only 
ideas. He concludes the work thus: 
There seems no case for thinking that, some details apart, the Chinese 
anthropogenic environment was developed and maintained in the way it 
was over the long run of more than three millennia because of particular 
characteristically Chinese beliefs or perceptions. Or, at least, not in 
comparison with the massive effects of the pursuit of power and profit in 
the arena provided by the possibilities and limitations of the Chinese 
natural world, and the technologies that grew from interactions with 
them.
118
  
 
Elvin seems to be saying that ideas and beliefs are important but do not 
completely determine how societies act in relation to the environment. A further 
step must be made in which one practices self-cultivation and strives to realize 
that vision of unity. The crucial question for Confucian environmental ethics is 
not that of cosmological vision, but how the process of self-cultivation seeks to 
transform that vision into practice.  With respect to Confucianism, it is impractical 
to think that masses of people will adopt Confucianism as their spiritual guide and 
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embark on the path towards sagehood.  Spiritually, Confucianism offers some 
powerful motifs that can challenge the techno-industrial worldview,
119
 but lacks a 
defined leadership and community of practictioners large enough to carry out 
extensively visible change. 
2.6.2 Judaism 
In contrast to the dominant trend in the field of environmental ethics, the 
majority of works seeking to accommodate Judaism and ecology have not 
disputed the anthropocentric orientation of Judaism as a whole.  Rather, they 
attempt to demonstrate how anthropocentrism is affirmed by the basic theological 
anthropology of the Torah and rabbinic literature.  Although there is a degree of 
variety to the arguments made in favor of a Jewish environmental ethic, one can 
easily detect certain dominant themes—1) creation and natural history, 2) 
commandments, and 3) Torah and the land.  A review of these themes below 
shows that worldview and cosmology, although central to the Jewish view of 
nature, are tempered by axiological and deontological concerns.  Whether these 
concerns are constitutive of worldview, though, is uncertain.  
The Jewish understanding of creation is the clearest example of 
cosmology being a central concern in Judaism.  One of the most basic themes in 
Jewish environmental scholarship is the rejection of Lynn White’s thesis that 
Genesis 1:28 purports to give humans “dominion” over the earth.  White holds 
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this passage up as the linchpin of Judeo-Christian culpability for the 
contemporary environmental crisis.  The responses to White come from all sides, 
effectively dismantling White’s assertion.  One move highlights the complexity of 
the creation story.  While White refers to the “first” creation story, scholars draw 
attention to the “second” creation story (Genesis 2:15) in which humans are 
commanded to care for the earth, but are not given complete possession of it nor 
of any of its inhabitants.
120
  Based on this passage, many scholars claim that the 
force of the command to “have dominion over the earth and subdue it” is 
mitigated by the command to “till it.”  Humans are not meant to do what they will 
with the earth, but are charged with its care.  Based on this argument scholars put 
forth a stewardship ethic as the biblically correct vision of human-earth relations.   
Further justification for the stewardship position can be found in the fact 
that humans are created last in the first creation story.  One interpretation of this 
placement has been that humans therefore represent the pinnacle of creation, 
thereby making humans superior to the rest of creation.  An alternative 
interpretation, though, recognizes that this ordering places creation temporally 
prior to humanity.  In addition, creation is asserted by God to be good; that is, its 
goodness is intrinsic (to use the language of environmental ethics) and not based 
on its instrumental value to humans.  This interpretation supplants the “great 
chain of being” model of human-earth relations with a triadic relationship of God-
creation-humanity. 
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Another argument made in support of the stewardship ethic is that the 
second creation story depicts humans as made from the earth as are every other 
animal.  In light of this common ancestry, humans are part of creation; they do not 
stand outside of creation.  Furthermore, God initially gives adam the various 
animals as companions, which suggests that God considers animals worthy of 
companionship and thus beyond domination or instrumental value.  The name 
adam is linked to adamah “the land,” a connection which further deepens the 
relationship between humanity and creation.    
Scholars have drawn out the great complexity of the creation and have 
demonstrated that to lay the blame for environmental destruction on the shoulders 
of a few select words is sheer nonsense.  In fact, Jeremy Cohen, in “Be Fertile 
and Increase, Fill the Earth and Master it”: The Ancient and Medieval Career of 
a Biblical Text, examines the variety of ways in which these lines have been 
interpreted in Western history, demonstrating that there is nothing inherent in the 
passage that must necessitate the interpretation White argues for; “Rarely, if ever, 
did premodern Jews and Christians construe this verse as a license for the selfish 
exploitation of the environment.”121  This is not to say that there have not been 
individuals who have opted for this understanding of rightful maximal 
domination, but this is not the standard Judaic interpretation.   
A topic closely related to the creation-based stewardship ethic is the 
whirlwind speech in Job.  Few articles have dealt with the work as a whole, which 
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can be cast in the light of environmental justice.  But many scholars refer to the 
forceful statement made in the whirlwind speech.  Essentially, this passage makes 
clear that if one takes seriously the creation as the work of God, it is obvious that 
humans can stake no claim to possessing any part of it.  Creation belongs wholly 
to God.  Humans are at best stewards of creation or simple guests.  In either case, 
there is no justification for human domination of nature.  To claim otherwise is to 
succumb to the same hubris that has been the downfall of so many other biblical 
figures.  Aside from putting creation beyond the ken of humanity, the effect of 
this passage on the reader is one of sheer awe.  If one contemplates nature in its 
complexity, how can one not be humbled in its presence?  Moreover, the passage 
is helpful in obviating the need to argue for creation’s intrinsic or instrumental 
value.  For a person who views this text as scripture, this passage does not simply 
ask the reader to recognize value in nature.  It is both simpler and more profound, 
in that it tells the reader to recognize nature. 
A few scholars have explored textual evidence which suggests that 
Judaism developed primarily as a land-based tradition.  These scholars begin with 
questions like: what was the environmental context of the early Israelites?  How 
did they relate to the land and their surroundings?  How did this relationship 
affect their beliefs and practices?  To what degree did belief and practice likewise 
mold their environment?  Is this natural history of Judaism relevant for Judaism 
today?  The upshot of this line of inquiry is that they read the first texts of the 
Torah as natural history and not as sources of Jewish cosmology. 
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Theodore Hiebert offers the most convincing argument in favor of the 
importance of land in the development of the religion of the Israelites.  Hiebert 
begins by addressing the claim that if history is taken as the biblical center (as it 
often is), nature is therefore rendered problematic.
122
  Hiebert aims to prove that 
the Yahwist author was writing from a mixed agricultural society supplemented 
by a seminomadic pastoralism.  He argues that the period of desert nomadism did 
not significantly shape the cultural practices of the Israelites. Hiebert concludes 
that Israelite religion was one in which the land provided the context out of which 
meaning was derived, and he suggests that Jews should reaffirm their connection 
with the land upon which the Jewish experience ultimately rests.  However, this 
connection is based on history and experience and not cosmology.    
A second theme is the observance of divine commandments (mitzvoth).  
With reference to Judaism and ecology, scholars primarily focus on three 
commandments: “do not destroy” (bal tashchit), non-cruelty to animals (tza’ar 
ba’alei chayim), and Sabbath.123  Scholars draw several implications from the 
commandment to not destroy, the most common being that humans are to act 
judiciously and with restraint towards the natural world, particularly in cases in 
which elements of human civilization (war, commerce, etc.) place the natural 
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world at risk.  To be sure, the applications of this commandment are varied and 
debatable.  Issues arise such as how to reconcile conflict between human and 
nature’s interests?  Scholars commonly respond, and I think rightly, that a central 
element of this commandment is that the sphere of moral consideration is 
significantly wider than humans commonly think.  This wider sense of the 
commandment does not go so far as to endorse an ecocentric ethic or theory of 
intrinsic value, but the broader implications that might be drawn from this 
commandment does invite one to consider how the commandment might be 
employed beyond the context of wartime in which it appears.
124
  In other words, 
many scholars are aware of the moral and philosophical sophistication that 
observing the commandment not to destroy requires.   
The commandment to observe the Sabbath is often used to explain how 
Judaism requires one to be mindful of the effects of overuse of the land.
125
    The 
Sabbath requires that humans allow the land to rest.  Ehrenfeld and Bentley even 
argue that the Sabbath is the touchstone of Jewish environmentalism:  
Without the influence of the Sabbath, stewardship in practice is 
corruptible and unstable.  For Jews, it is the awareness of the Sabbath 
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during time working days that can bring the realm of time and its 
accompanying sense of restraint and limit to stewardship.  It is the Sabbath 
that defines the relationship between steward and Ruler.  It is the Sabbath, 
ultimately, that completes and confirms the environmental wisdom of 
Judaism.
126
 
  
In fact these three commandments, taken together, form a rather coherent Jewish 
ethics of sustainability.  They raise the question of how we are to maintain 
resources (bal tashchit and Sabbath) while adopting practices (tza’ar and 
Sabbath) that do not diminish the quality of life (bal tashchit and Sabbath).  I see 
great potential in further developing sustainable Jewish practices that are deeply 
and broadly rooted in tradition, are philosophically rigorous, and acutely relevant 
to contemporary debates and issues.
127
   
A third theme that frequently occurs in the literature is the relationship 
between Torah, nature, place.  Certain currents can be distinguished within this 
larger topic, such as issues of Jewish identity and the degree to which that identity 
is rooted in texts and thus disregards place, the impact of Israel on Jewish notions 
of place and, by extension, the natural world, and Zionism.  There is not space to 
offer a thorough treatment of all four of these currents, but as a whole they give 
the impression that the Jewish view of nature is tied into a Jewish worldview. 
Taking these first two currents together, the dominant response is that a positive 
relationship with the Earth or nature is deeply rooted in what it means to be 
Jewish, based on the recognition that the Earth is God’s creation.  As God’s 
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creation, the Earth or nature is a locus for knowledge about God.  Many symbols 
and allegories employ natural imagery.  Humans, then, in the process of coming 
to understand what it means to be created in the image of God, should turn to the 
natural world as a source of information.  That is to say, to be a Jew in the world 
is tied in with understanding God’s being in the world, God’s presence in nature.  
This position is labeled by several scholars as panentheistic, which is acceptable 
to these thinkers in contrast to the pantheistic view, which limits God to the 
world.  There are clearly theological implications, then, in arguing that Judaism 
recognizes the world as a source of divine revelation.  God is not solely 
transcendent but also immanent.     
Such a view has drawn criticism.  The most well-known essay rejecting 
this idea of divine immanence in nature making a relationship with nature a part 
of Jewish identity is Steven Schwarzschild’s “The Unnatural Jew”.  
Schwarzschild argues that being Jewish is definitively to be opposed to nature.  
God is absolutely transcendent and not in any way present in nature.  The basis of 
this argument is rooted in Schwarzschild’s commitment to a Neo-Kantian 
understanding of transcendence.  Eilon Schwartz describes Schwarzschild’s thesis 
thus: 
Judaism is profoundly at odds with the natural world, a world which 
functions according to certain laws to which history is then subjected.  
Judaism sees the human being as transcending those laws, with the power 
to impose a moral order on an otherwise amoral reality.  Through human 
reason, that which makes the human “in the image of God,” moral thought 
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can impose its order on the natural disorder, completing the process of 
creation.
128
 
 
Therefore, Schwarzschild rejects any position which suggests that Judaism is 
connected with a pantheistic worldview.  Jews are, thus, in no way responsible for 
bringing their lifestyle in harmony with the natural world.  To reinforce this 
argument, Schwarzschild points to the urbanization of Jewish communities since 
medieval times.  Given this lack of a land, a place, a geographic home, what 
matters most, in Schwarzschild’s opinion is the Torah.  The Torah is that singular 
symbol of Jewish identity.  The main relationship a Jew should cultivate, qua Jew, 
is a relationship with the Torah.  The text is everything and the earth (at least with 
respect to Judaism) counts for nothing.     
How have scholars responded to Schwarzschild?  One response has been 
to claim that Jewish history is primarily an agrarian one.  Jews only became 
urbanized when forced by external powers to relocate to the city.  There is 
nothing “inherently” urban about Jews.  Another response has been to marshal 
forth the textual evidence referred to above regarding the positive view of creation 
found in the creation story and Job.  But the most problematic issue 
Schwarzschild raises, although certainly not the first to do so, is what nature 
means in the light of the revealed Torah.  Does the Torah obviate the need to turn 
to nature to seek God?  Moreover, does the Torah irresolvably problematize 
theological interest in the natural world?  The traditional prooftext that 
                                                 
128
 Eilon Schwartz, “Judaism and Nature: Theological and Moral Issues,” in 
Torah of the Earth: Exploring 4,000 Years of Ecology in Jewish Thought, vol. 2, 
ed. Arthur Waskow (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2000), 168. 
  96 
Schwarzschild cites is the Mishnah Pirkei Avot 3:9.  Schwarzschild argues that 
this mishnah clearly establishes the importance of Torah study over contemplation 
of nature to the point that a moment’s distraction from Torah to admire a scene in 
nature is devastating.  Surely, a cursory reading of this mishnah does not 
contradict this reading.  However, as in the case of the Bereshit passage 1:28, 
there is a great deal more complexity perhaps as a result of the apparent clarity of 
the text.     
 These debates and issues raise the question of just how to define Jewish 
worldview.  Marc Jacobs, in describing the character of contemporary Jewish 
environmental activism shows that there is no firm consensus among the various 
participants.
129
  Hava Tirosh-Samuelson notes that many Jewish environmental 
activists came to Judaism only after having previously worked with secular 
environmental organizations.
130
  Different traditions within Judaism surely will 
have different positions on each of these issues and if scholars continue to 
narrowly focus on worldview and cosmology, they will cut themselves off from a 
wide variety of materials within each tradition that could potentially shape a 
tradition’s environmentalism. 
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2.7 Conclusions 
So is there any one methodology for the field of religion and ecology?  If 
environmental philosophy (religiously-oriented or not) is to be practical, should 
there not be an approach that has the ability to address large sectors of a religious 
tradition?  Or is the best approach to hope that each community will change its 
collective behavior?  Certainly, scholars of religion and ecology need to move in 
the direction of developing critical methods of how to go about doing the work of 
religion and ecology, in the same way that religionists have gone about 
developing theoretical models of how to study religion.  But we also saw that 
there is a strong current of practicality and applicability that animates much of the 
work in the field.  The methods that currently dominate are often intellectually 
and philosophical stimulating, even spiritually intriguing, but the nagging 
question is what effect does this work have on solving present environmental 
problems.  The ecotheological method (although it has not been described as such) 
helps us see ways of negotiating religious doctrine and environmental 
philosophical positions.  The cosmological method is fascinating and sometimes 
inspiring, but it is difficult to see how it can concretely influence policy or 
behavior (short of a transformation of consciousness).   
While these approaches offer helpful resources, several scholars mention 
the importance of how what people say about the environment is a key factor 
determining their environmental behavior.  The work of McFague, Norton, and 
Oeschlaeger particularly highlight this aspect of environmentalism.  Not only do 
the hermeneutical problems implicit in the field turn on how terms like ‘nature’, 
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‘environment’, and ‘ecology’ are defined and used, but the importance of 
language is central to the hope that religious environmentalism and environmental 
ethics will make a difference.  Oeschlaeger and the environmental pragmatists 
make it clear that the first order of business is to effect change.  This is 
epitomized in Light’s articulation of “methodological pragmatism” as an 
alternative to “rationalist motivational internalism.”  What scholars say about the 
environment in ethical discourse, secular or religious, goes beyond just describing 
doctrines and problems.  Language is used to effect change and transformation.  
But the critiques of Toulmin, Gilkey, Kirkman, and Sideris demonstrate that 
words cannot be tossed around and reapplied haphazardly.    
Building on these approaches and arguments, I will argue that if scholars 
begin by analyzing how religious communities frame environmental problems, 
how they articulate the connection between their tradition’s (or other tradition’s) 
textual and conceptual resources, and how they communicate these connections to 
their communities, we can have a basis upon which to better compare different 
religious environmentalisms.  That is to say, a rhetorically-based method 
informed by secular environmental philosophy, particularly that of environmental 
pragmatism, seems to offer the most efficient and effective approach to this 
project.  It does not require that faith be compromised in order to advocate for 
specific environmental policies to be implemented.  Additionally, it offers a 
model of how interreligious dialogue might be reconceptualized. 
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Chapter 3 
RELIGIOUS ENVIRONMENTALISM AND RHETORIC 
The problems environmental movements (and the environmental 
movement in general) face are both external (e.g., political and industrial) and 
internal (e.g., ideological and rhetorical).  Yet, one common thread to all these 
difficulties is discursive—how environmentalism and environmental messages are 
communicated to concerned and unconcerned audiences.  In this chapter I will 
propose that given this common thread, environmental rhetoric can offer an 
effective basis from which to develop responses and solutions to environmental 
problems.  I will first demonstrate this common thread with reference to the issues 
raised in chapter two.  Then I will introduce a reasonable and relevant definition 
of rhetoric which includes the elements of audience, identification, framing and 
rhetoric’s relationship with dialectics.  To illustrate how this characterization of 
rhetoric fits environmentalism I will analyze the work of two environmental 
philosophers, Bryan Norton and Arne Naess, and see how their philosophical 
positions reflect a deep concern with not only language but, more specifically, 
rhetoric. Both Norton and Naess have been greatly influenced by philosophers 
like Wittgenstein and Carnap, who argued for the importance of addressing 
language as it is used in everyday communication, rather than an idealized form 
of language derived from universal rules.  This common background has 
contributed to both Norton and Naess being concerned with making 
environmentalism accessible to a wide audience.  In the case of Naess, I will 
suggest that this approach provides a necessary corrective to the ways in which he 
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has generally been interpreted.  I will also examine the latent dialects in various 
positions in one strand of environmental philosophy known as radical ecology.  
Concluding this chapter I will explore the ways in which environmental rhetoric 
provides a constructive and novel approach to thinking about religious 
environmentalism.     
 
3.1 The Role of Rhetoric in Environmentalism 
Language is not only a central concern for environmentalism and ecology 
for how environmental messages get conveyed, but the lack of clarity over the 
most foundational terms of environmental discourse (secular and religious) makes 
linguistic concerns central to the discussion. These issues are present in the work 
of a number of scholars covered in chapter two.  The different names scholars 
give to the field religion and ecology demonstrates recognition of the impact 
linguistic choice can have.  One rather early volume entitled Postmodern 
Environmental Ethics situates language at the very center of the project.  Max 
Oelschlaeger explains in the introduction that postmodernism, marking the 
“linguistic turn,” has exposed the linguistic dependence and contingency of 
scientific knowledge.
1
  Novel and creative approaches to environmental ethics, 
then, are inconceivable apart from a concern for the impact and importance of the 
role of language in constructing our scientific, religious, and social 
epistemologies.   
In the previous chapter we saw that the question of language and 
terminology is not merely a cosmetic concern in environmental philosophy, but 
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also how the key terms are defined and the terms that are used go a long way to 
shaping the nature of inquiry.  The differences between environmentalism, 
ecology, and nature and the way religion is defined creates boundaries that, while 
intellectually and disciplinarialy necessary, can limit they ways in which the 
intersection of religion and environmentalism or ecology or nature is taken up.  
We saw how Kate Soper explains how the semantic conundrums in environmental 
discourse effect the way that environmentalism and the environment are 
understood and addressed.  Concepts applied out of the context in which they 
have gained meaning can lead to false similarities.  Max Oeschlaeger’s work on 
creation narratives engages with language, specifically metaphor and narrative, as 
a source of meaning that can unify various, seemingly disparate communities.  
Many more scholars voice an interest in language as integral to articulating an 
environmental or ecological ethics.   
Also interested in the power of narrative, Jim Cheney has advocated the 
bioregional narrative as an approach that cultivates ethically beneficial thinking 
about humanity’s relationship with and existence in nature; “What we want then 
is language that grows out of experience and articulates it, language intermediate 
between self and world, their intersection, carrying knowledge of both, 
knowledge charged with valuation and instruction.”131  Bryan Norton, claiming 
that “we lack a unified, comprehensible vocabulary for discussing environmental 
problems as problems facing our democratic society” and “a coherent set of terms 
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for expressing environmental values and for explaining and justifying 
environmental goals,” offers a revamped theory of sustainability.132  Approaches 
employing discourse analysis seek to illuminate the various ways problems are 
defined and solutions offered, mainly with respect to environmental policy.
133
  On 
a more expansive scale, Thomas Berry argues that what we need is “a new 
language” that reflects the interdependence of beings, a central concept in 
ecology, and a language that will cause an experience of this interdependence.
134
  
What Berry means by “a new language” is that our current discourse on the 
environment is based on difference and hierarchy.  Carol P. Christ echoes Berry’s 
concern and advises, “As we attempt to rename the world, we must be careful 
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experientially, we will know it more intimately.  Our understanding deepens and 
evolves with the increased accuracy of the language we use to speak about the 
nature of the object of speech.   
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about the language we choose.  Dualistic and hierarchical assumptions have 
shaped the conclusions of traditional theologies as well as the ways questions are 
posed.”135  
Language is a broad topic, even when confined within a specific discourse 
such as environmentalism.  But it is a crucial topic since it impinges on both 
ontological and epistemological issues.  Ontologically speaking, what we say 
about the environment and human/nature (human/non-human) relations both 
affects and arises from what we believe nature to be.  How we understand the 
terms “environment(alist)” or “ecology(ist)” impinges on what environmentalism 
means in word (semantically) and action (rhetorically).  But even these 
ontological concerns are rooted in questions regarding our knowledge about the 
natural world, how we interpret and communicate our experiences of ‘nature’ and 
what we believe about the way nature should be.  When nature is viewed as 
“other” it is an object of knowledge.  But the way this knowledge is 
communicated to form communities of concern regarding nature depends on 
language.  Less abstractly, as the success of environmentalism as a social 
movement depends on forming action-conscious communities of concern, the way 
in which these communities communicate their values, plans, and agendas 
internally and to other communities externally depends on the coherence, 
intelligibility, and persuasiveness of the language they use. 
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Having established the importance of questions of language to 
environmentalism, the next question must be how we should approach language 
in order to contribute to clarifying environmental issues and working towards an 
ethics of the environment that is practical.  As one dominant strand of 
environmentalism is an activist movement dealing with social engagement and 
environmental ethics is a form of practical ethics, if we are addressing this strand, 
we should employ a view of language that is equally action-based.
136
  John 
Dryzek and Maarten Hajer have made significant contributions to our 
understanding of the linguistics of environmentalism through their use of 
discourse analysis, showing how language alters and constructs knowledge of 
environmental problems and possible responses.  Hajer even ends with practical 
recommendations of how ecological modernization should be carried out in the 
context of social inquiry.  Bryan Norton’s pragmatist method of adaptive 
management goes further to use ‘sustainability’ as the hub around which his 
method turns, interpreting sustainability as a normative term that acquires 
meaning only when taken up by a specific community.  What these approaches 
have in common, and the direction in which they point us suggests that, in order 
to make new connections explicit, we need to reorient ourselves to the link 
between how we think, how we speak, and how we act.   In this chapter, I show 
how the study of rhetoric can help in clarifying the dynamics of this nexus of 
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speech, thought, and action.  When we approach environmental language through 
the lens of rhetoric, making environmental rhetoric our analytical starting point, 
we will be better able to bridge the theory/practice gap that currently plagues 
environmentalism.  Before examining religious and non-religious environmental 
rhetoric, I will first explain how I am using the term and develop a coherent view 
of rhetoric and the vital importance of analyzing rhetorical issues as first-order 
issues within religious environmentalism. 
 
3.2 Definition and Strategy 
Traditional definitions of rhetoric, mostly derived from Aristotle, tend to 
single out persuasion in oratory as the main concern of rhetorical practice.  A 
more inclusive characterization of classical rhetoric might be stated thus: “the 
focus on rhetoric typically emphasized the public, persuasive, and contextual 
characteristics of human discourse in situations governed by the problems of 
contingency.”137  Modern theorists of rhetoric have broadened and reoriented the 
field to emphasize the complex nature of audience, rhetoric of texts, and the 
rhetorical dimensions of a whole range of social discourses, notably the media 
and sciences.  However, these new directions in the study and application of 
rhetoric still reflect to some degree the aspects of classical rhetoric.   
I will emphasize three strategic aspects of rhetoric—audience, 
identification, and framing—that will help delimit the term and focus our later 
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analysis of environmental discourse.  In addition I will argue that the practice of 
dialectic when partnered with rhetoric, can effectively establish a demonstrative 
dimension to environmental discourse and strengthen the appeal to audience and 
identification of a specific rhetorical strategy.    
 Just what rhetoric is is difficult to say, but Kenneth Burke, the most 
influential rhetorician of the twentieth century, in defining the human as a 
“symbol-using animal” and rhetoric as the essentially symbolic function of 
language, states that rhetoric is “an essential function of language itself, a function 
that is wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of language as a 
symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to 
symbols.” 138    For Burke, symbols and language are what make humans unique 
and no human enterprise can be carried out apart from language.  Following 
Burke’s lead, Sonja Foss states that “rhetoric is the human use of symbols to 
communicate.”139  “Symbols” in this definition of rhetoric are not necessarily 
linguistic, but the vast majority of our symbolic communication takes place 
through language.  It is for this reason that Burke refers to rhetoric as symbolic 
action.  Distinguishing action from motion based on the intentional nature of 
action, Burke argues that rhetoric is the use of language that involves strategy.  
Another aspect of modern interpretations of rhetoric is that it is concerned not 
with truth or falsity but with meaning.  Burke states that “wherever there is 
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persuasion, there is rhetoric and wherever there is meaning, there is persuasion.”  
Thomas Farrell also notes that “the aim of rhetorical judgment is to particularize 
meaning by instantiating and refiguring possible categories and criteria through 
the world of action.”140   
Since rhetoric has been defined in so many ways, one must be careful to 
remain consistent.  Throughout this paper I will rely on the work of Kenneth 
Burke.  The concept of strategy for Burke is central.  Burke claims that “any 
document…is a strategy for encompassing a situation.”141  Essentially, it is the 
strategic nature of language that is what we call rhetoric.  Burke posits rhetorical 
language as a type of action different from poetic language, which is also 
symbolic action but of a different sort.  The difference between these two is that 
rhetorical action sets out ends to achieve, ends that can be reasonably understood 
as achievable, while symbolic action, although responding to some situation, does 
not attempt to realistically affect the situation.  Poetic action represents a desire to 
change the situation but does not direct its efforts at altering it. 
Speaking in similar terms, Lloyd Bitzer claims “rhetoric is pragmatic” 
because it always seeks “to produce action or change in the world.”142  The 
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concept of the rhetorical situation illumines the connection between a situation 
and the subsequent discourse.  Put another way, there is always a context, not 
only from which rhetoric arises, but to which it is responding.  Discourse is 
rhetorical in so far as it is a response to a certain situation.  Furthermore, 
rhetorical discourse seeks to participate in the situation and, ultimately, provides a 
fitting response capable of persuading an audience to accept a specific 
understanding of reality.
143
   
The rhetorical situation has three elements: exigence, audience, and 
constraints.  Exigence refers to some imperfection in a situation, some problem 
that arises.  Of course, not every exigence gives rise to a rhetorical situation; 
Bitzer clarifies that only if the situation can be modified by discourse is it 
rhetorical.  A natural disaster, for example, cannot be averted by discourse.  The 
last component, restraints, refers to anything that has “the power to constrain 
decision and action needed to modify the situation.”144  Bitzer devotes little space 
to the role played by constraints in the rhetorical situation, and it is possible that 
the category is merely offered to explain why a discourse may fail to affect the 
desired result. 
So, rhetorical action and rhetorical language are distinctive in their attempt 
to effectively and affectively respond to a specific situation.  In line with 
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traditional notions of rhetoric, such an understanding of rhetoric may evoke the 
sense of rhetoric as persuasion.  Neither Burke nor Bitzer deny this connection, 
although they both qualify it.  Burke raises the status of persuasion to art, which, 
like art, requires the development of certain skills but is also founded in the nature 
of language itself.  Bitzer distinguishes the two by claiming that rhetoric is a 
discipline with philosophical justification; whereas, persuasion is not.  I will 
discuss rhetoric as persuasion more below in its connection to identification.  
3.2.1 Audience  
Audience is a crucial element for both Bitzer and Burke.  In terms of a 
rhetorical situation, there must be a specific audience to which the rhetor
145
 
addresses the response, otherwise the discourse is not rhetorical.  The rhetor’s 
response is intended to modify a situation by means of discourse, but the change 
is carried out by those whom the rhetor is capable of affecting; “properly 
speaking, a rhetorical audience consists only of those persons who are capable of 
being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change.”146  For Burke, 
language is always addressed to an audience (Burke states that two aspects of 
rhetoric are “its use of identification” and “its nature as addressed”), an aspect 
which must enter into the consideration of the rhetor if the rhetoric is to 
succeed.
147
  The targeted audience provides the constraints on which images and 
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topoi the rhetor will choose.
148
  As Burke explains, “the rhetorician may have to 
change an audience’s opinion in one respect; but he can succeed only so far as he 
yields to that audience’s opinions in other respects.”149  Burke refers to the need 
to meet an audience’s expectations as form and argues that the form of symbolic 
action is a key factor in its ability to move an audience.
150
  This idea of form is 
based on how the rhetor manipulates topoi by performing “tactical procedures” in 
which the topoi, or audience’s opinion, are presented in a way as to minimize the 
content or meaning of the topoi and draw the audience into a attitude of 
collaborative expectancy through assent to the form of the delivery.  According to 
this method a rhetor may acquire the audience’s assent to a proposition based on 
their acceptance of the form, regardless of whether they agree with the 
proposition.  
Stephen D. O’Leary, in his book Arguing the Apocalypse, suggests that 
“viewing rhetoric from a dynamic perspective requires critics to note the subtle 
differentiations in the temporal constructions that render predictions relevant to a 
given audience.”151  His approach to millenarian rhetoric takes the issue of time 
(as in his reference to “predictions”) as a function of an argument made to 
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persuade a “given audience” of a certain interpretation of scripture or view of the 
world.  Seen in this way, time is not an immutable element external to the 
historical situation.  It is a malleable device meant to evoke a desired response 
from an audience.  But O’Leary shows that the way in which millenarian rhetoric 
is used depends heavily on the character of the audience and the social context 
impinging upon that audience.  
Although not considered a rhetorical theorist, Bruce Lincoln’s discussion 
of the role myth and narrative, as forms of discourse, play in constructing “new 
social formations” demonstrates a deep concern for audience.  He identifies two 
techniques that are employed: “ideological persuasion and sentiment 
evocation.”152  Lincoln uses the term ‘ideology’ in the more or less conventional 
sense of an underlying sociopolitical force.  Ideological persuasion, then, refers to 
the ability to achieve a dominant position for a given ideology.  The concept of 
sentiment evocation is more important for Lincoln in the process of social 
construction.
153
  He divides the term into two parts: affinity and estrangement.  
The point here is that persuasion and evocation both require an audience to take 
place.  Lincoln argues that “we would do better to classify narratives not by their 
content but by the claims that are made by their narrators and the way in which 
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those claims are received by their audience(s).”  He later defines myths as “that 
small class of stories that possess both credibility and authority,” where authority 
refers to the ability to “mobilize a social grouping” based on the “paradigmatic 
truth” of the myth.154 
3.2.2 Identification 
Inextricably related to the importance of audience is the notion of 
identification.  In addition to language as being that which is addressed, Burke 
asserts the importance of identification (elsewhere termed consubstantiality) 
between the rhetor and audience.  Myth and narrative employ “stylistic 
identifications” to achieve their ends of constructing social formations, aspects of 
a text that provide occasions for establishing a connection between concerns the 
audience has and the concerns the text purports to address.   
Burke’s continuity with classical rhetorical is revealed in the way he 
connects persuasion with identification.  He acknowledges that persuasion is the 
main concern for figures like Aristotle, Cicero, and Augustine and remains a key 
feature of rhetoric (“Rhetoric is the art of persuasion.”)155  In fact persuasion and 
identification (and Burke includes communication), refer to the same function of 
language.  Burke does not replace persuasion with identification; rather he shifts 
the focus to identification, claiming that “[y]ou persuade a man (sic.) only insofar 
as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, 
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idea, identifying your ways with his.”156  In connection with persuasion, Burke 
argues that the goal of rhetoric (or persuasion) is to have an effect upon the 
audience’s attitude, rather than needing to directly affect action.157   
Burke readily uses the term ‘persuasion,’ but as we can see with the two 
aspects of rhetoric he identifies, he is more intent on using the notion of 
identification to explain the functioning of rhetoric.  Burke’s definition of rhetoric 
as concerned with “inducing cooperation” highlights the link between 
identification and audience, since there must be an object to which the rhetor’s 
words are addressed and there must be an action, attitude, or opinion that the 
rhetor wishes to induce the audience to accept.  However, identification can have 
different purposes.  It can be an attempt to have the audience identify with the 
person of the rhetor.  Or the rhetor can attempt to convince the audience to 
identify with an opinion or action (to make it theirs, so to speak).  Or the rhetor 
can attempt to instill a sense of solidarity among the individual members of the 
audience (which, in turn, can serve either of the former two purposes).  As an 
extension of the first and third purposes, it is helpful to note that another term 
Burke uses for identification is ‘consubstantiality’, the idea that the members of 
the audience (and rhetor) become “one substance.”  There are clear parallels with 
Lincoln’s theory of discursive social formation. 
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One important caution that Burkes makes regarding identification is that it 
always implies division.  On one end, if division did not already exist, there 
would be no impetus toward unity.  On the other end, if unity is achieved in an 
audience, or if a rhetor succeeds in unifying an audience by persuading them to 
identify with a given attitude, opinion, or subject, the rhetor has created a division 
between the audience and those who hold contrary positions.  This raises the 
question of what Burke refers to as the “agonistic” nature of rhetoric, meaning 
that it “so often implies the presence of threat or an adversary” and suggests that 
rhetoric seems never to be universal (in the sense that philosophic or scientific 
discourses are often thought to be purely rational or objective).   
Coming back to the idea of environmental rhetoric, this point is quite 
important since much of environmental ethical discourse attempts to establish 
universal principles of ethical concern.  While these principles may appeal to 
many and be logically consistent, in Burkean terms, it is unlikely that they will 
lead to any change in attitude to inducement to action.  Without the necessary 
corollary of division against which the process of identification stands, such 
universal philosophical positions will likely to fail to be practically effective.  
Without identifying an audience, there is no possibility of division between the 
audience and that which is not the audience, and thus, there is no one to be 
persuaded.    
3.2.3 Framing 
Framing is a key concept in Burke’s thought.  Although he does not use 
this exact term, his notion of language being bound by terministic screens is 
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nearly identical to the concept of framing.  Burke first argues that the use of terms 
(or of language in general) necessarily directs the attention: “Even if any given 
terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology is must 
be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of 
reality.”158  The terms we choose will affect how we “see” a situation.  But Burke 
continues and asserts that “terministic screens,” as he labels them, imply that what 
we see is also the result of what terms we have used.   
Not only does the nature of our terms affect the nature of our observations, 
in the sense that the terms direct the attention to one field rather than 
another.  Also, many of the “observations” are but implications of the 
particular terminology in terms of which the observation are made. In 
brief, much that we take as observations about “reality” may be but the 
spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms.
159
 
     
 
The choice of words, which audience is addressed, the tone, and the style of 
discourse all determine whether the rhetor will succeed in inducing cooperation in 
the audience.  But these aspects of communication are also already products of the 
discourse.   
In ways that approximate Burke’s terministic screen, some scholars are 
beginning to look at framing in environmental communication and the role it 
plays in affecting an audience’s receptivity and acceptance of environmental 
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messages.
160
  Benford and Snow in dealing with social movements refer to 
“collective action frames” as an “active, processual phenomenon that implied 
agency and contention at the level of reality construction.”161  Robert Entman 
explains the process of framing by stating, “To frame is to select some aspects of 
a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context, in 
such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”162  
Julia Corbett, analyzing specifically how environmental messages are framed, 
states that frames are implicit in all environmental messages and contribute to 
environmental “problem definition.”  She further argues that “[f]rames facilitate 
communication because they carry a great deal of symbolic meaning and help 
organize and structure our world.”163  Framing is relevant to rhetoric, furthermore, 
because it is largely a strategic act aimed at establishing mutual cooperation 
among members of a specific group. 
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3.3 Environmental rhetoric 
 In Ecospeak, a rhetorical analysis of the intersection of politics and 
environmentalism, the authors’ state, “As much as the environmental dilemma is 
a problem of ethics and epistemology, it is also a problem of discourse.”164  Julia 
Corbett argues:  
On the surface, efforts to effect environmental change may seem like 
battles over physical things like wilderness or air or fish.  But in a larger 
sense, the communicative battle is over the meaning and value attached [to] 
those physical things, which affects their destiny.  In essence, it’s a 
struggle of rhetoric and persuasive argument and the ability to have your 
values and problem definition prevail and become the accepted cultural 
viewpoint, the new status quo.
165
 
 
Scholars working on environmental rhetoric address nature and the 
environment across a broad spectrum of sources including literature, the popluar 
media, and grassroots organizations.  Scott Slovic shows how genre distinctions 
fail to capture the subtle persuasions and differing effects of rhapsody/ 
epistemology and jeremiad/politics among American nature writers/ 
environmentalists.
166
  His analysis demonstrates the impact on the audience of 
choosing embedded rhetorical strategies (combining rhapsody and jeremiad) or 
discrete rhetorical strategies (separating rhapsody and jeremiad).  H. Lewis Ulman 
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shows how Aldo Leopold’s rhetorical strategy in A Sand County Almanac drive 
the way in which Leopold transforms his persona throughout the book.
167
  Ulman 
argues that the various personae Leopold puts forth aid others in recognizing the 
systemic value proposed by the land ethic that was the fruit of Leopold’s many 
experiences.      
 Rhetoric can also contribute to how environmental concern is made 
meaningful.  In the case of environmental ethics, rhetorically sophisticated 
formulations can provide a strong foundation to build an effective and meaningful 
environmental ethics, which might prove a fruitful strategy for religious 
communities as they seek ways to respond to environmental issues.  Michael 
Bruner and Max Oelschlaeger criticize environmental ethics for its failure to 
identify and engage a larger audience, therefore failing to have any considerable 
impact on environmentalism, “In so far as environmental philosophy aspires to be 
effective discourse, then it needs to reconsider its pretense of producing 
knockdown arguments, philosophical foundations, and master narratives, and 
begin attending to the resources rhetoric offers.”168  They argue that 
environmentalism has suffered from a lack of “a metaphor or an alternative 
discourse paradigm that resonates with the lived experiences of non-elite 
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publics.”169  Finally, Herndl and Brown argue that since environmental discourse 
is a “polyphony” of different discourses, rhetorical analysis can help identify the 
various strands of discourses within environmental discourse and contribute to a 
more robust understanding of how environmental discourses function and are 
used in society.
170
   
3.3.1 Applying audience, identification, and framing 
One key in finding a discourse or metaphor that “resonates” with an 
audience is the achievement of identification between the discourse and the 
audience.
171
  As I have shown with reference to the work of Kenneth Burke, 
scholars locate the importance of identification as an aspect of rhetoric in the 
speaker’s ability to achieve consensus and forge a community, often in political 
contexts.  This is no less true for environmental movements.  According to 
Killingsworth and Palmer,  
The political effectiveness of environmental rhetoric has thus depended 
upon a discourse’s ability to create valences, open links that attract 
individuals among the general public by realistically mirroring the 
experience of daily life...The working vocabularies of the old movements 
remain available; new discourses arise to challenge the old; new 
communities enter the debate as the effects of pollution are more widely 
experienced.
172
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The success of environmental campaigns thus depends less, or at least no more, 
on funding and legal battles than whether the targeted audience identifies with the 
way in which the environmental problems and suggested goals are presented in 
the discourse.   
  Some scholars making this argument refer specifically to the question of 
framing.  Robert Weller discusses the slippage between policy measures and 
successful programs to ameliorate environmental problems, with particular 
reference to Taiwan and China.  He states that “policy failures here come when 
different cultural frames and modes of discourse fail to mesh.”173   
We have already seen how Corbett presents the issue: “We see meanings 
of nature and environment constructed in all messages…Why these frames or 
labels matter to environmental communication is because, first of all, they appear 
natural and are therefore taken for granted.  And second, they have the ability to 
powerfully communicate ‘this is the problem, this is who is responsible, and this 
is the solution.’” 174  But she goes on to argue that the way that environmentalism 
has been framed by issues like pollution and preservation has limited the effect 
environmentalism can have.
175
  She argues that the power of the environmental 
frames includes wilderness but leaves out consumerism.  Thus the current frames 
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that communicate environmental messages that environmental groups draw on, 
limit and compromise the movement as a whole.  Corbett recommends an entirely 
new vision for environmentalism, “We need a new set of ‘articulators’ to 
communicate a fresh, broad view of human relationships and actions towards the 
natural world.” 176 
But from a communication standpoint, successful communication 
is not just about shifting a frame of reference and “talking” about the 
natural world in a different way.  There is no magic bullet message or 
strategy that will transform the environmental movement and “save’ the 
natural world.  Given the public’s reaction to environmentalists, the hostile 
political environment, and the becalmed and coopted nature of some 
movement groups, what’s needed is an entirely new modality for how we 
think, speak, and act toward the natural world.  What’s needed is a new 
vision.
177
 
 
Her call for a new vision is respectable and may be correct, but issuing such a call 
is suspect based on what she says about the power of frames themselves.  She 
states that frames are useful when they are stable and that frames provide a 
common means of understanding for members of a society.  If the new vision she 
advocates is to go beyond frames, then how will that vision be communicated 
broadly?  If it is a new frame, of what use is it until it achieves wide stability?  It 
seems the better route is to take to heart Corbett’s analysis of frames and 
communication in order to develop a more robust environmental rhetoric based on 
existing frames.  Rhetoric can help the activist (broadly speaking) create that 
sense of identity and so motivate an audience.  But it can also help the scholar to 
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analyze how the various elements of a given environmental discourse function or 
fail to achieve consensus among a specific audience. 
Max Oelschlaeger sees environmental problems as deeply intertwined 
with discourse.  He seems to answer Corbett’s call for a new vision (but in a way 
that she might find suspect) by reframing the environment in terms of “creation.”  
He argues that a legitimating narrative is needed to establish the importance of the 
environment in ways other than the market value of resources.  He contends that 
taking the root metaphor of “caring for creation,” seeing environment as 
“creation,” can establish a non-consumer value for the environment.  Creation as a 
metaphor for the natural world is powerful and people will accept since it is 
rooted in the legitimating authority of religious discourse.  This basis also makes 
concern for creation meaningful and carries with it obligations to act.
178
  Creation 
is an element of religious discourse that, Oelschlaeger argues, can unify many 
different religious communities and create solidarity.  Since religious discourse is 
public discourse, these groups can then collectively support policy changes that 
oppose environmental degradation.      
Oelschlaeger supports his argument very well, but as I pointed out in the 
last chapter, it is unlikely to have wide appeal beyond North American Judaism 
and Christianity.  For example, there is no strong tradition of creation in the 
Buddhist or Hindu traditions that carry the same legitimating narrative of creation.  
I also suspect that the other groups he mentions, pagans and wiccans, will so 
easily put aside their theological differences.  Nonetheless, Oelschlaeger’s 
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argument that discourse and rhetoric do offer valuable resources for instigating 
environmental action is cogent.  The way in which the specifics of his approach 
will differ between cultures and religious communities should give us pause as to 
whether such wide consensus can be achieved.  
3.3.2 Norton’s Sustainability  
One alternative to Corbett’s call for an entirely new vision is Bryan 
Norton’s approach in his work Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive 
Ecosystem Management.  Norton states that the problem facing environmentalism 
today is that communication between the various actors is insufficient. He argues 
that economists, philosophers, managers, and policy makers, as well as members 
of the general public have no common vocabulary.  His position is built upon a 
pluralist, pragmatic, multiscalar method of environmental decision making that 
seeks to establish what is correct by communal consensus arising out of a process 
of public deliberation.  His method of adaptive management can be traced back to 
a pragmatist theory of language, relying on the philosophies of John Dewy and 
C.S. Peirce.  Norton observes: 
The language we speak does not get its meaning by reflecting an inert and 
passive world “out there,” beyond experience, created and ordered by a 
benevolent, all-powerful being.  Instead, language gains meaning from the 
dynamic relations emerging within a constantly changing and evolving 
culture composed of purposive individuals in linguistic cohesive 
communication.  Language is thus integral to a complex set of behaviors 
that have evolved within a community’s day-to-day practices.  Meaningful 
speech is reflective of social relationships; social communication includes 
many exchanges of experience and gradually results in cultural 
adaptation.
179
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Beginning from this basis, Norton critiques what he labels the current dominant 
theories of environmental value that inform environmental policy discourse—
economism and intrinsic value theory.
180
  Norton identifies these two theories as 
the only two that profess comprehensiveness and connectedness.  The former 
suggests that a theory encompasses all or most environmental values, and the 
latter denotes that all environmental values can be reduced to a select few 
principles.  Norton shows how economism (the theory that all environmental 
values can be reduced to questions of cost and willingness-to-pay calculations) 
and intrinsic value theory (the theory that all environmental values can be reduced 
to the question of establishing noninstrumental value of beings) are set in 
opposition, greatly reducing the complexity of perspectives that could be taken on 
any number of environmental issues.   
 Having rejected the monism and reductionism of economism and intrinsic 
value, Norton proceeds to develop his argument for an empirical pragmatic 
understanding of environmental value.  Following the pragmatist tradition, he 
allows that instrumental value, intrinsic value, and economic value are all 
legitimate methods of valuation.  But he also argues for communal value as a 
notion that is commonly precluded in discussions of environmental value, which 
tend to turn on a contemporary bias for “methodological individualism.”181  
Having established that whatever forms of value members of a community or 
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discussion bring to the table are legitimate, Norton goes on to explain, with 
reference to Habermas’s communicative ethics and discourse ethics that solutions 
to environmental problems are worked out in the process of deliberation.
182
  There 
are no uniquely correct answers, though, and the answers that are chosen are 
subject to continual revision based on experience of putting the decision into 
practice.   
 The basic assumption of the method that Norton devises is that there are 
no a priori values or solutions to be discovered.  A community or society faced 
with some sort of environmental problem should seek the participation of all 
concerned parties and seek to formulate a practical response based on the 
persuasiveness of the arguments given.  This process is two-phased and entails a 
reflective phase and action phase.
183
  In the reflective phase the issues are 
discussed and debated, but also the various values are weighted, prioritized, and 
arranged hierarchically according to temporal and spatial scales.  The action phase 
of the process sets forth what criteria will be used to guide the policies and actions 
the community decides to implement and take.  Thus, to facilitate this process, 
Norton offers “sustainability” as a tool of communication that can bring together 
(but not necessarily synthesize) the value-oriented, fact-oriented, and pluralistic 
demands of environmental decision-making.   
The rhetorical thrust of his argument for sustainability rests in the idea that 
the deliberations must proceed in terms understandable to an ordinary language 
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speech community—experts and specialists need to communicate their insights 
accordingly.  But this understanding of language goes beyond just having a term 
to describe an idea or method.  According to Norton:  
[B]y focusing on everyday communication—language used in 
everyday situations in which people are trying to act cooperatively—I 
have emphasized the multiple uses of language.  Language is not just used 
to describe; it is also used to question, to deliberate, to persuade, to 
express emotions, to enlist allies, and perform commitments.  
Sustainability, as a term for communication in public policy discourse, 
then, can be judged according to its usefulness in that broader context, as 
well as for the connections we forge between it and more specialized 
theoretical and scientific discourses.
184
 
 
Sustainability needs to be defined with flexibility so that it can incorporate 
scientific and philosophical discourses, as well as express the desires, needs, 
interests, and values of various communities involved in public policy.   
So how does Norton define sustainability?  Based on the above 
clarifications regarding what kind of definition Norton is seeking, he offers a 
schematic definition (one which “characterizes and relates the key components of 
a definition while leaving specification of the substance of those components 
open”), stating that “sustainability is a relationship between generations such that 
the earlier generations fulfill their individual wants and needs so as not to destroy, 
or close off, important and valued options for future generations.”185   We can see 
how his definition sets boundaries for communities to decide what is valuable in 
the present, but what specifically is valued is left to the generation.  His definition 
also clearly shows concern for future generations, but the connections between 
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generations (communal, national, global, etc.) is unspecified.  It may seem like he 
is advocating a strict preservationism by stating that “important and valued 
options” must not be destroyed, but his pragmatism enables him to claim that 
although we cannot know for certain what future generations will value, we 
deliberate to the fullest extent possible, knowing that in doing so we have fulfilled 
our obligations.  In addition, Norton emphasizes that sustainability as a normative 
term can only be defined more specifically in the context of each individual 
community (directing our attention to the importance of framing and audience).   
 Norton’s approach has much in common with Maarten Hajer’s 
reformulation of ecological modernization.  Relying on a Foucauldian notion of 
discourse,
186
 Hajer refers to “story-lines” and “discourse coalitions” to highlight 
the ways in which discourse works both to support institutional changes 
advocating environmental policy change and contrarily to reinforce current 
institutional policies that fail to substantively address environmental problems.  In 
particular he seeks to demonstrate how ecological modernization—a 
environmental policy making approach that “suggests that environmental 
problems can be solved in accordance with the workings of the main institutional 
arrangements of society”—emerged as the dominant position in the nineties.187  
Hajer offers his “argumentative approach” as a way to understand how various 
                                                 
186
 Hajer defines discourse “as a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations that is produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of 
practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities.” 
Hajer, Politics, 60. 
 
187
 Ibid., 3. 
 
  128 
policies and policy orientations (such as ecological modernization) emerge as 
dominant, an approach in which story-lines are central.  This approach is quite 
similar to Norton’s.  Hajer acknowledges that many competing discourses are at 
work in environmental politics, representing a plurality of values and positions.
188
  
Moreover, each participant seeks to have his/her discourse be accepted as the 
basis of policy formation and so must persuade other parties to offer their support.  
The role of story-lines is to facilitate the communication of these positions.  He 
states: 
 
Story-lines are narratives on social reality through which elements from 
many different domains are combined and that provide actors with a set of 
symbolic references that suggest a common understanding…The point of 
the story-line approach is that by uttering a specific element one 
effectively reinvokes the story-line as a whole.  It thus essentially works as 
a metaphor…In other words, a story-line provides the narrative that allows 
the scientist, environmentalist, politician, or whoever, to illustrate where 
his or her work fits into the jigsaw.
189
 
 
The role that story-lines play is to allow a way for disparate discourses to be 
organized into a meaningful conversation.  Given this explanation of story-lines, 
we can see that Norton’s use and definition of sustainability is just such a story-
line.  Norton’s schematic definition of sustainability and his assertion that it is a 
normative term ascribe to sustainability the very same functions that Hajer gives 
to story-lines.  But there is a slight difference.   
Towards the end of his book, Hajer suggests that ecological modernization 
should be reinterpreted “reflexively,” meaning it should refer to a process of 
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public deliberation regarding environmental problems that incorporates both 
scientific and value discourses.
190
  It is difficult to see where Norton’s 
“sustainability” and Hajer’s “reflexive ecological modernization” diverge.      
However, Hajer does not develop the way in which this practice would proceed 
with nearly the detail that Norton does.  In addition, the term “reflexive ecological 
modernization” does not have the same appeal sustainability does.  It is doubtful 
that the public Hajer wishes to empower by making ecological modernization 
reflexive would rally around this term.  This is to say, it does not possess the same 
communicative efficiency that sustainability does.  Interpreting sustainability as a 
tool for effective communication has the advantage that the term is already 
rhetorically rich and there already many popular avenues for articulating Norton’s 
schematic definition of the term.   
Norton insists that interpreting sustainability in this way allows each 
community to present the values held by its constituents and reach a common 
understanding.  The audience for each community is, of course, the collective 
membership of the community including those who do not participate in the 
decision-making process.  The term ‘sustainability,’ as Norton defines it, makes 
the argument that whatever choices are made and whatever practices enacted, 
there must be concern and commitment to future generations.  In this process, it is 
inevitable that each group or interested party will attempt to make its case in the 
most persuasive way possible, using metaphors, images, and frames that resonate 
strongly with the largest number of individuals.  One goal of this process is to 
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provide a strong sense of community, both in the present and in the future.  
Although Norton emphasizes pluralism, the success of a community to achieve 
consensus (though not perhaps agreement on all issues) should lead to a clearer 
perception of the community’s identity.  The process of deliberation can 
strengthen identity of the community among its individual members as they 
become more proactive participants in the decision making process.  On this 
account, one goal of sustainability can be stated in terms of identification, finding 
ways of framing environmental policy debates in ways that create “unity among 
environmentalists.”  Audience, too, is a critical concept for Norton.  His appeal is 
to a large and diverse audience, made up of experts and non-specialists alike, all 
who share a common interest.  He therefore supports the use of ordinary language 
as one characteristic of the form rhetorical appeal should take.  As we can see, 
Norton’s philosophy of sustainability is thoroughly rhetorical.  
 
3.4 The Philosophy of Arne Naess 
In order to show how rhetoric can help understand the way that 
environmental messages are presented, even in cases where rhetoric might not be 
readily apparent, I will now turn to Arne Naess’s ecophilosophy and Deep 
Ecology.  I will first provide a short overview of the main components of Deep 
Ecology, but highlight throughout where Naess’s individual philosophy differs.191  
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Although recognizing Arne Naess as the founder of Deep Ecology is 
commonplace, the notion has only recently been challenged, but this is an 
important distinction to make in order to more clearly see the rhetorical features 
of his thought.  Then I will present Naess’s philosophy through a rhetorical lens to 
show how what has been understood to be abstract metaphysics is in fact intended 
to be a strong appeal to deepen one’s concern for the welfare of human and non-
human beings, an appeal which if successful Naess hopes will lead to the creation 
of communities working towards social transformation.      
3.4.1 Approaches to Deep Ecology 
Naess coined the expression ‘Deep Ecology’ in a short 1973 article, which 
set ‘Deep Ecology’ against ‘shallow ecology.’192  In the mid-1980s many 
philosophers including Bill Devall, George Sessions, and Warwick Fox promoted 
Deep Ecology as a social movement, based on selected interpretations of some of 
Naess’s ideas.  Deep Ecology, like the larger environmental movement, speaks in 
many voices.  In general, scholars distinguish between Deep Ecology as 
philosophy and Deep Ecology as social movement.
193
  Eccy de Jonge classifies 
                                                                                                                                     
Guha, “Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation—A 
Third World Critique,” Environmental Ethics 11 (1989), 72.   
 
192
 Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Long Range Deep Ecology Movement: An 
Overview,” Inquiry 16 (1973), 95-100. 
 
193
 Some authors deal with Deep Ecology both as philosophy and social 
movement; others choose one or the other.  For a focus on the philosophy of Deep 
Ecology, see Warwick Fox, Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing 
Foundations for Environmentalism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995); Eric Katz, 
Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000); Eccy de Jong, Spinoza and Deep Ecology: 
  132 
Deep Ecology in four ways: “(i) as a deep questioning of the relationship between 
human beings and nature; (ii) as a metaphysics of ethics rather than an 
environmental ethics; (iii) as a political movement whose premises are both 
descriptive and normative; and (iv) as an activist approach to dealing with the 
ongoing destruction of natural entities.”194  I will focus upon the philosophy of 
Deep Ecology as defined in (i) and (ii).  But there are still distinctions to be made 
in within this rubric.  One distinction is between philosophical content and 
philosophical method.  To the degree that Deep Ecology advocates a process of 
questioning, it reflects Arne Naess’ style of doing philosophy, one which refers to 
subject and object and aims at understanding the nature of being of both.  
Therefore, we might say it is an onto-relational method of inquiry: ontological in 
that it seeks to uncover the nature of being and beings; relational in the sense that 
it explores the meaning of entities from the basis of their relationships with other 
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entities.  This differs from other styles which examine only the object of inquiry 
or which are epistemological in nature.   
In terms of philosophical content, Deep Ecology is primarily concerned 
with ontology.  “It is a philosophy that focuses on the fundamental ontological 
interrelatedness and identification of all life forms, natural objects, and 
ecosystems.”195  In both these respects, method and content, Deep Ecology has 
been described as totalizing, meaning it does not address solely social or 
psychological phenomena; rather, “it is a cosmology or a world view.”196  Arne 
Naess has complicated the matter by coining the term “ecosophy,” which he 
argues is different from the philosophy of Deep Ecology.  An ecosophy is 
essentially an ecological philosophy that serves as the basis of individual action.  
According to Naess, it is the specific expression of an individual's deep ecological 
understanding.
197
 
3.4.2 Loose derivation, deep questioning 
In addition to the fourfold division of Deep Ecology offered by de Jong, 
Harold Glasser rightly argues that it is important to distinguish among the “Deep 
Ecology Approach” (DEA), Arne Naess’s Ecosophy T, and the Deep Ecology 
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movement.
198
  Glasser uses the phrase “Deep Ecological Approach” to identify 
Naess’s general style of doing philosophy, which is partly based on “loose 
derivation” and “deep questioning.”  This twofold method moves between norms 
and hypotheses to link ultimate premises with concrete actions.  Ecosophy T is 
Naess’s particular application of the DEA, beginning with the norm of “Self-
realization!”199  Naess insists that each individual should work to express their 
own ecosophy as fully as possible.  Both the DEA and Ecosophy T should be 
distinguished from the Deep Ecology movement, which refers to “the loose group 
of individuals who endorse the deep ecology platform (but may not employ the 
DEA).”200  Related to the Deep Ecology movement is the Deep Ecology Platform 
(DEP) that was devised by Arne Naess and George Sessions in 1984 and attempts 
to organize the basic beliefs of a variety of supporters of Deep Ecology ideas in 
an eight-point statement.
201
  The DEP is not meant to explain the philosophical 
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principles of Deep Ecology; it is simply a set of guidelines out of which many 
groups can further elaborate their own programs of action.
202
  Having delineated 
the forms and strands of Deep Ecology, I will now turn to a description of the 
broad philosophical position of Deep Ecology. 
3.4.3 Ontology 
Deep ecologists
203
 see the problem of ecological destruction wholly in 
terms of ontology or worldview.  They claim that an anthropocentric worldview 
leads humans to see nature as “other” and, therefore, as something which exists 
solely to be appropriated however humans deem necessary.  The development of 
social institutions which enable the domination of some beings by others is more 
symptomatic of anthropocentrism than constitutive of the root cause.  Arne Naess 
                                                                                                                                     
substantially smaller human population.  The flourishing of non-human life 
requires a smaller human population.  5. Present human interference with the non-
human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.  6. Policies must 
therefore be changed.  These policies affect basic economic, technological, and 
ideological structures.  The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from 
the present.  7. The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life 
quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an 
increasingly higher standard of living.  There will be a profound awareness of the 
difference between bigness and greatness.  8. Those who subscribe to the 
foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the 
necessary changes.  See Arne Naess, “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some 
Philosophical Aspects,” in Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, ed. George 
Sessions (Boston: Shambala, 1995), 68.  The eight points of the platform have 
been somewhat revised by Naess over the years, but the basic thrust of each has 
remained constant. 
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uses a hypothetical situation involving a developer and a conservationist who see 
a forest from two different ways to illustrate the primacy of ontology within 
ecological philosophy: “The difference between the antagonists [the developer 
and conservationist] is one rather of ontology than of ethics. They may have 
fundamental ethical prescriptions in common, but apply them differently because 
they see and experience reality so differently.  They both use the single term 
‘forest,’ but referring to different entities.”204  Naess goes on to explain that, on 
the one hand, the conservationist’s experience of the forest reflects the perception 
of the forest as a gestalt.  The developer, on the other hand, does not experience 
the forest gestalt, only the presence of many individual trees.  For Naess, the 
failure to experience gestalts strikes at the heart of the ontological problem.  To 
experience gestalts is to understand things in a relational way.  To begin thinking 
in terms of gestalts is the goal Naess sets out for Deep Ecology.  Although gestalts 
and ontology cover what is most essential to the philosophy of Deep Ecology, 
there are three other concepts that proponents of Deep Ecology endorse: self-
realization, non-anthropocentrism, and unity in diversity. 
3.4.4 Self-realization, Identification, Unity-in-diversity  
Self-realization is the term Naess places in square one of his own 
ecophilosophy, labeled Ecosophy T; “self-realization is an adequate key-term 
expression one would use to answer the question of the ultimate goal of life.”205  
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Naess clarifies that the “self” in “self-realization” is not the same that people 
associate with the ego.  Rather, it is a wider, intercorporal self, or “Self” (the 
uppercase “S” suggesting a metaphysically wider, more universal self).  Key to 
Naess’s understanding of self-realization is identification, which is further related 
to “a situation which elicits intense empathy.”206  According to Naess, when we 
identify with other beings, we see their interests as our own.  In this process of 
identification we are “realizing” that our “self” is much larger than that with 
which we normally identify.  What Naess is suggesting is that there is ontological 
potential beyond what we normally assume.  Elsewhere, he refers to the 
“ecological self,” a self that occupies a fourth stage of development beyond the 
ego, social self, and metaphysical self.
207
  “The ecological self of a person is that 
with which this person identifies.”208   
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The aspect of self-realization and identification that fails to receive much 
acknowledgment is that both refer to processes.  David Rothenberg points out that 
“the word in Norwegian is Selv-realisering: Self-realising.  It is an active state, 
not a place one can reach.”209  The same active meaning holds true for 
identification (Norwegian, identifisering).  Thus, even though self-realization is 
presented as the ultimate goal of life in Naess’s Ecosophy T, it would be better to 
think of it as a continuous process of the ‘Self’ unfolding before the self.   
Both Warwick Fox and Freya Mathews have written at length on these 
concepts of identification and self-realization, and both have done so with great 
sophistication.  Fox uses the term “transpersonal self” to capture the goal of self-
realization: a self that goes beyond its own ego to identity with other selves or 
egos.  However, the interpretations of self-realization given by Fox and Mathews 
assume a model of development based on a linear progression of ever wider 
development, but neither seems to explore the implications of the concept in the 
sense of process.  Rather it is presented as a (usually cognitive) state to be 
achieved.  In other words, both reify the concept of self-realization, shifting 
emphasis away from its dynamic character.  In contrast to this reification, Naess 
has asserted that the concept of self-realization is rather a tool for thinking about 
the process of expanding one’s sense of self, without seizing upon a final state to 
be achieved.
210
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The concept of “unity-in-diversity” is an attempt to account for the 
complexity and plurality of nature; either of these two concepts, unity or diversity, 
alone can lead to positions of absolute identity of the self with the natural world 
or absolute difference.  According to Naess, “Here we have a difficult ridge to 
walk: To the left [unity] we have the ocean of organic and mystic views, to the 
right [diversity] the abyss of atomic individualism.”211  The concept of unity 
reveals the influences of Indian and Chinese articulations of non-duality.
212
  The 
classic case of non-dualism is the Indian school of Advaita Vendanta, which seeks 
a complete union with the universal godhead, and would have been familiar to 
Naess based on his readings of Gandhi.  But the Advaita conception of unity as 
non-duality is more extreme than what Naess intends.  Instead, Naess seeks to 
emphasize the interconnectedness of all beings through the concept of being.  The 
idea is closely linked to the process of self-realization.  Another way of 
interpreting the talk of non-dualism is through the concept of relational being.  
This means that a being's essence is determined ultimately by its relationship with 
other beings.    
 Diversity is as important as unity in the phrase “unity in diversity.”  It is 
mentioned in the eight point platform and Naess comments on his difficulty in 
resolving the “unity in diversity” problematic.  Unity, nonanthropocentrism, and 
self-realization all direct our attention to oneness and holism, but stopping here 
would effectively negate the value of individual beings, and not just human 
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beings.  Naess consistently affirms the value and necessity of diversity, and it is 
on this point that Naess clearly connects Deep Ecology to ethics.  Naess argues in 
the first three parts of the Deep Ecology Platform that richness and diversity 
contribute to the flourishing of human and non-human life and that no being has 
the right to infringe upon another being’s unfolding of its potential, except in the 
case when vital needs must be met.  The problem with this adherence to diversity 
has been that it is sometimes difficult to see how holism can be squared with 
diversity.  Naess’ use of the concept of relationality helps clarify this apparent 
contradiction.  Seeing the relational nature of being not only allows diversity to be 
maintained as a value, it greatly strengthens the deep ecology position by 
invoking diversity.  The more diverse forms of life that exist, the more beings 
there are to establish relationships with, and the more depth and breadth one will 
experience.   
3.4.5 Naess’s Rhetoric and the Language of Transformation 
Language, for Naess, is crucial.  His work on semantics should alert us to 
the fact that what Naess says is not necessarily any more important than how he 
speaks.  Benjamin Howe has recently argued that interpreters of Naess’s thought 
and promoters of Deep Ecology have neglected Naess’s philosophical background 
in empirical semantics and that the Deep Ecology with which Naess should be 
associated must be seen in light of this background.
213
  Through a close reading of 
Naess’s writings on semantics, Howe shows that when we look at how Naess uses 
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concepts like meaning, precision, and vagueness, it is quite unlikely that Naess 
would have supported a static platform to which all supporters of Deep Ecology 
would consent.  Furthermore, despite a widespread acceptance of most of the 
statements in the platform, it is probably the case that there are multiple 
interpretations of what each statement means.
214
   Naess is not content to offer a 
systematic analysis of environmental philosophy and hope that people are 
convinced.  He wants to draw others into the conversation.  Naess gives the 
following justification for why he choose the term ‘self-realization,’ one of the 
most contentious terms in Deep Ecology:  
If ‘self-realization’ (or ‘self-fulfillment’) is habitually associated today 
with lifelong ego-trips, then isn’t it stupid to use this term for self-
realization in Gandhi’s widely different sense or (in a less religiously 
loaded context) as a term for widening and deepening the ‘self’ so that it 
embraces all life forms?  Perhaps it is.  But I think the very popularity of 
the term makes people feel safe, and they listen for a moment.
215
 
  
Therefore, his articulation of Deep Ecology philosophy and, in particular 
Ecosophy T, should be read for its rhetoric as much as for its logic.  That is to say, 
we should ask ourselves why he chooses the terms does and what his reasons are 
for choosing to articulate his philosophy in the form that he does.  For example, 
when Naess ventures an explanation of the terms ‘ecology,’ ‘ecophilosophy,’ and 
‘ecosophy,’ he states: “In this work, these three words will have three very 
different meanings adapted to our purpose.  Others, however, with other purposes, 
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may disagree somewhat on these precise meanings.”216  Although this statement 
may appear to be simply following scholarly convention (many authors choose to 
explicitly define their terms), we should still ask: What is Naess’s purpose, and 
how is it served by employing these three terms? 
3.4.5.1 Semantics    
One indication that Naess is concerned with the rhetorical force of 
language is his coining of neologisms and construction of terms.  Three terms that 
he claims have, for him, “very different meanings” are ‘ecology,’ 
‘ecophilosophy,’ and ‘ecosophy.’  Naess explains that he defines ecology as “the 
interdisciplinary scientific study of the living conditions of organisms in 
interaction with each other and with the surroundings,” but just below that 
definition claims that “the aspect of the science of ecology that is most important 
is the fact that it is concerned first of all with relationships between entities as an 
essential component of what these entities are in themselves.”217  Naess uses 
‘ecophilosophy,’ a field of study examining the relations between entities, to 
emphasize the mutual concerns of ecology and philosophy.  But he notes that 
ecophilosophy is not concerned with “a choice between fundamental value 
priorities.”218  In order to address the relationship between philosophical inquiry 
and pragmatic action, Naess coins the term ‘ecosophy.’  The term ‘ecosophy’ is 
startling in its simultaneous strangeness and familiarity.  It calls to mind ecology 
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and philosophy and invites one to consider how these two modes of inquiry can 
be combined.  It differs from ecophilosophy, though, in that there is not the 
emphasis on a field of study (as is indicated by philosophy), but rather the ‘-
sophy’ part of the term denotes wisdom that is “relevant for action.”219  Therefore, 
an ecosophy is “a philosophical world-view or system inspired by the conditions 
of life in the ecosphere.”220   
What is Naess’s purpose in offering and defining these three terms as he 
does?  Beginning with ecology, Naess establishes that whatever concepts that 
follow ecology will be ultimately tied to the natural world.  They will have 
ecological impacts.  Moving on to ecophilosophy, Naess narrows the field of 
inquiry to an examination of relations, internal and external.  He also casts the 
discussion in the light of philosophy so as to bring to the fore other philosophical 
concerns, primarily ontology and epistemology.  Finally, with the ecosophical 
turn, Naess brings the philosophical to bear on the personal.  Basically, Naess 
uses the terms in conjunction to contextualize the discussion in terms of the 
environment but narrows the focus to the personal.  The deeper we go in the 
analysis (from ecology to ecosophy) the more we see the connections between 
two “households” (eco-, oikos), that of the mind and that of the Earth.    
3.4.5.2 Methodological Vagueness 
The rhetorical concerns of Naess’s Deep Ecology extend beyond these 
general semantic concerns.  In accounting for the misinterpretations of Deep 
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Ecology, Harold Glasser refers to Naess’s “methodological vagueness,” which he 
defines as “a sophisticated semantic device for facilitating the acceptance and 
agreement of statements and notions by emphasizing the positive aspect of 
ambiguity that is sometimes associated with a high level of generalization.”221  
Naess explains the vagueness of the terms in his survey of normative systems 
saying, “[t]he terms and sentences (including the many one-word sentences) are 
strikingly vague and ambiguous.  They are purposely open to a variety of 
interpretations…There are serious methodological considerations that favor 
multiple interpretability.”222  According to Naess, “Communication…is not to be 
seen as a process of two or more individuals making use of a completely ‘shared 
language’, but of each carrying out a personal process of interpretation in their 
own directions of precisations.”223  “Precisations” are increasingly precise 
formulations of less precise statements, but in being more precise, they admit 
fewer interpretations.  The ambiguity characteristic of less precise statements is 
more conducive in articulating the ultimate premises of normative systems.  In 
describing his use of normative systems as a way of defining “total views,” Naess 
argues that less precise statements, in their ambiguity, allow for a wider range of 
possible interpretations and, therefore, more fruitful dialogue and 
communication.
224
  The ultimate goal of communication is to “try to uncover the 
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roots of valuations and total systems, in both our own and our opponents’ 
premises and conclusions.”225   
The point to be made regarding the methodological vagueness of Naess’s 
approach to normative systems is that it invites conversation.  Initially the 
conversation might be only with one’s self.  This can be considered in rhetorical 
terms following Burke’s assertion that the self can serve as audience.  The 
vagueness also implies that the process is not a measuring of principles.  As Howe 
points out, even the eight-point platform is not intended to express definite 
concepts that are integral to a Deep Ecology worldview.
226
  Naess advocates a 
system that encourages people to start from any articulation of their total view and 
uncover their ultimate premises through a process of questioning, from which 
point they can formulate more concrete norms.  The whole process, as Naess 
conceives it, is communicative; it does not favor one group over another, nor does 
it require any prior accepted belief.  Thus, Naess’s method can involve a 
potentially unlimited scope of individuals in ecological discussion.  
   
 3.5 Dialectic and Rhetoric 
            Raising the issue of dialectics under a discussion of rhetoric may seem at 
first counterintuitive, if not outright mistaken.  However, going back to Aristotle 
dialectic and rhetoric are two means of argumentation.  Before going further I will 
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clarify what I mean by dialectics.  As Stephen Dunning summarizes: “dialectic 
refers to some sort of polarity or binary opposition, either a debate between two 
perspectives or a conflict between two realities.”227  Burke’s use of dialectics will 
carry this idea further, but the definition above will keep his developments 
anchored.  Burke appeals to the function of dialectics as a way of dealing with 
what words mean.  Rhetoric, as we have seen, is concerned with strategies for 
creating communities though symbolic action.
228
  As we will see below, dialectic 
is integral to at least one strand of environmental philosophy—radical ecology.  
And by reading carefully the way in which dialectic is used by philosophers 
representative of this strand, we will see that their dialectic is also a strategy of 
creating a community of concerned environmentalists committed to a change of 
ecological consciousness.   
For Burke, dialectic is a way of establishing “substance,” or that which is.  
Dialectic is roughly similar to grammar, logic, and philosophy and constitute for 
Burke one of four aspects of language (with the other three aspects being the 
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poetical, rhetorical, and ethical).
229
  Timothy Crusius, in analyzing the relation 
between dialectic and rhetoric, defines dialectic as “the study of verbal universes, 
the disinterested pursuit of a vocabulary’s implications,” and rhetoric means 
“overcoming estrangement.” 230 Generally, the relation between the two transpires 
in the goal of effecting a situation (as in Bitzer’s rhetorical situation).  Based on 
Crusius’s reading, both dialectic and rhetoric seek to address differences.  
Dialectic seeks to uncover and expose differences, latent paradoxes of substance, 
and rhetoric seeks to overcome differences, to create community.  Based on this 
connection Crusius suggests that dialectic be considered prior to rhetoric, in that 
without differences, there is no need for rhetoric.
231
  As a counter-claim, one 
might argue that rhetoric puts dialectic to use, that rhetoric as symbolic action, 
gives dialectic meaning.  While this logical privileging of dialectic fits with 
Burke’s notion of dialectic, we must recognize that the language within which the 
dialectic process takes place, the terms that are the objects of analysis, for which 
one seeks to establish what the dialectic substance is, emerge out of a certain 
reading of the situation.  The dialectical analysis works out from and not outside 
of a terministic screen, so that the relevance of the analysis is already a symbolic 
act in which acceptance of the terms at hand is part of the process.  So dialectic 
contains rhetorical forces, and to some degree, the rhetorical act, to the degree that 
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an audience is presented with something new and thus a new perspective, serves 
the ends of the dialectic.  In addition, since one key for “inducing cooperation” is 
to create mutual identification among members of an audience, illustrating that 
there is an “other,” one which is “not us,” can highlight the basis upon which the 
“we” is established.  In this respect, dialectic becomes meaningful when 
actualized in the rhetorical process.   
In addition to Burke’s discussions of dialectic and rhetoric on their own 
terms, this relationship is relevant when using Burke as the basis of an 
environmental rhetoric, since some notion of ecology is integral to understanding 
these two dimensions of language.  Burke’s connection to ecology has been 
discussed in reference to how his thought is used in literary eco-criticsm
232
 but 
little attention has been given to the role ecology (or the concept of ecology) plays 
in his more rhetorical thought.  Burke referenced ecology as early as his Attitudes 
Toward History (1937), a time when the term was achieving quite widespread 
currency.  Siegel states that “Burke’s use of ecological metaphors to describe 
social phenomena was a practice becoming increasingly common both within and 
outside of the ecological community when he began to write AtH.”233  Burke’s use 
of the term turns on its reference to the interrelationships among organisms of a 
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specific ecosystem.  Siegel points out that ecology is similar to Burke’s notion of 
the “comic frame.”  The comic frame is one which values cooperation and 
“interrelationships between individual lives,” a notion that might seem to fit a 
broad understanding of ecology where “individual lives” are beings within an 
ecosystem.
234
 
The connection between ecology and dialectic is apparent in some of 
Burke’s other writings.  In his discussion of patterns of experience, he states that 
“universal experiences are implicated in specific modes of experience: they arise 
out of a relationship between the organism and its environment.”235   As the 
organism adjusts to the environmental conditions certain universal experiences 
are selected and others neglected; “[s]uch selections are ‘patterns of 
experience’.”236  And finally, the verbalization of these patterns is what Burke 
calls a symbol, or “the conversion of an experiential pattern into a formula for 
affecting an audience.”237  Here we can see the importance of dialectic in 
generating symbols.  Without the interaction between the symbol-using animal 
and its environment, an interaction that seeks to reconcile the tensions of 
environment and individual experience, humans would lack the resources to 
create meaning, that is, in Burke’s terms, rhetoric.    
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There is another connection between ecology and dialectic, though, if we 
bring in one of Burke’s central concepts, his theory of logology.  For Burke, 
logology is literally “words about words.”238  Whereas his method of discerning 
and uncovering motives for action is labeled ‘dramatism,’ ‘logology’ refers to 
Burke’s critical method of understanding how words work in the labyrinth of 
motives.  Ecology, alternatively, refers to that non-symbolic ground which serves 
as the basis of all language use.  The dialectic can be seen in Burke’s 
anthropology, where he defines humans as “symbol-using (logological) animals 
(ecological).”  Ecology in this sense is analogical to the material world.  It is the 
basis of that context or situation in which language use is possible.  But it also 
represents the sense of balance between the symbolic and the non-symbolic or the 
transcendent and the material that is the dialectical context constraining symbolic 
action.  It is in this sense that ecology is likened to the “comic frame”: 
[a] comic frame…show[s] us how an act can “dialectically” contain both 
transcendental and material ingredients, …both “service” and “spoils”…It 
also makes us sensitive to the point at which one of the these ingredients 
becomes hypertrophied…A well balanced ecology requires the symbiosis 
of the two.
239
 
 
Crusius compares and contrasts ecology with logology, asking “[w]hat does 
logology, as the study of verbal systems, have to do with ecology, the study of 
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natural systems?”240  On the one hand, there is no ultimate materialism, because 
logology demonstrates that humans have extricated themselves from a meaningful 
existence in the natural world.  On the other hand, the fact that humans are bodies 
and that action and symbolic action is predicated on motion (material) 
necessitates that we cannot claim that we are language all the way down.  The two 
are dialectically related in that ecology (or more properly, ecological balance)
241
 
provides the context in which the contradictions which logology uncovers can be 
held in tension.
242
  This tension allows the dialectical process to continue, 
allowing for an ever-fuller self-understanding.   
So dialectics, in the way in which Burke relates it to rhetoric, functions on 
one level to expose the need for rhetoric, providing the materials which rhetoric 
will then shape.  On another level, dialectics provides a way for thinking about 
and talking about the human-nature relationship.  But this way of thinking about 
and talking about the human-nature relationship is not merely a descriptive act.  
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Dialectics helps us choose our words and, as Burke argues, these words filter our 
views in certain ways.  So dialectics itself is part of the strategy of persuasion.  
We will see whether this model is one which finds expression in radical ecology.  
Next, I will present examples from environmental philosophy to illustrate how at 
least three forms of environmental philosophy build off the dialectic-rhetoric 
interface to achieve their philosophical and rhetorical goals. 
3.5.1 Radical Ecology and Language 
Within the broadly construed environmental movement, some theorists 
give more attention to articulating the core reasons for human-induced ecological 
destruction.  Those theorists who call for sweeping transformation in either 
human consciousness or society, essentially rejecting “modernity’s instrumental 
view of nature,” are referred to as radical ecologists, as opposed to those who 
advocate addressing individual environmental problems, such as water pollution, 
deforestation, or species extinction.
243
  Michael Zimmerman identifies three 
branches of radical ecology: Deep Ecology, Ecofeminism, and Social Ecology.
244
  
All three share the view that ecological destruction, what some people in the 
movement refer to as “ecocide,” is the result of a single basic problem.  
Furthermore, all three highlight the importance of ontology, develop an ethics, 
and emphasize the relationship between society and nature, but they disagree on 
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whether ontology or hegemonic social institutions lies at the root of the problem 
of ecological degradation.  In dealing with these problems, language is a central 
concern.  Ecofeminism highlights the language of domination and metaphorical 
change, and Social Ecology openly employs what they call ‘dialectical 
naturalism’.  For Deep Ecology, the role of language is implied, ‘folded into’ the 
philosophy of Deep Ecology itself.  This is to say that, although language is 
immensely important in understanding Deep Ecology, nowhere is language 
addressed on its own terms.
245
   
3.5.2 Dialectics in Radical Ecology 
 
Viewing rhetoric as a strategic act, which attempts to affect or change the 
attitudes of others through the skillful use of language
246
, moves beyond the 
traditional understanding of rhetoric characterized as simple persuasion, usually at 
the expense of logical argumentation.  This revised interpretation of rhetoric does 
not discard the goal of persuasion, nor does it do away with logic.  Logic and 
rhetoric form a dialectic within which truth and meaning are conjoined.
247
  
Dialectics offers one avenue for exploring the connection between ecology and 
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language.  Thomas W. Simon explores the ways in dialectics has been used in 
environmental philosophy.
248
  He examines the dialectical approaches of Marxist 
biologists, Murray Bookchin, and Lakota cosmology.  He concludes by arguing 
that ecological dialectics function to remind scholars that multiple perspectives 
must be used when viewing ecological problems, primarily political, ethical, and 
spiritual.  It is not clear how this position qualifies as a form of dialectics, except 
in the sense that these viewpoints stand in some degree of contrast.  He relies on 
the Lakota cosmology to suggest a dialectics whereby we can recognize the 
validity of multiple perspectives and attend to how these perspectives frame 
problems in the political sphere.
249
  Simon provides a helpful overview of some 
approaches to dialectics in environmental philosophy and science but also waters 
down the very idea that dialectics have an important role to play in 
environmentalism.  Below I will offer a more robust discussion of not only how 
dialectics are used to establish the principles of strands of environmental 
philosophy, but also how dialectics can benefit the development of an effective 
environmental rhetoric that motivates people to action.  
Dunning offers a three-fold typology of dialectics: theoretical, 
transactional, and transformational.  “[T]heoretical interpretation presupposes a 
dialectic of contradiction and finds truth in clear distinctions…Transactional 
interpretation involves give-and-take, contract, and even covenant.  It treats the 
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two poles of the relation as two consenting parties to a hermeneutical 
transaction…Transformational interpretation is based upon a dialectic of paradox.  
It embraces both method and dialogue, both explanation and understanding.”250  
Burke’s use of the term dialectic at various times fits each of these three types.  
The first type characterizes Burke’s understanding of dialectic as a way of 
establishing the meanings of words, “the dispositions and transpositions of 
words.”  The second type is related to Burke’s notion of logology as dialectics 
and the connection between dialectics and ecology.
251
  The third evokes Burke’s 
idea of dialectics as essentially transcendent.   
The discussion below attempts to place dialectics alongside rhetorics in 
the sense that Ecofeminists (Plumwood), Social Ecologists (Bookchin), and Deep 
Ecologists (Naess) advocate dialectical understanding as a strategy to affect a 
transformation in consciousness; a move towards ecological thinking.  Following 
the typology offered by Stephen N. Dunning, the dialectical approaches of the 
Ecofeminist and Social Ecology strains of ecological thought can be characterized 
as “transactional dialectics.”  In contrast to transactional dialectics, Dunning 
offers “transformational dialectics.”  Transformational dialectics are based on 
paradox, “contradiction is no longer a static opposition; it is a dynamic 
confrontation leading to a mutual change in both the poles.”  Although the 
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contradiction is not resolved, the dialectic reveals “a new reality that embraces 
both poles in their creative tension.”252  This dialectic, I argue is precisely that 
which is employed by Naess, but not the Deep Ecologists.   
3.5.2.1 Social Ecology 
For one form of radical ecology, Social Ecology, dialectics is a central 
feature.  According to John Clark, “Social ecology applies an evolutionary, 
developmental view of history and a holistic conception of social unity-in-
diversity to social and political issues.  As a dialectical theory, it does not dissolve 
the parts into the whole (as various forms of holism are regularly accused by 
critics of doing).  Rather it studies the mutual interaction between parts and 
wholes, while reducing neither dimension to the other.”253  The founder of Social 
Ecology, Murray Bookchin, defines dialectics as “a ‘logic’ of evolution, from 
abstraction toward differentiation,” and advocates what he calls “dialectical 
naturalism,” in opposition to Hegelian or Marxist dialectics.254  Janet Biehl 
describes dialectical naturalism as “both a form of reasoning and an ontological 
theory of causality.”255  Bookchin argues that the evolution of lifeforms is 
participatory and proceeds in the direction of diversity, establishing a unity in 
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diversity that is the basis of a stable and healthy ecosystem.  But Bookchin would 
prefer society to ecosystem, since he views the contextual and interrelated 
characteristic of nature and human society as existing in a continuum, 
emphasizing that “it is the logic of differentiation that makes it possible to relate 
the mediations of nature and society into a continuum.”256  The two are related but 
distinct and Bookchin distinguishes the non-human world and humanity by 
labeling them “first nature” and “second nature,” respectively.   
Dialectical naturalism is the means by which humans can resolve the “first 
nature” (the fact that humans are organisms) with “second nature” (the unique 
consciousness of humans).
257
  According to Bookchin, second nature evolved 
from first nature and is, thus, embedded in first nature.  To conceive of second 
nature as absolutely different is a mistake.  However, there is a qualitative 
difference between first and second natures; second nature (humanity) is endowed 
with consciousness.
258
  Ultimately, Bookchin seeks to place these two natures on 
an evolutionary continuum, the recognition of which will lead to a third, 
“ecological” nature.  The first and second natures should be in conversation 
because they share in the fabric of being.  The human aspect common to the two 
natures and the emphasis that these two natures need to be harmonized refutes the 
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possible characterization of dialectical naturalism as theoretical dialectics; at the 
very least it is a form of transactional dialectics.  As David Abram points out, the 
only reason humans (Bookchin’s second nature) can conceive of the nonhuman 
world (Bookchin’s first nature) as “other” at all is because they are part of that 
world: “We can perceive things at all only because we ourselves are entirely a 
part of the sensible world that we perceive!  We might as well say that we are 
organs of this world, flesh of its flesh, and that the world is perceiving itself 
through us.”259  Although, I imagine that Bookchin would object to the 
“mysticism” inherent in this statement, it reflects Bookchin’s own idea that 
humans are/should be the voice of the natural world.  Bookchin argues that the 
synthesis sought by employing dialectical naturalism will result in the dismantling 
of social institutions which perpetuate the domination of some groups over others.  
The dialectical aspect of dialectical naturalism provides a way to break free of the 
dualistic bind of nature and culture.  Thus, if the reification of social institutions 
leads to hegemonic domination of one group over others, a dialectical approach 
allows us to deconstruct those establishments and move towards more 
ecologically appropriate social structures.            
Is Bookchin’s dialectical naturalism transformational?  It seems defensible 
to make this characterization.  Bookchin’s dialectics is not too far removed from 
Hegel’s, in the sense that a synthesis arises out of the dialogue between first and 
second natures.  Of course, Bookchin departs from Hegel in the former’s rejecting 
an absolute spirit or metaphysical reality.  But Bookchin’s systhesis is not so 
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much a new reality as it is the recovery of a primal state of affairs.  In reconciling 
first and second natures, humans achieve balance between the two.  Tension is 
maintained, but no new reality is created.  In this way, Bookchin’s dialectical 
naturalism is very close to Burke’s dialectic which seeks to improve the condition 
of human society for all members but maintain ecological balance.  Bookchin’s 
dialectic, despite his distaste for mysticism, even refers to the transcendence of 
first and second natures in a “free nature” and so parallels to some degree Burke’s 
interest in transcendence.
260
   
We must, though, also question the way in which Bookchin describes 
dialectics as developmental.  He sets up his dialectical naturalism as an 
improvement on Hegelian and Marxist dialectics, positing the tension between the 
first and second natures.
261
  However, his emphasis on the evolutionary character 
of organic and inorganic beings creates a link between humanity and the 
nonhuman world.  This link is crucial to his argument, because it is on this basis 
that humans must find an ecological way to live.  The structures supporting 
industrial societies ignore the reality of the natural world, which for Bookchin is 
based on mutuality, harmony, and cooperation.  Simon identifies the limits of this 
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position, noting that while cooperation can be observed in some biotic processes, 
there is undeniably strife and conflict as well.  In addition we should add that 
Bookchin’s understanding of dialectics as both ontological and logical 
compromises the dialectical character of this philosophy.  For example, the idea 
that second nature opposes first nature allows us to see the logic of the dialectical 
relationship, but the fact that second nature emerges out of first nature 
complicates the claim that there is an objective ontological difference between the 
two.  Bookchin, of course, acknowledges that the two are related and explains the 
dialectical, ontological connection by reference to “eduction,” a form of reasoning 
that “render(s) the latent possibilities of phenomena fully manifest and 
articulated.”262       
Despite the philosophical shortcomings of Bookchin’s dialectical 
approach, it is important to identify the rhetorical use to which the dialectic is put.  
Bookchin locates the root of domination of nature and majority segments of 
human society in a view of nature as conflictual and the use of instrumental 
reason.  This conflict leads humans to seek to obtain their welfare at the expense 
of the nonhuman world.  This view of nature should be corrected to perceive 
nature as rooted in harmony, differentiation, and mutuality, and if so corrected by 
the use of dialectical naturalism (organic reasoning), social forms of domination 
would no longer be tenable.  Bookchin seeks to persuade his audience by linking 
the meaning of “nature” as ecosystems and biotic communities with the meaning 
of “nature” as an a priori essence of entities.  The first meaning of nature is 
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employed when writing about environmental problems; the second when 
discussing “first nature” and “second nature.”  In fact, the idea of “first nature” 
incorporates both meanings of nature.  So the argument that second nature 
evolves or emerges out of first nature is both logically and ontologically entailed 
in the way that Bookchin constructs the term, and the acceptance of the logical 
sequence of his dialectical reasoning favors the acceptance of his ontological 
causality (as Janet Biehl describes it).  We can see how the logic and rhetoric of 
dialectical naturalism cooperate to establish a sense of intellectual identification 
with the philosophical premise of social ecology and a sense of ontological 
identification of the (human) members of his audience with the wider biological 
community.        
3.5.2.2 Ecofeminism 
Although it would be inaccurate to claim that Ecofeminists in general 
acknowledge a dialectical component within their discourse, some Ecofeminists 
do.
263
  Karen Warren argues that one area at which the various Ecofeminisms 
intersect is language.
264
  She refers to Wittgenstein’s descriptions of the role 
language plays in constructing conceptual frameworks.  While she does not offer 
any linguistically-based method for addressing the domination of women and 
nature perpetuated in a variety of contemporary discourses, one Ecofeminist who 
does is Val Plumwood.  In her book, Environmental Culture: the Ecological 
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Crisis of Reason, Plumwood offers an extended and sophisticated critique of the 
host of authoritative dualisms current in modern, Western cultures: culture/nature, 
reason/nature, human/nature, mind/body.
265
  Plumwood argues that these 
dualisms serve as the foundation for “hegemonic centrisms,” structures which 
then take on a universal status.
266
  These centrisms, among them 
anthropocentrism, have lead to the ecological crisis.  These centrisms are the 
result of a monological culture of rationalism, a crisis of reason.  This crisis is not 
one that can be solved technologically, though, for it is not a failing of nature.  
Rather, “[t]he ‘ecological’ crisis is a crisis or failing of reason and culture, a crisis 
of monological forms of both that are unable to adapt themselves to the earth and 
to the limit of other kinds of life.”267 
In response to this predicament, Plumwood argues that we need to develop 
an “environmental culture”: “In its fullest meaning, developing an environmental 
culture involves a systematic resolution of the nature/culture and reason/nature 
dualisms that split mind from body, reason from emotion, across their many 
domains of cultural influence.”268  Plumwood believes a “dialogical interspecies 
ethics” could counter the hegemonic tendencies of rationalist dualism.269  The 
reason guiding a dialogical ethics is based not on a subject/object dichotomy, 
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which leads to monological hegemony of rationalism, but a subject/subject 
dichotomy, the nature of which resists hegemonic appropriation.  Granted, 
dialogical and dialectical are not identical terms.  However, if we place 
Plumwood’s dialogical ethics in the context of her analysis of the root cause of 
the “ecological crisis,” what we find is that her approach is essentially dialectical 
in a very Burkean sense.  Her dialogical solution seeks to resolve the “dualisms 
that split mind and body” by redirecting our attention to a dialogical view of 
human/non-human interaction.  This is Burke’s comic frame.  It is also a response 
to Plumwood’s dialectics of nature/culture, nature/reason, but as a response is 
dependent on what her dialectical approach uncovers.  But the dialectical 
approach is always implied in dialogical ethics since this form of ethics is always 
related to what it is not—monological.  Moreover, when we recall that Burke used 
ecology to refer to that material aspect of human life and kept this aspect in 
tension with the logological aspect of human life, we find much more similarity 
than we may have expected.  
Plumwood describes the dialogical approach in a way which draws quite 
near to Bookchin’s use of the term ‘dialectical’.  Both approaches recognize a 
dichotomy in which the terms involved are in tension.  For Bookchin, the 
dichotomy is of first nature and second nature.  The dialogical nature of 
Plumwood’s approach sees humans moving between the terms “nature” and 
“culture,” so that the dualism no longer exists as an absolute difference.  Rather, 
nature and culture must be seen as equally legitimate topoi, and only a dialectical 
movement between them can reveal the reality in which they both participate.  
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Thus, although Plumwood prefers the term “dialogical,” her project is not far off 
from that of the Social Ecologists, a primary difference being the terms which 
comprise the dualism.  The connection between these two thinkers dialectic and 
rhetoric can now be clarified.  When Bookchin and Plumwood argue for a 
resolution of their respective dichotomies (first and second natures for Bookchin, 
nature/reason for Plumwood), they do so with the intention of offering a new way 
to view human living, a new mode of human consciousness.  Both operate within 
the anthropocentrism/nonanthropocentrism dichotomy, favoring the latter as the 
proper ecological worldview.  In presenting their arguments as philosophy, they 
are developing what Burke terms a “stylistic identification” for their audience to 
accept.  This identification can be characterized as (properly) rational, egalitarian, 
and environmentally recuperative. 
3.5.2.3 Arne Naess     
Arne Naess does not explicitly refer to dialectics as an aspect of the Deep 
Ecology approach.  However, a central aspect of Naess’s thought is elucidating a 
method of discussing environmental and ecological problems in a way that affects 
and develops the kind of thinking required to solve these problems.  This aspect 
of Naess’s thought is obfuscated by the writings of other Deep Ecologists.  This is 
not to say that they misrepresent or misinterpret Naess’s thought, but that they 
seem to have overlooked this crucial element.  By clarifying the intention behind 
what is often considered to be vagueness on the part of Naess, we can see that 
Naess advocates a specific, albeit implicit, method of articulating ecological 
awareness that is essentially dialectical.  When we understand Naess’s ecological 
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rhetoric, we will find that not only critiques of Deep Ecology as a hegemonic 
anthropocentrism can be answered, but that there is an underlying unity among 
the various types of radical ecology that can be used to further the conversation 
among them.   My discussion of Deep Ecology below sees the dialectical form as 
inherent in the deep questioning approach to thinking ecologically.  In other 
words, Naess advocates dialectical understanding as a strategy to affect a 
transformation in consciousness, a move towards ecological thinking.  
 I discussed above the dialectical approaches of Social Ecology and 
Ecofeminism.  In fact, Naess’s philosophy is likewise dialectical.  The core of 
Naess’s philosophy is based on a dialectics of ontology and ethics. As Naess 
states, “It is, I think, important in the philosophy of environmentalism to move 
from ethics to ontology and back.  Clarification of differences in ontology may 
contribute to the clarification of different policies and their ethical basis.”270  That 
Naess is concerned with ontology and ethics, not merely with ontology alone, has 
been ignored by most commentators on Naess’s brand of Deep Ecological 
thought.  This movement between ontology and ethics serves as the impetus for 
Naess’s development of a method philosophical inquiry which incorporates 
alternating processes of questioning and derivation.  Furthermore, it justifies the 
otherwise vague and systematic presentation of Deep Ecology.   
The process of “deep questioning” leads one to a further articulation of 
ultimate premises.  The process of “loose derivation” leads one from those 
premises to a concrete basis for ethical action.  But the process is circular so that 
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the concrete particulars are constantly being refined in light of clearer (evolving?) 
articulations of the ultimate premise.  This movement could also be thought of as 
spiraling outward.  A spiral highlights the concept of increasingly wider 
identification with others.  As one develops deeper ecological premises, one sees 
that one’s being need not be limited to the physical body or individual ego.  From 
this more comprehensive ontology will be derived ethical norms that incorporate 
a greater number of individual beings.  Since one’s relationship with some beings 
will not yet be informed by the derived ethical norms, one must come back to the 
process of deep question and examine whether there is any reason why one should 
not identify with these beings, and so on.  
 We can see from this description of Naess’s dialectic, the basis of the 
DEA, that whether we refer to the cognitive/epistemological experience of deep 
questioning as ‘identification’ or ‘solidarity’ (as Plumwood suggests) does not 
matter a great deal.  What is important is that the method addresses ethical 
relationships in a significant way, without diminishing the value of individual 
beings.  In fact, as Naess has repeatedly claimed, the greater the diversity of 
individual beings, the greater the degree of self-realization.  Furthermore, if the 
process of self-realization (i.e., the process of deep questioning) can continue, 
then there is more opportunity to refine one’s ethical position.  So the process of 
self-realization does not only lead to a wider scope of ethical concern, it also leads 
to a more sophisticated and well-developed ethics, perhaps the kind of ethics that 
radical ecology envisions.   But none of this would be possible without the 
rhetorical elements of Naess’s philosophy.  Terms such as ‘Deep Ecology,’ ‘self-
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realization,’ and ‘ecosophy’ draw one into a sphere of discourse that conjoins 
philosophy, ethics, and ecology in the context of a dialectic aimed at the 
transformation of consciousness. 
3.5.3 Deep Rhetoric 
 Bookchin, Plumwood, and Naess all place emphasis on ontology in 
articulating their philosophies.  But in attempting to speak meaningfully to an 
audience, their ontological concerns are imbued with ethical significance.  The 
relationship between ethics and ontology in these instances of radical ecology can 
be highlighted by showing the dialectics inherent in all three.  All three thinkers 
share the goal of transforming an audience’s attitudes (or consciousness) so that 
the shared ontology between the human and nonhuman spheres leads to a change 
in behavior: they all aim for a transformative dialectics.   
David Tracy argues: “Our knowledge of reality is irrevocably linked to 
our use of language.  Our language is possible because of the differential relations 
that constitute the words of the particular language.  Any claims to full presence, 
especially claims to full self-presence in conscious thought, are illusions that 
cannot survive a study of language as a system of differential relations.”271  
Tracy’s remarks further highlight the dialectical nature of humanity’s onto-
linguistic condition and demonstrates why uncovering the dialectics of each of the 
three thinkers discussed above helps understand the rhetorical nature of their 
project.  Each thinker presents a view of humanity as dependent on the nonhuman 
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world, which serves to undermine anthropocentric bias.  Bookchin’s “free 
nature,” Plumwood’s “solidarity,” and Naess’s “wide identification” all offer an 
ontological alternative, but one that can only be realized through a change in 
behavior.  Dialectical/dialogical approaches to speaking about human being in the 
world acknowledge the relationship we have with what exists around us.  Viewed 
rhetorically, the dialectics of each thinker opens the door to linking onotology to 
ethics.  But, only Naess offers a way to make the dialectics a tool of achieving 
transformation, continually exposing the “differential relations” between the 
“self” and “other” that leads to the incorporation of an ever greater diversity of 
opinions.  And this dialectical process is strengthened and motivated by the other 
rhetorical elements of his philosophy such as ambiguity, vagueness, and novel 
terminology.  
 
3.6 Religious Environmentalism and Rhetoric 
 The preceding discussions in this chapter have mainly dealt with 
environmental rhetoric within secular environmentalism or environmental 
philosophy.  One reason for analyzing the dialectics of radical ecology is because, 
more than any other type of environmental philosophy, radical ecology addresses 
worldviews.  Because of this concern with worldviews, many religious 
environmentalists look to radical ecology, in particular Deep Ecology, as a link 
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between environmental concern and religious belief.
272
  Naess contributes to the 
religiosity of Deep Ecology with references to concepts in Buddhism and Advaita 
Hinduism.  But many scholars and activists recognize that “[b]y probing world 
views [sic.], [D]eep [E]cology inevitably is concerned with religious teachings 
and spiritual attitudes.”273  Whether Deep Ecology is a form of religion or 
religious is a question that scholars can address.  Roger Gottlieb states plainly that 
“Spiritual [D]eep [E]cology is at once the oldest and newest of world 
religions.”274  But we should ask: why would a religiously oriented environmental 
philosophy be appealing or useful to the task of environmental philosophy, 
generally considered a secular enterprise?  As noted in chapter two, theologians 
responded to the call for more inquiry into the relationship between religion and 
the environment following Lynn White’s essay implicating the Judeo-Christian 
worldview in the contemporary environmental crisis.  Much of that earlier work 
focused on theology and religious doctrines, intending to show whether there was 
an anti-environmental bias (which usually meant anthropocentric, following the 
terms of the debate White initiated) in religion or religious traditions.  Many 
claimed to show that in each tradition there are rich resources to support an 
environmental ethics.  But if the tests came back negative, if a tradition seemed 
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deeply anthropocentric, what were environmentally-concerned religious leaders to 
do?  Rarely was the suggestion made that religions be dispensed with.  So 
scholars set about to see how religions could be reinterpreted or refocused to 
encourage environmentally friendly behavior.  In addition, following the ethical 
calls to action by pioneers like Leopold and Carson, discussions of ethics 
inevitably spilled into questions of religion and religion’s role in society.275  But 
as Roger Gottlieb notes the involvement of religious organizations in 
environmentalism is somewhat less inevitable, for despite the importance of 
religious leaders and communities in social movements like civil rights, there is 
also a history of religious opposition to progressive social movements.
276
  It is this 
aspect of religious environmentalism—the use of religious discourse to forge 
communities, motivate activism, and to challenge establishments and 
institutions—that truly animates the field of religion and ecology.277  In other 
words, it is the promise of religious rhetoric that lies at the heart of the field.   
 The theological and philosophical work done to articulate environmental 
ethics within (or coming out of) religious traditions needs to be seen as 
contributing to the larger project of religious environmentalism.  One of the most 
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important contemporary figures in the field of religion and ecology, Mary Evelyn 
Tucker, referring to the “ecological phase” of religions, claims: “Indeed, the 
environmental crisis calls the religions of the world to respond by finding their 
voice within the larger Earth community.  In so doing, the religions are now 
entering their ecological phase and finding their planetary expression.”278  She 
states that religions can help us “revision our role as citizens of the universe” and 
reorient humans to the Earth.
279
  Tucker addresses the fact that religious traditions 
contain resources that do not have any implicit connection with 
environmentalism.  To reconstruct and reconstitute religions “toward 
reconceiving mutually enhancing human-Earth relations” requires significant 
hermeneutical work.
280
  But in comments like “religions in their postmodern 
phase can inspire larger aspirations for our place and purpose in nature than 
simply economic exploitation,” we see basic rhetorical forces at work.281  It is not 
the religions that actively seek to inspire, but humans who see in religious 
discourse the power to change attitudes and opinions, to inspire, and to persuade 
larger communities to implement critical changes in behavior.   
In this chapter I have attempted to work out how rhetoric can contribute to 
our understanding of the environmental values we in our communities currently 
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hold, but also offer a method of constructing more effective and practical forms of 
communicating environmental value.  This is not simply to find a way to 
circumvent reasoned deliberation, but to contribute to the problem that scholars 
like Bryan Norton, Killingsworth and Palmer, and Oelschlaeger confront, who 
identify the failure of environmentalism with a failure of discourse and 
communication.  Below I will suggest some ways that a rhetorical approach to 
religious environmentalism can offer religious leaders and communities a means 
to draw clearer and more meaningful connections between their traditions and the 
community’s environmental concern. 
3.6.1 Audience and Identification 
 Rhetoric alerts us to the vital importance of identifying, understanding, 
and responding to an audience.  One way that one succeeds in gaining an 
audience’s assent to a proposition or proposal is by forging identification between 
one’s self and the audience and creating unity within the audience.  This means 
that one must deliver one’s proposition in a form that induces assent but also 
connects to the values and opinions held by the audience.  We saw that many 
environmental philosophers support the use of narrative as a successful form.  
Narrative, in Bruce Lincoln’s terms, needs to evoke emotion and be ideologically 
persuasive.  The problem with the more philosophical or doctrinal analyses in 
religion and ecology is that the authors have not identified any particular 
audience, or the audience is merely a limited community of academic specialists.  
Certainly, there are scholars whose interests are purely academic and are not 
concerned with the effects on religious environmentalism.  But as I have shown, 
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there is a current of practical engagement that many scholars bring to their work 
on religious environmentalism.  Certainly this is true of the Jewish, Christian, and 
Muslim ecotheologians, but many contributors to Buddhist and Hindu 
environmentalism are also practitioners. 
Ramachandra Guha’s critique of radical environmentalism points out that 
no approach, no matter how successful or popular in one cultural context, is 
necessarily applicable to another cultural context.  When Willis Jenkins maintains 
that “[f]or an environmental ethic to be ‘practical’...its readers must come away 
with some moral sense to their involvement with extra-human world,” he implies 
that the practicality of environmental ethics depends in part on the degree to 
which the propositions are meaningful to the audience.
282
  Supporting an 
understanding of truth as arising out of public/communal deliberation, 
environmental pragmatists create a space for a community to be formed based on 
the collective will of the members of the audience.  The way in which issues are 
raised and addressed determines the values of the community.  The way audience 
functions here resembles an externalization of Burke’s idea of the self as 
audience, a process by which one comes to identify with a community or society 
from examining and creating a hierarchy of values.
283
   
When we consider the importance of audience in religion and ecology, it 
becomes clear that limiting it to religious studies or theology is insufficient.  The 
resources and skill of the anthropologist or sociologist are perhaps better suited to 
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identify the dynamics and commitments of a religious community than those of 
the religious studies scholar or theologian.  Rhetorical inquiries that seek to 
identify what topoi the environmentalist (religious or secular) might turn to to 
make an effective appeal for activism or ethical reflection (regardless of whether 
such inquiries are academic, activist, or both) thus lead us to reexamine the 
foundations of the field and where it fits in the larger academy.   
3.6.2 Examples   
In section 2.6 I provided an overview of two religious environmentalisms, 
Jewish and Confucian.  If we just look at the two traditions monolithically and from the 
perspective of doctrine, they have much in common.  Both seem to subscribe to a notion 
of universal law that is essentially ethical and guides human society.  Both advocate 
humility in light of this law.  Both view the natural world as somehow embodying this 
law.  But a rhetorical perspective leads us to see the situation differently.  In this section 
I will offer a revision of these overviews from a rhetorical perspective to illustrate 
how this method opens new insights valuable to both the scholar and 
environmentalist.   
3.6.2.1 Confucianism 
Confucianism, and particularly the Song dynasty development known as 
Neo-Confucianism, offers a metaphysics and cosmology with resources that seem 
to support a nonanthropocentric worldview, concern for nonhuman beings, and a 
strong emphasis on observing ethical norms.  For these reasons, scholars like Tu 
Weiming suggest Confucian humanism can serve as a model for how societies 
can reorient themselves towards environmentally-positive behavior.  Tu, in fact, 
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argues that Confucianism is more properly termed ‘anthroposcosmic’, suggesting 
the dynamic interrelationship between humans and the rest of the cosmos.  Tu’s 
point is interesting and his use of ‘anthropocosmic’ is appealing, although it does 
not necessarily make humans equal with other beings.  Rather, it suggests that 
humans hold a special position in the universe, a position that highlights the 
importance of appropriate human action, but not one that challenges the notion of 
human superiority.
284
  And while it is true that there is a significant use of natural 
imagery in Neo-Confucian discussions of self-cultivation, reflecting the 
importance of the natural world in human striving for sagehood, this imagery is 
mostly just imagery.
285
  It does not follow that the use of natural imagery 
engendered a sense of responsibility for the concrete world of nature.  Moreover, 
the material that Tu and Tucker draw on, while being labeled ‘Confucian’ is 
almost exclusively taken from the tradition known as Neo-Confucianism.  But as 
Hoyt Tillman has shown through his identification of three “levels of discourse” 
among Song Confucians, the metaphysical level of discourse (what Tillman labels 
“speculative philosophy”) was not always the level from which Confucians 
sought to address problems, and they did not always respond to issues with the 
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level of discourse at which the issue was initially raised.
286
  From this 
observation, we can see that important distinctions need to be made within Neo-
Confucian thought, even more so when we speak of Confucianism as a whole. 
Approaching Confucian environmental ethics from a rhetorical 
perspective, alternatively, we would first seek to identify an audience.  The 
promise of Confucian environmentalism begins to falter here.  One the one hand, 
it is not easy to identify a large Confucian community that would have a 
significant environmental impact.  Confucianism is an influential cultural tradition 
in China, Japan, and Korea, but even in Chinese cultural regions, such as Taiwan, 
there is little sense that Confucianism is a religious tradition.  The lack of 
audience suggests that the project of Confucian environmental ethics is not likely 
to have pragmatic effect.  This is not to say that values such as filial peity (xiao 
shun 孝順), appropriateness (li 禮), and humanity (ren 仁) need not be presented 
as Confucian for them to be accepted.  Instead, the challenge is to identify in what 
manner to communicate these concepts to an audience for which these ideas have 
resonance.  One possible consideration would be to look at the age group of the 
audience.  Using the above concepts may be a fruitful way to engage older 
Chinese audiences for whom traditional values might resonate more deeply.   
What can be said of concepts like qi (vital energy, breath) and Dao (the 
way of, sometimes translated as nature)?  Confucian philosophers have not been 
silent on these topics, but, to be sure, they belong to Chinese philosophy and 
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religion broadly rather than having their provenance in either Daoism or 
Confucianism.  For contemporary scholars who want to access the environmental 
resources in Chinese religious traditions, these two concepts are central.  Tu 
Weiming and Cheng Chungying both develop theories of Chinese religious 
environmentalism around these ideas.  But what traction do they have with more 
modern audiences?  Does framing environmental issues in terms of qi or Dao 
inspire audiences?  It would be hard to argue that they do.  The terms are common 
enough in everyday discourse, but not in the highly philosophical sense that Tu 
and Cheng use them.  A rhetorical perspective allows us to better situate the kind 
of work that Tu and Cheng are carrying out.  It is not work that will impact a large 
audience, but the way in which they organize Chinese religious environmental 
ethics with notions like qi and Dao as the basis, helps illuminate other potential 
topoi that might have more practical application.  For example, Tu reference to 
the “fruitful ambiguity” of the meaning of qi that “allows philosophers to explore 
realms of being which are inconceivable to people constricted by a Cartesian 
dichotomy” mirrors Naess’s intentional ambiguity which promotes discussion and 
leads possibly to consensus.
287
  Cheng suggests that environment should be 
understood as Dao, which is related to “natural spontaneity” (ziran 自然).  Cheng 
defines natural spontaneity as “a matter of infinite depth and infinite breadth in an 
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onto-cosmological sense.”288  As a descriptive statement, arguing for this kind of 
definition of environment would probably not appeal to many listeners.  But it fits 
well into the form of rhapsody/epistemology that Scott Slovic uses to analyze 
American nature writers.  So the move that Cheng makes is not as philosophically 
important as the sense of awe evoked by representing environment as “infinite 
depth and infinite breadth.”   
There is still more rhetorical work to be done to move an audience to act 
from this sense of wonder, but the rhetorical value of Cheng’s philosophical 
analysis seems to me more effective than the philosophical analysis itself, at least 
in terms of practical environmentalism.  Finally, both Tu and Cheng refer to the 
interaction between qi and Dao.  Cheng notes that they form a dialectic which 
joins metaphysics to materiality in a way that affirms the value of both.  As we 
have seen already, dialectics is a valuable element of the rhetorical approach and 
the necessity of formulating an environmental ethic by incorporating both qi and 
Dao serves as a fine illustration of this point.  
3.6.2.2 Judaism 
 The case with Judaism is quite different from Confucianism.  Unlike 
Confucianism, Judaism has many readily identifiable communities (audiences) 
defined by ethnic differences, theological differences, and linguistic differences.  
These communities share a common historical trajectory, but each also has its 
own history of development.   
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If we look at the denominations of modern Judaism, such as modern 
Orthodoxy, Reform, Conservative, and Reconstructionism, we can identify 
different ways environmentalism might be made meaningful.  Orthodox thinkers 
have identified many laws concerned with the protection of the natural world, 
which, when combined with the absolute importance of the Torah in Orthodox 
Judaism, has led Orthodox thinkers from Samson Hirsch on to advocate that 
protection and avoidance of misuse of natural resources is incumbent on every 
Jew.  Since Conservative Judaism shares with Orthodox Judaism a deep concern 
for maintaining the law, there are a number of Conservative Jewish thinkers that 
have likewise been very active in promoting (Jewish) environmental ethics within 
Jewish communities.  Reconstructionism’s progressive posture suggests that it 
would positively respond to and advocate ecologically beneficial attitudes and 
practices.  Given the naturalistic character of the movement’s philosophy, 
however, its responses may not be very different from the secular social responses 
found in the environmental movement. 
The various denominations each have their own particular theological and 
organizational constraints and nuances which present different possibilities to 
each community.  Despite the denominational character of Judaism in the United 
States, organizations such as COEJL (Coalition for Environment and Jewish Life) 
suggest that Jewish leaders and communities seek to address environmental issues 
from the stance of Judaism, as opposed to denominations.  In addition, a review of 
the literature suggests that the discourse of Judaism and the environment has 
defined Judaism as a single entity.  Recurrent themes stand out from the literature, 
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such as the commandments, the importance of the Torah, and a sense of 
stewardship towards creation.  But this common strand might be might be more 
apparent than real, each author writing from his or her own perspective as if that 
perspective is the “Jewish” one.  In addition, as Hava Tirosh-Samuelson observes, 
“the religious sources of Judaism do not inform the identity of most Jews, and 
secular Jews do not appeal to them in their attempt to address environmental 
concerns.”289  However, it is possible that the urgency of the environmental crisis 
will lead to a renegotiation of older boundaries between the strands of Judaism.  
Perhaps the leading theologians and rabbis will classify the environment as a pan-
Jewish issue, while retaining denominational distinctions on other issues such as 
marriage, membership, and ritual practice.   
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 In this chapter I have argued that because of the practical nature of 
environmental ethics and philosophy, these various philosophies are presented 
with an interest in persuading an audience to accept a certain position.  This is no 
less true of religiously-oriented environmentalisms.  In fact, given the highly 
metaphorical nature of religious discourse, the persuasive strategies and tactics 
are more effusive than those in secular environmental discourse.  Based on this 
assessment, I argued that a rhetorical analysis can reveal the motives of 
representatives of various environmentalist positions.  I outline the key elements 
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of rhetoric as they would apply to the kind of practical philosophy environmental 
philosophy and ethics tends to be.  A robust rhetorical approach will use concepts 
of identification, audience, and framing to analyze the potential a delivery or 
proposition has.  I also discussed the importance of dialectics to the rhetorical 
approach.  Dialectics highlights the vocabulary of values relevant to each 
audience that the rhetor can draw on to achieve identification.  Dialectics is also a 
mode of inquiry that promotes effective communication between opposing 
positions with the aim of resolving conflict and establishing a unity.  It is thus a 
tool available to the scholar studying the discourse of religious environmentalism 
and the rhetor employing the rhetoric of religious environmentalism.  
Rhetorical analysis has much in common with the discourse analysis 
approaches advocated by Hajer and others.  Rhetorical analysis helps scholars 
address the difficulties and conceptual impasses that environmental philosophies 
(both secular and religious) have encountered in the history of their development.  
A rhetorical approach does not nullify other approaches (philosophical, 
sociological, anthropological, etc.), but Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar notes that 
rhetorical consciousness arises with a crisis within a discourse.
290
  So 
environmental problems are not solely rhetorical problems, but rhetoric can 
advance our ability to discuss, think about, and formulate responses to 
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environmental problems, especially when the tools and methods of other 
discourses seem to have stalled.   
The rhetorical approach, by emphasizing elements of audience, framing, 
and identification, also works on another level.  This is the practical level by 
which environmental advocates are encouraged to conceive of their discursive 
strategies in rhetorical terms.  From the comparative examples of  Judaism and 
Confucianism, an analysis of rhetoric reveals that conceptual similarities, once 
contextualized, might not speak to the same concern.  We might consider the 
Jewish commandment “do not destroy” as akin to the Buddhist teaching of “non-
harm” (Skt. ahiṃsā)  But before we make this connection, we would need to 
understand how each term is used in the environmental discourse of each 
tradition.  Raising awareness of the importance of rhetoric in effective 
communication and providing the outline for conceiving of successful screens and 
appeals, environmental communication can be made more effective and better 
achieve the goal of motivating audiences to implementing practical measures.         
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Chapter 4 
BUDDHISM AND ECOLOGY
291
 
In this chapter, I will begin with an overview of the scholarship on 
Buddhism and ecology, describing what concepts have been at the forefront of the 
discussion and how these concepts have been developed.  Then I will argue for a 
contextualized approach to analyzing Buddhist environmentalism, one which 
attends to a community-specific, or country-specific understanding of Buddhism 
and focuses on the ways that environmentalism has been practiced and articulated 
as a Buddhist concern in each specific community.  This approach requires 
clarifying how key terms, such as environment and dependent origination (Skt. 
pratitya samutpāda, Ch. yuanqi 緣起), are interpreted.  It also requires examining 
the efforts of Buddhists to communicate environmental practices as part of the 
Buddhist tradition and operationalize the key terms.  I will focus specifically on 
the ways ‘environment’ has been discussed by scholars of Chinese Buddhism and 
the critiques that these scholars have regarding the current discourse of Chinese 
Buddhist environmentalism.  I will conclude by arguing that the label Chinese 
Buddhist environmentalism better characterizes the current discourse and 
practices than phrases like Buddhism and ecology or eco-Buddhism.    
4.1       Survey of the Field 
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A survey of recent work on Buddhism and ecology reveals that the major 
trends in scholarship reflect similar trends in secular environmental ethics and 
work in other religious traditions.  Although the literature in the field continues to 
grow, most scholars deal with Buddhist environmentalism in addition to their 
primary areas of focus.  Generally speaking, the majority of articles address the 
question of Buddhist environmental ethics, sometimes crossing over into 
philosophy, as is common in secular environmental ethics.  Many articles have 
appeared in journals such as the Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Contemporary 
Buddhism, and the Journal of Global Buddhism.  Many seminal articles can be 
found in the four edited volumes on Buddhism and ecology.
292
  There is usually a 
chapter devoted to environmental questions in anthologies on Buddhist ethics like 
Contemporary Buddhist Ethics and Destroying Mara Forever.  Peter Harvey’s 
comprehensive treatment of Buddhist ethics, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, 
likewise contains a chapter on Buddhist environmental attitudes.  These 
collections are valuable for showing that not all work on Buddhist 
environmentalism is bound to an ethics-based approach.    However, the book-
length treatments of Buddhist environmentalism all deal with Buddhist 
environmentalism from the perspective of environmental ethics.   
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To date, there are three English language monographs, Environmental 
Ethics in Buddhism by Pragati Sahni, Environmental Philosophy and Ethics in 
Buddhism by Padmasiri deSilva, and Zen Buddhism and Environmental Ethics by 
Simon P. James.  Sahni and de Silva address the difficulties of reading 
environmental concern back into Buddhist concepts that became current well 
before there was anything such as “the environmental crisis.”  Both works attempt 
to articulate clearly the parameters and practices that constitute Buddhist 
environmental ethics.  On this basis Sahni’s work fairs much better, since she 
focuses on one ethical approach, virtue ethics.  Regrettably, Sahni and de Silva’s 
historical and philosophical analyses are overwhelmingly directed towards how to 
construct a Buddhist ethic solely based on traditional (Theravāda) and textual 
material.  The problem in this approach is that it provides no clear examples of 
how Buddhists today are to proceed, short from the pursuit of enlightenment.
293
  
Sahni concludes that “early Buddhism can be seen to address environmental 
problems once its philosophy is interpreted in the right spirit.”294  This sounds 
reasoned and critical, yet raises the question: How much does early Buddhism and 
the ethical system surrounding it apply to Buddhists today?  What does it mean 
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for the philosophy of early Buddhism to be “interpreted in the right spirit”?  The 
answer inherent in Sahni’s conclusion is that the right spirit is one that articulates 
a Buddhist environmental ethic that differs only in minor details with the 
dominant strands of Western environmental ethics.  The point to be made here is 
that the most thorough efforts at seeking an environmental ethic in Buddhist 
philosophy are always guided by the normative parameters of global 
environmental ethical discourse(s), and so such efforts have lost sight of the very 
audience they intend to address. 
De Silva’s work is interesting more for what it does not state than for what 
it does.  Throughout his book, De Silva refers to the practical nature of Buddhist 
ethics, to the attention the Buddha paid to context when delivering a teaching (for 
example, “[t]he Buddha’s sermons are permeated with an eye for context and 
practicality.”295)  And de Silva argues that any environmental ethics should be 
likewise practical and contextual, at one point claiming ethics should be a “way of 
life.”296  But when de Silva proffers evidence of early Buddhist environmental 
concern he often presents it without any reference to context.  The project that de 
Silva engages in, articulating a Buddhist environmental ethics from a 
reinterpretation of early sources, does not coincide with the way in which he 
presents the character of the project, which sees ethics as tied to contexts.  He 
therefore implies that rhetoric should be a valuable aspect of Buddhist 
environmental discourse (per the emphasis on the contextuality of the passages he 
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cites), but fails to explicitly recognize that a rhetorical analysis of the same 
passages would yield a more accurate and reasonable understanding of just what 
in the Buddhist tradition is inherently applicable to a contemporary Buddhist 
environmental ethics.
297
      
Simon James’ work seems like it would offer the closest treatment to 
Chinese Buddhist environmentalism.  The work is solely philosophical in its 
approach and is mostly directed towards an audience unfamiliar with Buddhism.  
While it provides some philosophical food for thought, it is falls into the same 
category as other works that seek to align the ethics of a given religious tradition 
with commonly accepted norms of environmental ethics in hope of providing a 
resource for some sort of global environmental ethic.  Like Sahni, James 
adovacates an environmental virtue ethics approach as the most inviting for 
Buddhism.
298
  In a chapter on “Zen ethics” he delineates how Zen can be thought 
of as a virtue ethics tradition, even to go so far as to imply that Zen is virtue 
ethics.   
In spite of the tight arguments James makes, the work suffers consistently 
from the intagibility of James’s main subject, Zen.  Although taking Zen as his 
focus, much of what he says of Zen ethics—prizing wisdom (Skt. prajna) and 
compassion (Skt. karuna), importance of skillful means, the goal of awakening—
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is simply true of most strands of the Mahayāna tradition (Tiantai, Huayan, Pure 
land, etc.).  “Zen,” which James takes as some sort of agent, refers to whatever 
can be called Zen.  His sources are gathered from the Chinese, Japanese and 
American Buddhist traditions, as well as sources he argues Zen is based on: 
Daoism, Confucianism, and Shinto.  Although he treats Zen as philosophy he 
states that “it is in practice that the ‘real’ Zen is found.”299  Is this to mean that the 
book, which treats Zen philosophically, is then not really about the ‘real’ Zen?  In 
one way, yes.  As he notes, “I have drawn indiscriminately from various Zen 
traditions as I saw fit in order to make this or that particular point.”300  In addition, 
the real Zen as he defines it is about practice, particularly zazen, a practice that 
might make one more receptive to suffering of non-human beings and 
environmental systems but does not qualify as ethics.  But if James’s presumed 
audience is environmental philosophers (as we should assume when he says that 
this book is about environmental ethics), then how does his conclusion that he has 
not attempted to construct a Zen Buddhist environmental ethics, but “an 
environmental ethics inspired by Zen Buddhism,” accomplished by fitting 
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Buddhist-related notions into the mold of an Aristotilean virtue ethic, speak to 
Buddhists?  The problem here is apparent in many such works.  It is intellectually 
intriguing, but fails to address the tough questions of religious environmental 
ethics like how can religious leaders drawn on their tradition effectively to 
motivate members of their community to carry out environmental practices.  Had 
James addressed his book to contemporary Zen Buddhist leaders, he would have 
gone some way to pushing the field forward.                   
Finally, some additional noteworthy articles should be mentioned.  First, 
several articles by Ian Harris have served to pose a challenge to the all-too-simple 
approach of sliding Buddhist terms up against concepts common in environmental 
ethics.  He has argued that the approach taken by many scholars to construct an 
eco-Buddhist ethic distorts the tradition and misinterprets central tenets.  
Although possibly troubling to scholars who are trying to forge an ethic of this 
ilk, his objections are nonetheless thought-provoking and intended to refine the 
discourse.  Harris also provides us with the first typology of Buddhist 
environmentalism. 
Donald Swearer’s article, “An Assessment of Buddhist Ecophilosophy” 
builds upon the typology of eco-Buddhism proffered by Harris.
301
  Swearer’s 
typology, building upon Harris’s, identifies five different eco-Buddhist positions: 
eco-apologist, eco-critic, eco-constructivist, eco-ethicist, and eco-contextualist:  
                                                 
301
 See Donald K. Swearer, "An Assessment of Buddhist Ecophilosophy," 
Harvard Theological Review 99:2 (2006), 123-137 and Ian Harris, "Getting to 
Grips with Buddhist Environmentalism: A Provisional Typology," Journal of 
Buddhist Ethics 2 (1995), 173-190. 
  190 
The first position [eco-apologist] holds that Buddhist 
environmentalism extends naturally from the Buddhist worldview; the second 
[eco-critic] that the Buddhist worldview does not harmonize with an 
environmental ethic. The third position [eco-constructivist] maintains that one 
can construct a Buddhist environmental ethic, though not coterminous with a 
Buddhist worldview, from Buddhist texts and doctrinal tenets; the fourth [eco-
ethicist], that one should evaluate a viable Buddhist environmental ethic in 
terms of Buddhist ethics rather than inferred from the Buddhist worldview. 
The fifth position [eco-contextualist] holds that the most effective Buddhist 
environmental ethic takes its definition in terms of particular contexts and 
situations.
302
 
  
The latter three positions are more recent responses to the critiques offered by the 
“eco-critics.”  Swearer’s article (and Harris’s) is important for it provides a clear 
and accurate picture of the various approaches to eco-Buddhism; most, but not all, 
of those being ethically-oriented.  Moreover, Swearer’s typology introduces a 
category he terms “eco-contextualists.”  This category is valuable in identifying 
how some Buddhists can express environmental concern without engaging in 
formal theoretical construction or debates.    
For almost two decades, scholars have been examining this intersection of 
Buddhism and the environment—is it legitimate?  How to articulate it?  Is it 
traditionally Buddhist?  Is it a new form of Buddhism?  The field of Buddhism 
and ecology has grown gradually since the first anthology of Buddhist 
environmental writing, Dharma Gaia, appeared in 1990.  Much of the scholarly 
work has addressed the ontological strands of Buddhist thought in an attempt to 
demonstrate that Buddhism is an “environmentally-friendly” tradition.  Some of 
this work has simply focused on descriptions of Buddhist texts as “ecological,” 
while other approaches have been more sophisticated, taking into consideration 
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the cultural contexts of the Buddhism under examination.  Not every scholar 
believes that Buddhism contains a sui generis environmental ethic and some have 
critiqued work on Buddhist environmentalism for twisting the tradition beyond 
recognition.  Since the environmental crisis as it is currently perceived is a 
contemporary, or at least modern, phenomenon, the resources that scholars draw 
upon and the very way in which they define the tradition precedes and conditions 
(if not determines) their environmental reading of the tradition.  Pragati Sahni 
describes the situation very well: “It is believed predominantly that nearly all 
Buddhist teachings in their application to the environment remain unclear and 
ambiguous.  Thus scholars at both ends of the spectrum have legitimate reason to 
trust their own interpretation and doubt others.”303 
 
4.2  Environmental ethics and Buddhist environmentalism 
Lambert Schmithausen has observed that “among Buddhists as well as 
Buddhologists there seems to be considerable disagreement with regard to 
whether Buddhism does or does not [favor] an ecological ethics.”304  Drawing on 
Swearer’s typology, arguments made by eco-apologists, eco-constructivists, and 
eco-ethicists relate popular Buddhist concepts to common concepts in 
environmental ethics.  Eco-constructivists differ from eco-apologists primarily on 
the point that the values, concepts, and practices from Buddhist tradition(s) need 
to be reinterpreted in light of current environmental situations.  Eco-critics argue 
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that the relationship between these two spheres is either inauthentic or that there 
are concepts that contradict or supersede the concepts that seem logically 
consistent with concepts in environmental ethics.  Eco-ethicists, further, attempt 
to discern what kind of environmental ethics Buddhism most closely resembles, in 
order to clarify what kinds of questions need to be asked.  From the literature, the 
dominant position, reflected in the work of authors like Sahni and others is that 
Buddhist environmental ethics most resembles virtue ethics.
305
  
But perhaps discussions of ethics in terms of type are misguided.  Is 
Buddhist environmentalism a form of virtue ethics?  It might have elements that 
resemble what is known as virtue ethics, as several scholars have pointed out, but 
it also seems amenable in ways to deontology and utilitarianism.  The fact that 
religious traditions are not coterminous with ethical systems makes it 
conceptually difficult to claim that a given religious tradition’s ethics is of one 
sort or another.  Thus, the debate that Schmithausen refers to of whether 
Buddhism is an ecological tradition appears to take the wrong question as its 
focus; as the Buddha might say, the question is poorly put.  For environmental 
ethics, as a form of practical ethics, is intent on seeking reasons advocating a 
change in behavior or attitude.  We need to look for other ways in which to assess 
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the ethical dimensions of a tradition’s environmental activities.  For Buddhist 
environmentalism we need to begin with the Buddhists who are engaging in 
environmental practice and examine how they are doing this.  It must have some 
effect on human behavior, individual or communal.  Whether Buddhism favors an 
ecological ethics depends on how Buddhists and scholars of Buddhism interpret 
elements of the tradition.  The evidence put forth for either position may be culled 
from the vast number of texts in the Buddhist canon, the interpretation of these 
texts by commentators, extra-canonical material, or the simple desire to present 
environmental concern as a meaningful aspect of Buddhist life.   In this case, the 
question should be put thus: how do Buddhists go about making 
environmentalism meaningful in the context of Buddhist thought and practice? 
How is nature interpreted, understood, articulated, and set in relationship to 
Buddhists?  These are better questions, because they are more closely tied to 
environmental ethics as a form of practical ethics.  By looking at articulations and 
critiques of Buddhist environmentalism, we can see how nature is viewed, 
defined, and interpreted in the process of negotiating the intersection of Buddhist 
ethics, practice, hermeneutics, and doctrine.  What for some is a metaphysical 
issue, is for others a purely ethical one.  Just why these differences obtain is a 
question that would further highlight the various streams of Buddhist 
environmentalism. 
Defining what Buddhist environmental ethics is, what it seeks to 
accomplish, and who it speaks to seem like related questions, but greater clarity of 
the issues at stake can be gleaned from engaging one further distinction.  As we 
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saw in chapter one, disagreement over what to label the field of religion and 
ecology involves more than just individual preference.  Various labels highlight 
different understandings of the goal of the field, meanings of nature, and 
interpretations of religion’s role in society.  This is no less true in the Buddhist 
case.  Environmentalism is a contemporary phenomenon.  Arguments can be 
made for the environmentalism of pre-modern and even pre-20
th
 century societies, 
but these characterizations would be only based on analogy.  What I have been 
discussing so far are interpretations of Buddhist tradition(s) and interpretations of 
environmental concern.  It can be said with certainty that Buddhism is not an 
inherently environmental tradition, no religious tradition is (except for Taylor’s 
dark green religion, or unless we count Deep Ecology as a religious tradition).  
But many scholars and others argue for the inherent environmental outlook in 
Buddhism, or as de Silva and Sahni do, argue that Buddhism from its earliest 
forms or essential concerns is compatible with environmentalism.  
This approach, which is predominantly textual in nature I refer to as eco-
Buddhism.  Eco-Buddhism refers to interpretations of the tradition as an 
ecological or environmental tradition.  It suggests that something in the nature or 
essence of Buddhism (or some tradition of Buddhism) is at root concerned with 
the well-being of the natural world.  Eco-Buddhism is a view of Buddhism that 
focuses on Buddhist texts and teachings apart from any concrete Buddhist 
community, sometimes for the purpose of applying Buddhist concepts to other 
religious traditions.  It is an ontological position.   
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In contrast to eco-Buddhism, there is Buddhist environmentalism.  
Following Gottlieb’s definition of religious environmentalism, I suggest that 
Buddhist environmentalism is a form of environmental practice that is carried out 
in Buddhist communities, by Buddhists acting as Buddhists.  Buddhism is central 
and relevant to Buddhist environmentalists, but they will draw on the way in 
which Buddhism is understood and practiced in its local context, which is to say 
that the Buddhist environmentalism of an American Theravāda community of 
central California simply cannot be identical to the Buddhist environmentalism of 
a Sri Lankan village inspired by the Sarvodaya movement, despite the common 
tradition of Theravāda Buddhism.  Buddhist environmentalism does not require 
the establishment of first principles or that moral concern for non-human beings 
be first justified through Buddhist scriptures.  Studying Buddhist 
environmentalism does imply that the scholar is best served by not passing 
normative judgments on what is authentic Buddhist practice and belief and what 
is not.  Following this mode of interpretation, eco-Buddhism itself can be 
identified as a form of Buddhist environmentalism, provided there is a concrete 
community that is carrying out environmental practices in response to 
environmental concern.  This distinction offers the advantage of organizing the 
methodological clutter that has resulted from the hermeneutical admixture of 
analytical approaches and activist approaches to Buddhism and 
environmentalism, a situation that is nonetheless the natural outcome of the 
diversity of interests within the field.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
  196 
  In recognizing the importance of audience we must also acknowledge 
that Buddhist environmentalism and any corresponding ethics are necessarily 
contemporary in focus.  This is not to say that textual analysis and historical work 
are not helpful in articulating the contours of Buddhist environmental ethics, but 
that we must begin with Buddhist environmental practice in the present.  Mick 
Smith offers a thoughtful analysis of the connection of philosophy and context, 
remarking that “[t]he moral considerability of nature need not be a matter of 
discovering abstract criteria by which one can judge such valuations right or 
wrong in any absolute sense. Rather, ethical values need to be explained and 
justified in terms of their contexts and origins, their production and reproduction 
in particular social and environmental circumstances.”306  And Ian Harris points 
out that the cultural diversity of the Buddhist world is simply too great to hope 
that one ethic or approach will hold true for all Buddhists.  However, his 
suggestion that eco-Buddhism consists of other influences rendering it something 
other than “authentic Buddhism” seems at least called into question considering 
the fact that the framing necessary to make environmentalism a meaningful 
practice for Buddhists will inevitably produce an eco-Buddhism that has adapted 
to this one demand of the modern world.   
4.2.1 Approaches and Major Concepts 
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In an article on tree ordination, I divided current approaches to Buddhist 
environmentalism into two strategies, textual and practical.
307
  The textual 
strategy is itself discursive, by which I mean that for scholars and advocates of 
this medium, the first step of Buddhist environmentalism is the articulation of 
Thai eco-Buddhism, as opposed to a form of Thai Buddhist environmentalism.  
The textual strategy is the product of scholars and practitioners (both monastic 
and laity) who are familiar with Western forms of ecological discourse.  These 
scholars, relying on an interpretation of key Buddhist concepts and texts in a way 
that implies a connection to an environmental discourse, have created a Thai eco-
Buddhist discourse that resembles the approach Peterson critiques above.  That is, 
by placing Buddhist terms within the discourse of environmental concern and 
forging the link in theory between Buddhist thought and environmental theory, it 
is supposed that Buddhists will take a proactive approach towards addressing 
environmental issues.
308
  Below I will explore some of the terms and concepts that 
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make up part of this strategy.  Then I will lay out some of the critiques that have 
addressed this form of eco-Buddhist discourse.   
The term pratitya-samutpāda is often translated as “dependent 
origination,” but in the context of eco-Buddhist discourse, we find the term 
“interdependence” being used as well.  The reason for choosing the latter is not 
hard to discern.  Perhaps the most commonly accepted notion of ecology is the 
study of how entities (individuals, groups, and systems) in the natural world are 
interrelated.  The term “interdependence” (and sometimes “holism”) is often used 
to reflect this understanding.  Since dependent origination does not have the same 
ecological ring that interdependence does, it is clear that the latter, with its 
obvious sense that things are related, would be a more effective, meaningful 
translation with reference to environmentalism.  Sulak Sivaraksa uses this term 
“interdependent,” claiming that the “concept of interdependent co-arising is the 
crux of Buddhist understanding.  Nothing is formed in isolation and, like the 
jeweled net of Indra, each individual reflects every other infinitely.”309  The image 
of the “jeweled net of Indra” is a classic image for dependent origination and has 
been used to connect to Buddhism with the “web of life” image found in Western 
ecological discourse.
310
  Sivaraksa goes on to argue that anthropocentric language 
                                                                                                                                     
like Swearer's eco-contextualist type, since it is more concerned with 
characteristics of a social condition and less with actual events in society. 
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is a cause for environmental damage, and the concept of dependent origination 
reorients human understanding towards a more environmentally beneficial 
worldview, “Environmentalism, as advocated by the government, is a farce and 
needs to be replaced by a new understanding of the mutually dependent 
relationship between all forms of nature.”311  He further offers some instances of a 
life reflecting this “new understanding.”  “Every time a tree is planted, every time 
a child swims in a river, every time we look upon each other with eyes of 
compassionate understanding, our commitment to interdependence is restored.”312 
Chatsumarn Kabilsingh also draws on this sense of interdependence, using 
it to describe the proper human/non-human relationship.  She says, “A man is a 
part of nature and cannot live as an individual or collectively as a nation, if he 
violates the laws of nature and shows disregard for it.  We must learn to respect 
nature and see it holistically.”313  This understanding of the nature of the 
environmental crisis—that humans act as if they are separate from the world—
resonates with much nonanthropocentric environmental ethics in Europe and 
North America.  The typical argument in this vein centers on the assertion that 
humans fail to see how their actions affect the rest of nature, so that, ultimately, 
environmental problems are seen as the result of hubris.  That is to say, human 
failure to acknowledge non-human beings as morally considerable allows for the 
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pursuit of courses of action harmful to other species and whole ecosystems to be 
rendered ethically unproblematic for humanity. 
Andrew Olendzki has remarked that “[t]here is nothing inherently 
connected about dependently co-arising phenomena,” suggesting that uses of the 
doctrine of dependent origination to mean ‘interconnectedness’ are misplaced, 
and he reflects that the “more interconnected we become, the more bound in the 
net of conditioned phenomena we may find ourselves.  I think the Buddha was 
pointing a way out of all this, but it is not through getting further connected.  It 
has more to do with getting less connected, less entangled, and less attached.”314  
Olendzki’s observation is accurate, certainly in the Pali context, and it heeds the 
cautionary principle advocated by Toulmin and Kirkland.  However, it does not 
fully account for how dependent origination is applied in eco-discourse.  The goal 
may certainly be to ultimately become unconditioned, but the uses of dependent 
origination in the context of eco-Buddhist discourse emphasize how to live in the 
world while we (individually) are still within the realm of saṃsāra (the cycle of 
rebirth).  It is from this perspective that the eco-Buddhist use of the concept 
should be understood.  However, Olendzki is correct in questioning the joy that 
some Buddhist thinkers such as Joanna Macy seem to find in this conditioned, 
“samsaric” world.  From a “Theravadin” perspective this joy would certainly not 
be easily justified, if at all.     
Mettā or loving-kindness is another concept commonly used as the basis 
of a Buddhist environmental ethic.  According to Chatsumarn Kabilsingh, “The 
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very core of Buddhism evolves around compassion, encouraging a better respect 
for and tolerance of every human being and living thing sharing the planet.”315  
Although Kabilsingh uses the word compassion here, she frequently switches 
between “compassion” and “loving-kindness.”  I do not think she is intending to 
distinguish mettā from karuna, but is referring generally to what is normally 
understood as mettā. 
Mettā is often connected to the concept of ahiṃsā, the doctrine of non-
harm.  If one is enjoined to not harm other living beings
316
, then developing 
loving-kindness towards living beings is one way to establish a relationship with 
them that provides an orientation away from actions that may cause harm.  If 
ahiṃsā is the goal, mettā is the method.  This construction is also central to the 
precepts and the Eightfold Path.  All five of the precepts are directed towards 
avoiding doing harm to others, whether that harm is verbal, bodily, or 
psychological.  The directives on the Eightfold Path concerning ethics (Skt. sīla) 
are likewise intended to limit the harm one might do.  Right speech, right action, 
and right livelihood provide guidelines for living that are intended to diminish the 
harm done to other beings in the course of daily life. 
Buddhadāsa Bhikkhu offers a vision of the human-nature relationship 
based on his own interpretation and arrangement of Buddhist concepts.  He takes 
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dhamma (Pali, Skt. dharma) to mean “nature,” setting up the condition that 
destruction of the environment is equivalent to destroying dhamma: “By cutting 
down the forests, we are cutting ourselves off from Dhamma.”317  Buddhadāsa 
makes clear that dhamma refers both to nature in the sense of a natural law, a 
fundamental truth of the world, and to nature in the sense of the natural world.  In 
the first sense, dhamma as the “Law of Nature” is the teaching of dependent 
origination.
318
  In the second sense, dhamma is nature as the physical world, of 
which humans are an inextricable part, and which is expressed by the term 
dhammajati—“that which is born out of the natural order.”319  This equation of 
dhamma with the natural world perhaps evolved out of his connection to the 
forest tradition.  Regardless the source, we are encouraged to view nature as a 
source of Buddhist teachings.  “Indeed, the lessons nature teaches us lead to a new 
birth beyond the suffering (dukkha) that results from attachment to self.”320  In 
response to environmental damage, Buddhadāsa advocates an ethic of care (Pali, 
anurakkhā), but this sense of care is based on non-attachment to self, an empathy 
with all other things that “necessarily implies the ontological realization of 
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interdependent co-arising.”321  It is difficult to isolate a single term as the most 
basic in Buddhadāsa’s teachings on the connection between Buddhism and the 
environment.  He links dependent origination, suffering, care, dhamma, and 
nature together in an interrelated system that strikes at the heart of the Buddhist 
project of overcoming suffering with wisdom.  Just how this system would be 
carried out in practice, however, is left somewhat ambiguous. 
Phra Payutto has also spoken about the dangers of environmental damage 
and the need to change our understanding of ourselves and nature in order to be 
able to act in ways that minimize or arrest this damage.  According to Donald 
Swearer, the difference between Payutto and Buddhadāsa can be described by 
comparing Buddhadāsa’s “spiritual biocentrism based on an identification of 
nature and dhamma,” with Payutto’s textual strategy in which “teachings are more 
systematic in nature and more consistently grounded in Pali texts and Theravāda 
historical traditions.”322  Swearer goes on to note that Payutto “finds within the 
Buddhist worldview of mutual cooperation an alternative to Western dualism and 
materialism, which he holds responsible for many forms of global 
exploitation.”323  Payutto investigates the roots of the environmental crisis, 
finding that aversion (Skt. doṣa) and greed (Skt. lobha) have led to a global 
consumerist lifestyle, the consequence of which is pollution, poverty, and other 
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social problems.
324
  These two qualities are basic to the Buddhist interpretation of 
dukkha.  Therefore, the problem of the environment is in essence the Buddhist 
problem of suffering.  Consequently, Payutto offers a solution that is the basic 
Buddhist response to the problem of suffering—the Eightfold Path. 
Payutto states that “environmental problems must be addressed on three 
levels,” which are “behavior,” “the mind,” and “understanding.”325  These three 
levels correspond to the three parts of the eight-fold path—sīla (behavior), 
samādhi (the mind), and prajñā (wisdom, understanding).  From this example we 
see the degree to which Payutto, although responding to a contemporary social 
and ethical problem, returns to the very foundation of Buddhism to craft a 
response.    
The textual strategy not only employs specific concepts but looks to 
certain texts, as well.  One popular body of texts for exploring the intersection of 
Buddhism and ecology is the jātakas, the stories of the past lives of the Buddha.  
There are several ways these have been used in eco-Buddhist discourse: to show 
that animals are morally considerable, to argue for the inherent ecological concern 
for the natural world by the Buddha, or to connect human ethics with the lives of 
animals.  Chatsumarn Kabilsingh makes reference to the jātakas in several 
different ways.  One way she uses the jātakas is as examples of injunctions to act 
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with compassion towards the natural world.  The argument is made in one respect 
on the basis that the jātaka tales show that, due to the working of kamma, humans 
are connected to non-human beings.  Just as the Buddha in the past was a bird, a 
tiger, etc., so we, too, have been animals before; thus, harming animals is 
tantamount to self-harm, as well as harm of those we care for.
326
  Another way 
this point is argued is based on the very presence of animals as characters in the 
jātaka tales.  Kabilsingh points out that in many stories, animals are spared from 
harm because they act in ethically conscious ways or because the story contains a 
proscriptive stance towards harming animals or other elements of nature.  Some 
of the stories she cites are found in sūtras beyond the jātakas, too, as in the 
Rukkha Sūtra (Samyutta Nikaya 48.67).327 
As we see from the above, the general thrust of the textual strategy is to 
reread Buddhist texts in terms of environmental concern to identify which 
concepts and texts in Buddhism serve the purpose of constructing a discourse of 
environmental concern.  The project attempts to offer a description of Buddhism 
that allows for a natural linkage with a more normative environmental ethic.  The 
bridging of Buddhist concepts, whether they are ethical or cosmological, with the 
elements of what tends to be a non-anthropocentric/biocentric/ecocentric 
environmental ethic is assumed to be all that is needed to induce in Buddhists a 
change towards ecological consciousness.  I will first present the critiques of other 
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scholars regarding this strategy, then after presenting the practical strategy, I will 
return to my own critique of the textual strategy.  
4.2.2 Critiques 
The category of “eco-critics” illustrates that not every scholar is convinced 
that an environmental ethic can be derived from Buddhist thought, much less that 
it is in any way inherently ecological.  Scholars such as Ian Harris, Christopher 
Ives, and Lambert Schmidthausen are critical of approaches that interpret 
Buddhism wholesale as unproblematically environmental.  Christopher Ives has 
illustrated how when some thinkers take a rather common environmental concept 
like identification with nature and explain it in a Buddhist context, or the Buddhist 
concept of dependent origination, when it is translated as the equivalent of the 
ecological notion of interdependence, they succumb to certain “rhetorical 
pitfalls.”328  For example, Ives states those who advocate using “interdependence” 
as the translation of pratītya-samutpāda tend to erroneously claim that flourishing 
of beings is dependent on all other things.  Likewise, equating the concept of 
identifying with nature with Buddhist non-duality puts one on the slippery slope 
of being unable to make ethical distinctions between pristine rivers and rivers of 
toxic sludge.
329
  Ives also points how appeals to compassion do not provide clear 
                                                 
328
 Christopher Ives, “In Search of a Green Dharma: Philosophical Issues in 
Buddhist Environmental Ethics,” in Destroying Mara Forever: Buddhist Ethics 
Essays in honor of Damien Keown, eds. John Powers and Charles S. Prebish 
(Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Press, 2009), 167.  
 
329
 See also Christopher Ives, “Deploying the Dharma: Reflections on the 
Methodology of Constructive Buddhist Ethics,” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 15 
(2008), 23-44. In the case of pratītya-samutpāda, Ives suggests that the concept is 
  207 
interpretations of what the appropriate ethical behavior or response to any given 
situation might be.
330
 
Implicit in his critique is the notion that what, as Donald Swearer might 
say, eco-apologists and eco-constructivists are really trying to do is find a 
Buddhist environmental rhetoric, a way to speak in Buddhist terms about the 
environment that is both meaningful and effective.  He focuses this critique by 
asking whether the environmental values that Buddhists claim for Buddhism 
reflect an honest analysis of the sources or if they are mostly constructed from 
hand-picked Buddhist sources to fit already identified values.  He observes, “One 
methodological issue worth considering, however, is whether, in their efforts to 
address specific moral issues, contemporary Buddhist ethicists are formulating 
genuinely Buddhist ethical stances or are, consciously or otherwise, engaging in 
acts of eisegesis by looking selectively in Buddhists sources—whether 
experiences, texts, doctrines, practices, or institutions—to find support for the 
ethical and political stances that they brought to their practice of Buddhism in the 
first place.”331   
Ives’s critique addresses the aspect of the discourse of Buddhist 
environmental ethics that has made it both widely appealing but also intellectually 
                                                                                                                                     
not unrelated to environmental thought but that the “rhetorical pitfalls” might be 
avoided by translating the term as “conditional arising.” 
 
330
 Ibid., 33.  He states, “In short, good intentions are admirable, but some other 
criterion is needed to critique actions and situations, guide actions based on 
compassion, and conceptualize what Buddhistically optimal situations might look 
like.” 
 
331
 Ibid., 29. 
 
  208 
troubling.  His solution emerges out of the Buddhist tradition itself.  He suggests 
that Buddhists employ Buddhist soteriology as a device for analyzing and 
formulating responses to ethical questions regarding a Buddhist environmental 
ethics.  This approach provides for common criteria all based on the notion of 
dukkha, or suffering, for developing an environmental ethic.  This methodology of 
establishing a Buddhist environmental ethic is not susceptible to the charge of 
being inauthentic and one would be hard-pressed to find a Buddhist community 
that would deny the question of suffering is central to Buddhist thought and 
practice.  And he avoids the critique he makes of other Buddhist environmental 
ethics, “insofar as thinkers are pursuing Buddhist ethics, they must clarify the 
specific Buddhist principles that should be deployed for critical assessment of 
actuality and for constructive thought about optimal societies.”332  But we should 
ask if Ives’s approach is suitable for environmental ethics.  If we follow our 
understanding of environmental ethics as practical, must Buddhist communities 
be beholden to establishing first principles before engaging in environmentalism, 
even as Buddhists?  It might seem somewhat trite to say, but Buddhists are 
people, too, and so are individually complex.  A Buddhist does not necessarily 
make all his or her decisions on Buddhist first principles, so much less would we 
expect a community to do so.  Moreover to judge a Buddhist community’s 
environmental activism as un-Buddhist or inauthentic because it does not adhere 
exclusively to Buddhist philosophical principles would make the project of 
Buddhist environmentalism quite unattainable.  Least of all for the reasons that it 
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might be argued that the Buddhist quality of any such first principle is subject to 
debate.  For example, to what degree was the Buddha’s articulation of dukkha the 
product of the philosophical/religious environment of his time?  Would socio-
cultural influences on the Buddha’s articulation of dukkha make it less 
authentically “Buddhist?”  I agree with Ives that the Buddhist notion of dukkha is 
central to the tradition because that is a position commonly agreed upon, but in 
examining Buddhist environmental ethics, we should resist the move to establish 
absolute standards that all ideas must adhere to in order to be considered 
Buddhist.   
Ian Harris has offered a series of critiques of Buddhist environmentalism 
that question the way terms (Buddhist and non-Buddhist) are interpreted and 
points out what he sees as the damaging consequences of eco-Buddhist 
appropriations of the tradition.  Harris attributes the concern for the welfare of 
animals not to Buddhism, but to a larger ethic of civility: “Concern for the animal 
kingdom is compatible with Buddhism but does not arise naturally from its central 
insights into the nature of reality.”333  There are other specific examples that 
Harris offers (the instrumental value that wild areas have, not because of some 
intrinsic worth, but because they aid the monastic life), but the charge that Harris 
levels against the eco-Buddhist approach in general is that it does not sit easily 
with the view of the world that Buddhism adheres to.  “Nirvanic dysteleology” 
and the teaching of impermanence render the world “a domain devoid of 
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substantiality” and obviate the need to justify concern for the natural world.334  
Moreover, the instances of ecological concern represented by the adherence to 
ahiṃsā that other scholars point to in Buddhist texts and history are interpreted by 
Harris as the acknowledgement of the Buddha that it would be beneficial to the 
spread of the sangha to encourage actions that demonstrate respect for this kind of 
civilized behavior.  In general, Harris claims that the ways in which Buddhist 
notions have been enlisted to articulate an eco-Buddhist position in fact rely 
heavily on global environmental discourses of inherent value and 
interconnectedness.  According to Harris, most articulations of Buddhist 
environmentalism either appeal to values and concepts that are no different from 
other more general environmental philosophies, or they so greatly distort the 
meaning of the Buddhist concepts and text appealed to that they render them 
inauthentically Buddhist.
335
  Harris is, in one respect, correct in questioning the 
authenticity of Buddhist environmentalism, since claiming Buddhism is 
inherently environmental is contradicted by concepts central to the tradition and 
that some concepts looked upon to support Buddhist environmentalism have a 
pre-Buddhist history.  However, Harris’s concern with the authenticity of 
articulations of environmental Buddhist positions suggests that he is working 
from an essentialized interpretation of Buddhism.  So we may reasonably question 
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how far across the spectrum of contemporary Buddhist communities Harris’s 
critiques can be applied.  It is most likely that he is addressing particularly 
Westernized approaches to eco-Buddhism (regardless of the cultural identity of 
the representative), and so his critiques should not be taken to cover every 
instance of Buddhist environmental concern.   
There is another point that Harris frequently makes, though, that supports 
the argument made in this dissertation.  Harris states that “supporters of an 
authentic Buddhist environmental ethic have tended toward a positive 
indifference to the history and complexity of the Buddhist tradition” and that “the 
generalization of practices from one historical, geographical, or cultural phase of 
the tradition, in an attempt to justify some monolithic Buddhist position, will be 
largely illegitimate.”336  Harris’s point raises the issue regarding by what criteria 
is a Buddhist environmental ethic to be considered “Buddhist” and not “a blend of 
the sort of globalized environmental discourse we might meet with in any part of 
today’s world.”337  Perhaps the problem is inherent in the project of applying 
religious thought to social issues, for Harris also notes that each of the canonical 
languages of Buddhism is situated in its own cultural and linguistic context.  In 
this vein, he refers to the difficulty of defining “nature.”  If we are to understand 
the Buddhism of a certain cultural or linguistic region views nature, we must 
attend to how the natural world is understood.  Harris notes how nature in early 
Buddhism is subject the view of impermanence and suffering, but in other 
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Buddhist traditions, such as Chinese Huayan, a radical interpentration of all 
entities offers other possible interpretations of nature.   
Malcolm David Eckel raises a similar question by asking: “Is there a 
Buddhist philosophy of nature?”338  Eckel’s conclusion points to the 
contemporary exclusivity of Buddhist environmentalism: “If the intention of the 
question is to identify a simple, unified vision of the sanctity of the natural world, 
the answer must be no,” though it is not impossible for one to be created by 
exploring the meaning of self as centered in the natural world, the place of 
practice.
339
  It is not found “ready-made” in the tradition but must be developed 
consciously.  Both Harris and Eckel (indirectly) point to the fact that articulating 
elements of Buddhist environmentalism requires that we attend to the historical, 
linguistic, contextual particularities of Buddhist communities.  The implication is 
that any articulation of Buddhist environmentalism must account for the form 
Buddhism and environmentalism take in a particular audience.  
 
4.3 Varieties of Buddhist environmentalism 
In the following chapter I will be looking in detail at Chinese Buddhism 
and attempting to articulate what might constitute a meaningful appeal to 
environmental concern from the perspective of Chinese Buddhism.  The question 
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may arise: Why speak only about Chinese Buddhism and not Buddhist 
environmentalism in general?  The latter approach might be better for forging an 
international consensus regarding how Buddhists can understand various 
environmental issues.  And there is value in appealing to Buddhist groups 
broadly, as it seems to cast the net wider, creating larger communities, and 
appealing to the ecumenical nature of much of religious environmentalism.  But 
Trevor Ling contends that “the use of the word ‘Buddhism’ in an unspecified 
sense has little heuristic value and can be a source of confusion” and argues for a 
“country-specific” account of Buddhisms.340   After pointing out the many ways 
that Buddhisms differ among countries of a single cultural sphere (e.g., Southeast 
Asia), Ling observes: 
It is clear then that it is not enough to say in passing concerning the 
“Buddhism” of such and such a country in Southeast Asia that it is of the 
“Theravada” type or “Mahayana”, the Pali type or the Sanskrit.  We need to 
know more than that in order to begin to understand and appreciate what is the 
position of Buddhism in that country, why “Buddhists” in that country react 
so differently in matters such as public events, social relationships, natural 
disasters, political oppression, and so on, from “Buddhists” elsewhere…In 
other words, we need to be aware that “Buddhism” is an ideological 
abstraction, since “Buddhists” and their Buddhist traditions are everywhere 
country-specific, and that Buddhism, in real terms, has from the earliest days 
been pluralistic.
341
 
 
To examine “Buddhism and ecology” elides the contextual differences than 
contribute to the discussion—conceptions of nature, individual vs. society, 
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community problem-solving.  To refocus our attention away from constructing a 
Buddhist ethics and to look at how Buddhist environmental concern has been 
pursued requires acknowledging the differences with other forms of Buddhism.   
In order to bring the audience and the cultural context of Chinese Buddhist 
environmentalism into view and begin on the right foot, I will offer two points of 
comparison.  The first is how environmentalism is carried out by Buddhists in 
Thailand.  The second is an examination of Chinese Buddhism in Singapore.  As I 
will show in each case, Buddhist environmentalism is best understood in the 
context of how the forms of environmentalism are meaningful to the cultural 
context relevant to each case.  By cultural context I mean both the form of 
Buddhism and the larger social context in which Buddhists in those countries are 
participants.  The upshot of this comparison is that it raises the question of 
whether a global Buddhist ethics is able to make the link between Buddhism and 
environmental concern meaningful.  Even if this is the case, is global Buddhist 
discourse more than just another context with a specific audience?  On the one 
hand, the decontextualized way in which Buddhist environmentalism is usually 
discussed elides important cultural and contextual distinctions which makes the 
efforts of many articles ineffective in articulating the contours of a practical 
Buddhist environmentalism.  One the other hand, many articles that seek to 
uncover Buddhist resources of environmentalism focus on ancient texts (the 
creation account in the Aggañña Sūtra) or highly metaphysical concepts (“a 
chiliocosm in a single thought,” Ch. yinian sanqian一念三千) that carry little if 
any immediacy; since they need to be mediated through so many qualifications, it 
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becomes difficult to relate to them to concrete situations.  I argue that in order to 
articulate a practical Buddhist environmentalism, we must first identify the 
community to which the discourse is addressed.  Disembodied eco-ethical 
discourses do not contribute to changes in the behavior of communities or 
societies. In the case of Buddhism, what is needed is an approach that pays careful 
attention to the social context of the particular tradition.  
For example, Leslie Sponsel’s suggestion that Thai temples are good 
models for sustainability requires a culture in which those temples can be 
established.
342
  The simplicity of Thai forest temples is a stark contrast to the 
temples one often finds in Taiwan.  This is feasible in places like the United 
States where Buddhism is still being established and there is ample space for a 
Thai forest temple but is less practicable in Taiwan or Singapore, where land is 
scarce. 
John Daido Loori’s Mountains and Rivers Order promotes conservation 
and respect for natural spaces in a way that is reminiscent of the Sierra Club and 
reflects views of nature found in Thoreau, Muir, and Whitman.  Nature is seen as 
a source of wisdom and enlightenment experience, so the preservation of natural 
world/wilderness is necessary for the preservation of individual quality of life.  
Stephanie Kaza’s work on Green Gulch Zen Center and Spirit Rock show that the 
concerns and understandings of environmentalism are quite particular to each 
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location and demonstrates a connection these projects with Gary Snyder’s ideas of 
bioregionalism and reinhabitation.
343
  It is highly unlikely that any of these 
environmentalisms would resonate with Buddhists in overpopulated Taiwan.      
I argue that Buddhist environmentalism is best seen as a response by 
specific communities to cultural and social exigencies of the community or 
perceived by the community, however that community might be defined.  It seems 
rarely to be based purely on doctrine.  While a philosophical articulation linking 
Buddhist thought to environmental concern might be meaningful, it does not 
contribute to our understanding of why the environment is important to the 
community.     
4.3.1 Thailand 
Susan Darlington has written extensively on monks she terms “ecology 
monks,” a group that she defines as “those [monks] actively engaged in 
environmental and conservation activities and who respond to the suffering which 
environmental degradation causes,” and whose “priorities lie in action to preserve 
vanishing forests, watersheds, and wildlife, and to mitigate the negative 
consequences of their disappearance on people’s lives.”344  Perhaps the earliest 
Thai environmental activist monk is Ajahn Pongsak Techathamamoo, who in the 
early 1980s began working with villagers to restore the surrounding forests after 
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decades of clear-cutting.
345
  Ajahn Pongsak’s efforts were directed at enhancing 
the living conditions of the villagers by encouraging and helping them to reclaim 
the forest for the economic stability it offered. However, because he saw the need 
to change the villager’s perception of the forest he contextualized the project in 
terms of the practice of Buddhist ethics. 
Perhaps the most well-known example of Thai Buddhist environmentalism 
is tree ordination, a practice in which trees are “ordained” and wrapped in a 
saffron robe to indicate that they have the status of a monk.  Tree ordinations are 
an environmental strategy practice that connects Buddhism, ritual, and 
environmentalism in Thailand.  Nicola Tannenbaum summarizes the 
phenomenon: “Tree ordinations, environmentalism, and sustainable development 
are now part of the rhetoric and practice of Thai intelligentsia, development 
workers, and politicians.  In the past, tree ordinations organized by monks were 
part of a larger protest against modernization, capitalism, and development that 
were seen as destroying traditional values and ways of life.”346  Darlington 
identifies the practice of tree ordination as one of the ways in which these ecology 
monks work with local residents to develop programs of sustainable living that 
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benefit both the environment and the livelihood of the people.
347
  The first tree 
ordination was performed by Phrakhru Manas Natheepitak in 1988 as a response 
to the droughts brought on by excessive logging that had severely affected the 
rivers and streams.
348
  He saw that the droughts had been brought on by the 
deforestation caused by excessive logging.  In order to bring this connection to the 
local people’s attention, he invented the practice of tree ordination.  He explains:  
If a tree is wrapped in saffron robes, no one would dare cut it down.  So I 
thought that perhaps the idea could be used to discourage logging, and I 
began performing ceremonies on trees in the forest near the temple. I 
called the ritual “ordination” to give it more weight. The term “tree 
ordination” sounds weird to Thai people since an ordination is a ritual 
applied only to men. This weirdness has helped spread the news by word 
of mouth.
349
  
 
Phrakhru Manas addresses several issues of interest to questions of environmental 
philosophy and ethics. First, he does not refer to dependent origination, mettā, 
dharma, or the jātakas.350  It seems that people would not hurt a tree wrapped in 
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robes because even if they were not wholly convinced that the ordained tree was 
on par with a monk; they would not be willing to risk losing merit by harming it 
in some way. The saffron robes are in themselves something to be respected. 
Furthermore, Phrakhru Manas clearly says that the term “tree ordination” was 
chosen intentionally for its “weirdness.” By choosing to mimic the ordination of 
monks, he goes beyond just wrapping a tree in robes. The tree participates in a 
ritual in which normally a person undergoes a change in identity.  The ordination 
calls to mind the path of renunciation and the goal of nirvāṇa (the cessation of 
craving). This process marks the tree off from not only other trees, but all non-
ordained beings.  Herein lies the efficacy of the practice.  Anyone could wrap 
saffron robes around a tree, but only a monk can perform an ordination and in that 
ordination the monk passes karmic power to the subject being ordained.  The 
members of the Buddhist community are challenged to understand what an 
ordained tree means and how that affects what all trees now mean.  
The ordination is symbolic to the extent that both the monk and the tree 
are connected through the shared symbol of the robe, although a tree’s status as a 
monk would not find support in the Vinaya.  But it is more than than symbolic in 
the way that ordinations are symbolic.  The ordination is symbolic of the 
community’s environmental concern, and the way in which the human 
community relates to the forest (represented by the ordained tree) is now changed, 
                                                                                                                                     
dependent origination and an interpretation of the Buddha’s life that highlights a 
close relationship with the forest. His work is significant less because it 
incorporates Buddhism with ecological conservation principles than because he 
works closely with local villagers to identify and develop ways of dealing with 
the problems that they face.”  
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a change which would probably not occur were it not for the ordination ritual.  
This change can be understood by recalling Jenkins’s claim that strategies (such 
as tree ordination) can lead to “new ethical capacities” among religious 
practitioners.  In the case of tree ordination, the local community supportive of the 
ritual is engaged in a new intersubjective experience between the community and 
the forest. 
The practice of tree ordination rituals has not been without controversy.  
Although the monks fully recognize that the ordination is only symbolic of 
environmental concern, because according to the Vinaya only human beings can 
be ordained, criticisms have come from within and without the sangha that such 
ordinations are inauthentically Buddhist.
351
  Some monks have countered these 
criticisms by involving high-ranking members of the sangha and government 
officials in the rituals.  Others have justified their practice by highlighting the 
positive effects it has on the communities in which it is performed.  Yet another 
criticism has been that the rituals have become political statements.  In a case 
Darlington documents from 1991, the ceremony involved the nailing of placards 
to the trees to be ordained, the last word of which, chaat, can be read three 
different ways, yielding the pronouncement: “To destroy the forest is to destroy 
life, one’s rebirth, or the nation.”352  The political tone in the third reading 
demonstrates that the practice of tree ordination has extended beyond the local to 
the national level.   
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Both Darlington and Tannenbaum note how tree ordinations resonate on 
multiple levels.  Initially, the ritual was intended to act as a way of raising 
awareness of the importance of forests to the local community.  A sense of mutual 
well-being between the forest and the community was promoted, but this 
identification with the forest’s well-being created a sense of division between the 
community and the national government’s development policies.353  But tree 
ordinations have now become mainstream and are often ways of strengthening the 
ties between a local community and Thai national identity, the throne 
specifically.
354
  In 1996 fifty million trees were ordained in honor of King 
Bhumiphon’s 50th reign year.355  This event clearly reveals that the protest 
element central to previous tree ordinations has been lost in new ritual contexts of 
nationalism.   
Another level that tree ordinations operate on concerns contemporary 
Buddhist identity and practice.  The social activism symbolized in tree ordinations 
is often partially based in the role of the monk as local leader.  Darlington notes 
how monks refer to the suffering caused by environmental deterioration as a 
factor in their decision to carry out environmentalist actions.  Phrakhru Pitak’s 
reference to “basic Buddhist principles” concerns the effect these concepts have 
on affecting the villager’s relationship with the forest.   This use of Buddhist 
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concepts is not primarily for the sake of articulating a Buddhist environmental 
ethic, as it is with the textual mode of discourse, because this would not address 
the immediate situation.  As Darlington notes Prakhru Pitak has also incorporated 
shrines to tree and forest spirits, elements of Thai animism, as a way of making 
the ritual more relevant and meaningful in a local context.
356
     
That tree ordinations employ ritual rhetorically, as discourse-based 
strategies of community formation based on the process of identification to 
address a problem, is clear.  That they are effective is demonstrated by their 
appropriation on the national level, even though those appropriations do not 
necessarily seek to address the same needs as the localized versions.  Some of the 
monks use the rituals to promote Buddhist education among communities, using 
the rituals as symbolic markers of Buddhist ethical concepts.  But the tree 
ordinations are home-grown responses to local burdens rooted in environmental 
degradation.  They incorporate not only the localized situation of villagers (in 
both religious and welfare contexts) but the specific monastic–laity relationships 
of Thai Buddhism.  Of course, we can see that the rituals have been nationalized 
and thus applied to new contexts.  There are also tree ordinations that have 
occurred in Cambodia.
357
  Analysis of tree ordinations in Cambodia is a valuable 
avenue for future research as a test of the degree to which the ritual can be applied 
to other cultural contexts.  However, in Buddhist cultures with greater cultural 
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disparity, it would be difficult to imagine that such rituals would have the same 
legitimacy and efficacy.   
4.3.2 Singapore  
Buddhism in Singapore can be dated back to roughly the early- to mid-19
th
 
century.  Most temples were begun by monks and laymen from Fujian and 
Guangdong provinces or elsewhere in Southern China.  Early Chinese immigrants 
to Singapore practiced a religious syncretism (which Kuah-Pearce refers to as 
“Shenism”) of Chinese folk practices, worship of Daoist deities, observing 
Confucian values, and worship of Guanyin among other Buddhist deities.
358
  The 
temples that were built serves as meeting houses for various communities, often 
separated by dialects, or clan associations which were more exclusive than the 
communities based around a common dialect.
359
  Despite the extensiveness of 
Chinese syncretism, or “Shenism,” Buddhist temples were built that did not 
incorporate Daoist or folk elements.  The Shuanglin monastery was the first 
Buddhist monastery built in Singapore, completed in 1909.
360
  The Poh Kark See 
monastery was completed in 1923 and is now the largest Buddhist temple in 
Singapore.  In addition to temples, the growth of Buddhist associations and visits 
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from Chinese monks helped promote the growth of Buddhism in Singapore.  
Buddhist associations allowed laity to better organize and carry out fundraising 
and social welfare projects.  Ong notes that up through the nineteen sixties, 
Chinese Buddhism, aside from a few attempts by refomist minded monks to 
promote dharma teaching, was still mainly ritualistic.
361
  But beginning in the 
seventies and eighties, various Buddhist associations became more active in 
promoting a reform of Buddhism, moving it beyond just temple worship and 
chanting.  Trevor Ling observes, “One of its [associational Buddhism] chief 
characteristics is that adherents to this form of Buddhism have a serious interest in 
what can in general terms be described as a more philosophical formulation and 
presentation of Buddhist ideas and practices.”362  This trend mostly reflected the 
interest and concerns of younger Singaporean Buddhists, many of whom had 
matriculated through university and desired a more sophisticated and modern 
Buddhism.
363
   
Kuah-Pearce discusses Buddhist reform in Singapore as the response to “a 
new generation of local Chinese whose view of religion differs greatly from the 
early Chinese migrants” and who seek a more rational and individualized form of 
Buddhism.
364
  She examines how what she labels “Reformist Buddhism” is 
emerging as a new phenonmenon due to the influence of the modernization of 
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Singapore society.  Exactly what constitutes Reformist Buddism is not entirely 
clear, though.  Kuah-Pearce distinguishes it from the tradition Shenism well 
enough, and she provides a few examples of Reformist Buddhist organizations.  
But with respect to other Buddhist organizations, it seems Reformist Buddhism 
sits at one end of a spectrum of Buddhist religiosity in Singapore, and it is 
comparable to other contemporary Buddhist movements such as Humanistic 
Buddhism, socially-engaged Buddhism, and Buddhist modernism.
365
  Part of what 
constitutes Reformist Buddhism is a greater role for the laity, a de-emphasis on 
cosmology and myth, and an emphasis on rationality, individual religiousity, 
education, meditation, and social welfare/activism.   
In the Singporean context, Reformist Buddhism is also marked by 
collaboration with state policies aimed at maintaining and promoting multi-ethnic 
harmony.  Since in Singapore ethnicity is closely tied to religious identity, the 
state enacted the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act of 1991.
366
  The trend in 
Reformist Buddhism toward secularization, demythologization, and 
rationalization as well as the focus on observing ethical norms, minimizes the 
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likelihood that Reformist Buddhists will seek to challenge the authority of the 
state from their position as Buddhists.
367
  Moreover, the values that Reformist 
Buddhists advocate are essentially the same as those promoted by the state in its 
cultural policies.   
As Singapore society has continued to modernize, many Singaporeans 
have looked to their religious traditions as sources of inspiration and meaning.  
Leaders of Buddhist temples in Singapore have likewise faced the need to be able 
to speak meaningfully to the laity.  One of the challenges facing Singapore is 
maintaining a clean and livable environment on a densely populated but small 
island, while still promoting economic competitiveness.  Therefore, it is natural 
that environmentalists are gaining a stronger presence.  The government’s 
Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources in Singapore has carried out 
environmental initiatives with 2012 and 2030 goal deadlines, which claim to 
coordinate work with both public and private organizations and agencies.  
However, Kersty Hobson notes how environmental NGOs in Singapore have yet 
to occupy a secure position beyond governmental influence to actively voice 
critiques of anti-environmental or unenvironmental policies or practices, but have 
begun to construct alternate social spaces from which to communicate within the 
larger context of Singaporean society.
368
    
Buddhist environmentalism is present in different ways in Singapore.  This 
                                                 
367
 Ibid., 249. 
 
368
 Kersty Hobson, “Considering ‘Green’ Practices: NGOs and Singapore’s 
Emergent Environmental-Political Landscape,” Sojourn 20:2 (2005), 165-166. 
  227 
section will present three instances of Buddhist environmentalism.  Based on this 
picture, we will see that each instance of Buddhist environmentalism arises from a 
confluence of specific characteristics, rarely based on or emanating from a 
doctrinal or philosophical basis.  While a philosophical articulation linking 
Buddhist thought to environmental concern might be meaningful, it is tertiary to 
the task at hand.   
4.3.2.1 Kong Meng San Poh Kark See
369
  
 Kong Meng San Poh Kark See (KMSPKS) was established in 1921 by 
Ven. Zhuandao轉道法師. Zhuandao died in 1943.  There was no presiding abbot 
during the Japanese occupation.  The second abbot was Ven. Hong Choon宏船法
師, who took over in 1947.  Ven. Hong Choon greatly expanded the temple 
grounds, revived the adjunct farmland, and, to promote “the Buddha’s teachings 
on the sacredness of life,” set aside space for devotees to practice the release of 
animals (fangsheng放生).370  After Hong Choon died in 1990, there were three 
other abbots the longest serving from 1995-2004.  The current abbot is Ven. Sik 
Kwang Sheng釋廣声法師 who was appointed in 2004.   
The recycling program was begun formally in 2005 after a trial run in 
2004.  The name of the program “88 Recycling Kiosk” is a reference to the 
monastery’s address, 88 Bright Hill Road, which is meant to make the location 
easy to find for those familiar with the temple.  Although the program is officially 
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termed a recycling program, recycling is inclusive of the “three Rs”—reduce, 
reuse, recycle.  This is follows the classification of the government’s National 
Environment Agency.   
The program is entirely volunteer-run, and there are four categories of 
volunteers—retail sales volunteers, packing and sorting volunteers, electrical 
equipment repair volunteers, and administrative/environmental education 
volunteers. The two main activities of the program are its humanitarian relief 
work and the jumbo sales.  The jumbo sales take place periodically at the temple 
and they are events open to the public at which the goods that have been donated 
are sold to the public.  The income from the jumbo sales is intended to make the 
recycling program a self-sustaining program.       
88 Recycling is a response to or recognition that Buddhists should be 
socially responsive, should have a way to contribute to the betterment of society.  
KMSPKS offers many popular methods of enhancing one’s health and well-being 
including meditation/yoga classes, counseling seminars, and vegetarian cooking 
ideas.  The recycling program is not just a measure to respond to the environment 
but is a practical response to the move towards socially engaged Buddhism.  What 
is unique about this form of Buddhist environmentalism is that it combines 
environmental concern with social welfare.  The social welfare component has 
both domestic and international aspects.  Internationally, the recycling program 
has been inspired by and partially modeled after the recycling program of Ciji in 
Taiwan (the two organizations have even collaborated on occasion).  The 
recycling program supports KMSPKS’s humanitarian relief efforts, which are 
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organized and coordinated in response to requests for aid from government bodies 
overseas.  If a request for aid is approved, donated goods are gathered and 
packaged at the monastery.  Then a group of volunteers is established to deliver 
the goods to the specific community, whether it is a school, orphanage, or small 
village.  Goods generally include food, clothing, and books. Typically, KMSPKS 
does not engage in disaster relief, which the group Ciji is well-known for.  As the 
program’s director, C. Lee, explained, disaster relief requires human and financial 
resources and coordination that is currently beyond the capabilities of the 
recycling program.  The advantage to the way in which KMSPKS organizes their 
humanitarian relief, according to Lee, is that communities which might fall 
outside the purview of other aid organizations are helped and receive immediate 
material assistance.  
Domestically, the program is intended to help individuals engage in 
interpersonal exchanges against the backdrop of social welfare.  These 
experiences are thought to aid in opening the individual up to a developmental 
process of increasing awareness of how their sense of value towards material 
things and other beings can be deepened and how subsequently, the can alter their 
behavior to better help society.  The exchanges that take place at the jumbo sales 
are intended to raise awareness that the value of material goods is not merely 
based on the newness of a thing, but that whether a thing is valued is a choice one 
is free to make.  As Lee explained, Singaporeans tend to attribute value to new 
things.  Old and second-hand goods are considered generally to be worthless.  But 
there is a large segment of Singapore’s society that is not financially able to 
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purchase only new items.  In other words, the jumbo sales allow for the recovery 
of both a sense of value and actual monetary value of material goods.  The 
experiences that individuals have while participating in the jumbo sales form part 
of what Lee calls “walking the green path.”  This is a process of increasing 
awareness of how one’s exists ecologically or environmentally.  That is to say, 
one’s existence is always existence in the context of some environment.  A context 
that is often ignored, and in more urban environments, difficult to perceive is the 
natural environment.  The goal of walking the green path is to reach the “green 
zone,” a more or less constant mindfulness of the impact one’s actions have in the 
context of the natural environment.  More specifically, this is a way to respond to 
the ill-effects of rampant consumerism in a country with extremely limited natural 
resources and physical area.  According to Lee, the features of the recycling 
program are relevant to the Singapore context and not necessarily intended to be 
directly relevant to a global Buddhist context.   
4.3.2.2 Bao’en si 
 The temple was renovated beginning in 2002, and renovations proceeded 
in two phases.  This obviated the need to find a temporary location for the temple.  
The renovations were completed in 2007.  Bao’en si 報恩寺 can be considered the 
first technologically “green” temple in the world.  The temple’s president, Lee 
Boon Siong is the grandson of the founder of the temple.  His personal history is 
intimately connected with the temple’s environmental renovations.  Lee 
immigrated to Canada in 1969 in response to the government’s treatment of a 
number of students and Nanyang University (南洋大學) who opposed the push 
  231 
towards favoring English language education over Mandarin.  Although Mr. Lee 
was a graduate of National University of Singapore, which uses English as its 
language of instruction, he felt that the government’s accusation that the students 
at Nanyang were communists was unfounded and unjust.  He returned to 
Singapore in 1995 and took over as president of Bao’en si.  However, Mr. Lee 
was not previously a Buddhist.  Having received a Christian education, like his 
father before him, he considered himself a Christian.  But upon taking over 
responsibility of Bao’en si, he began to study Buddhism, albeit using English and 
not Chinese.  For this reason, Lee states that his intention in remaking Bao’en si 
into a model of environmental care is not based on a sense of carrying out the 
Dharma.  Rather, he recognized that given Singapore’s restrained resources, 
fragile environmental conditions, and dwindling natural habitats, it is imperative 
that Singapore begin to implement serious changes.  He sees Bao’en si as a model 
and testing ground for bringing these changes into public view. 
What has Bao’en Si done?371  In addition to making the temple more 
environmentally-friendly, he wanted to make the temple more accessible for 
elderly members.  Lee, himself over seventy years old, stated that the percentage 
of Singapore’s population that will be restricted to wheelchairs is increasing every 
year.  Moreover, the children of these elderly will be faced with rising costs of 
living and education costs for their children, and since many couples are 
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supporting both sets of parents (a result of the period of time Singapore 
implemented a one-child policy), costs of health-care will be an additional 
financial burden.  In the past, children would hire a full-time health-care attendant 
to look after their elderly parents.  However, Lee believes that by creating a 
wheelchair accessible environment, the temple will be a place that elderly in a 
motorized wheelchair can move around with ease.  Thus, every area of the newly 
renovated temple is easily accessible by wheelchair.  
By far, the most intriguing aspect of the temple is its environmental 
design, which produces solar, wind, and hydro power, minimizes water waste, and 
is capable of producing potable water from collected rain run-off.  The temple is 
outfitted with large sets of solar panels.  One is on the fourth floor roof and the 
other sets are placed as eaves around the pagoda, creating a solar pagoda.  In each 
location there are three different types of panel—monocrystallide, polycrystallide, 
and amorphous crystallide.  Each kind of panel was purchased from a different 
company.  The reason for this difference, according to Lee, is to discover which 
kind of panel is the best for Singapore’s environment.  Even though the panels 
have only been online for a couple of years, the numbers show that the amorphous 
produces the most overall wattage yearly.  Thus far the temple is able to produce 
75 megawatts per year—more than enough to meet the energy needs of the 
temple.  The excess power is sold back to the city.  Another source of power 
comes from the collected rainwater.  The water that is collected from the exposed 
ground surfaces is collected in one of two reservoirs—one located below the 
entrance to the temple, the other located beneath the floor on the east-side of the 
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second floor.  The water that is collected on the second floor is used in two ways.  
First, the water descends down a tube to which faucets are attached.  Hoses can be 
attached to the faucets which are set to open twice a day.  These hoses irrigate the 
ground along the side of the temple to water the native flora.  This flora is 
intentionally designed to provide a rich habitat for the many species of butterfly 
found in Singapore.   
The other way the water is used is to produce electricity.  The temple is 
fitted to accommodate the following process: Every day, the water in the upper 
reservoir falls 25 meters though pipes that are fitted with micro-hydro generators 
into the lower reservoir.  The electricity produced by this process fuels the pumps 
that send the water back up to the upper reservoir in an iterated process.  The 
iterations allow for some water to be released to the neighboring ground, 
enhancing the butterfly habitat.  In addition, electricity is used to light the grounds 
of the temple.  However, the use of micro-hydro generators has not begun, since 
the temple has yet to receive a permit for this use of collected water.  In addition, 
Lee noted that the government has proposed legislation to declare all rainwater 
government property.   
There is another reservoir in the basement at the back of the temple.  Lee 
has devised a plan to collect rainwater from the rooftops in the reservoir in large 
tanks.  The water will then run through a process of purification, including 
reverse-osmosis.  The water will be bottled and sent off for approval to a 
government and private agency.  Like the micro-hydro generators, the Singapore 
government has not yet approved a permit for this function, so the tanks have not 
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been installed.   
Other features of the temple include solar-powered hot water heaters that 
supply the temple with water for bathing.  This will mainly be used by the 
resident nuns, which the temple plans to house in the near future.  Along the back 
of the temple are seven solar tubes.  These are long tubes which collect sunlight.  
As the light passes through the tubes it is magnified.  These tubes open up in 
basement areas which do not receive direct sunlight, decreasing the need to use 
electrical light sources.        
4.3.2.3 Jinlong si 
 Another temple, Jinlong si 金龍寺, deserves mention as a way in which 
Buddhism and environmental concern come together in a different context.  
Jinlong si is a traditional Chinese temple in the sanjiao三教 tradition, located 
towards the east coast of Singapore.  The temple boasts a large Bodhi tree.  In 
2003, the Singapore government announced its intent to acquire the land where 
the temple was located as part of a project to lengthen an MRT (Mass Rapid 
Transit) line.
372
  The move required the temple to relocate, but the temple 
management argued that since the root system of a 100-year old Bodhi tree on the 
temple grounds was so intertwined with the temple, any changes or development 
would endanger the tree.
373
  The temple community moved to have the tree added 
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to Singapore’s Heritage Tree Registry.  A website entitled “Save our Roots” was 
started to raise awareness of the situation, and a petition to prevent the temple’s 
relocation in order to protect the tree was circulated.
374
   
The argument made by the temple’s supporters was meant to appeal two 
different but related audiences.  First, they argue that the Bodhi tree is a sacred 
object, so protecting it has positive religious value.  This line of argument appeals 
to Singaporeans not only as Buddhists but as members of a religiously diverse 
society.  Implied in the message is the idea that protecting religious objects, 
regardless of their religious affiliation is important to Singapore society.  
Secondly, there is an appeal made primarily to the government, which argues 
(from precedent) that the tree should be listed on the national historic tree registry, 
implying that preserving the temple’s Bodhi tree could contribute to the cultural 
richness of the country.  Of course, these two appeals would be mutually 
enforcing for members of Singapore’s parliament who were Buddhists.  
Ultimately, the appeals were unsuccessful and the high court dismissed the 
temple’s case in 2008.375       
The three cases examined above show that Buddhist environmentalism is 
present in Singapore Buddhism, and it is present in a rather active way.  We make 
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no mistake in calling it Buddhist environmentalism, either, since in each case the 
activities of the three temples are responsive to a community, and it is clear how 
the audience being addressed gives rise to a dialectical relationship.  Jinlong si, 
Bao’en si, and KMSPKS all engage in some form of environmentalism and 
employ some strategies that makes environmental actions meaningful in Buddhist 
terms to their own community.  KMSPKS is addressing a community confronting 
the material and financial modernization of Singapore, which challenges the 
coherence of the demographically broad community.  But modernization has also 
brought about new needs for community members that relate to meaningful 
interpersonal relationships and the desire to contribute to social welfare.  Bao’en 
si carried out an environmentally-focused renovation campaign of an older temple 
with an older community of adherents.  The renovations have brought Bao’en si 
into the public spotlight and rejuvenated the sense of community at the temple, 
not only by demonstrating that Buddhism can remain important in a modern 
society by making the temple a center for the community, but by offering a 
direction for how Singaporean society can address the problems of continuing 
development.  The activities carried out by the members of Jinlong si seem the 
most obviously rhetorical and perhaps for good reason.  Faced with the threat of 
relocation and the loss of a defining feature of the temple’s grounds, the Bodhi 
tree, the community made appeals to Buddhist history and likewise Singapore’s 
significance as a Buddhist country.  Eventually unsuccessful, these efforts 
demonstrate that the discourse of Buddhist values and identity is no silver bullet 
when a community’s status quo is threatened by government or private projects.  
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What is important is that these three temples work independently.  The elements 
of their discourse retain no rhetorical similarity and evince no underlying 
continuity of Singaporean Buddhist environmentalism or even a common ethical 
approach.   
     
4.4 Conclusion 
Buddhist environmentalism is a growing phenomenon that incorporates 
scriptural hermeneutics, social activism, and multiple discourses (ontological, 
sociological, political, and ethical, to name a few).  There is no one approach to 
Buddhist environmentalism and no formula for how Buddhists should engage 
environmental issues.  The predominant voice in Buddhist environmentalism is a 
globalized environmental ethic that seeks to cull environmental concern from 
Buddhist text in the hope of constructing a singular environmental ethic.  I have 
referred to this approach as eco-Buddhism.  In contrast I identified Buddhist 
environmentalism as an approach to understanding how Buddhists engage in 
environmentalism based on ways in which environmental concerns are 
incorporated in a community or tradition’s practice and made meaningful without 
becoming the central focus of its Buddhist identity.  This distinction allows us to 
better see why it is important to attend to local and individual instances of 
Buddhist environmentalism as a necessary precursor to any project to articulate a 
theory of Buddhism and the environment.  The examples I provided of Thai 
Buddhist and Singaporean Buddhist environmentalism illustrate that even 
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geographically proximate Buddhist traditions can diverge significantly based on 
the cultural factors that shape Buddhism in a region.   
In response to these observations of cultural and local particularity, I 
suggest that scholars begin by looking at how Buddhist environmental rhetoric 
navigates and negotiates the various influences (cultural, religious, environmental, 
and political) on the local context.  Rarely are Buddhists just Buddhists.  They are 
also members of nation-states, communities, families, and other organizations that 
all form a Buddhist’s identity.  The grammar of values and cultural perceptions 
that each Buddhist employs to understand, identify with, or dissociate from 
environmental issues can be illuminated by examining what claims they are 
persuaded by, even if it is a case of persuading one’s self. 
In the last two chapters, I will turn to Chinese Buddhist environmentalism.  
I will look in detail at the way environment and nature is conceived, the socio-
political role of Buddhism and environmentalism, and the importance of rhetoric 
in Chinese Buddhism.  I will examine three organizations and attempt to show 
how a rhetorical approach to their environmental discourse offers a different way 
of understanding how environmentalism is meaningfully linked to Buddhism in 
each case. 
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Chapter 5 
CHINESE BUDDHIST ENVIRONMENTALISM 
In this chapter I will present the discourse of Chinese Buddhist 
environmentalism as a precursor to the following chapter’s rhetorical analysis of 
Chinese Buddhist environmentalism.  This is no easy task, since as I will point out, 
the argument can be made that Taiwanese Buddhist environmentalism is 
qualitatively different from Chinese Buddhist environmentalism.  Moreover, the 
discourse is a multi-faceted one involving issues of politics, history, religion, and 
society.  In the following section, I will attempt to highlight some of the 
interstices among these various issues, suggesting some possible divergences 
between China compared with Taiwan.  Next I will present some of the various 
organizations that have engaged in environmentalism focusing particularly on 
three—Ciji Gongde hui 慈濟功德會 (Ciji), Foguangshan 佛光山 (FGS), and 
Fagushan 法鼓山 (Dharma Drum Mountain/DDM).  Finally, I will examine the 
issues that scholars have raised in critically addressing the project of Chinese 
Buddhist environmentalism.     
Before beginning I should note that the use of the phrase “Chinese 
Buddhist environmentalism” is, in fact, more hypothetical than purely descriptive.  
Taking into account the suggestion made by Trevor Ling in chapter four regarding 
the country-specific particularity of Buddhism, perhaps we should look at Chinese 
Buddhism and Taiwanese Buddhism separately.  And there is reason to think this 
is true, since because of differing socio-political contexts we should expect the 
Buddhism to be different as well.  But I am offering this phrase as a hypothesis.  
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There is a gap between the environmentalism of Chinese Buddhism in China and 
the Chinese Buddhism in Taiwan and part of this is due to there being little 
information on the former and a great deal of development on the part of the latter.  
We might even ask to what degree the former is following in the footsteps of the 
latter.  In time, as Chinese Buddhist environmentalism in China develops further, 
it will be necessary to reexamine the degree to which Taiwanese Buddhist 
environmentalism and Chinese Buddhist environmentalism differ.  For the time 
being, however, I argue that using the phrase “Chinese Buddhist 
environmentalism” to refer to Buddhist environmentalism in Taiwan and China 
widens our scope of inquiry and provides a basis for future comparative analyses.  
Furthermore, we could include Singapore under this designation as a test case 
regarding the continuity of at least one element (environmentalism) of modern 
Chinese Buddhism throughout East and Southeast Asia.   
 
5.1 Contexts of Chinese Buddhist environmentalism 
Julia Corbett identifies four factors linking environmental attitudes and 
behaviors: attitudinal, personal, contextual, and habits and routines.
376
  These four 
contextual factors describe the role that social, political, and cultural institutions 
play in influencing environmental behavior.  This influence can be on the 
individual or collective level (e.g., organizations or communities).  If we are to 
address the role that rhetoric plays in constructing identities that link Buddhism 
with environmental concern and more so with practice (that is, environmentalism), 
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it is important to identify the factors that can both limit and promote not only the 
identification, but the resultant practice.  Therefore, we need to ask in what ways 
do environmentalism and Buddhism share space in contemporary Chinese and 
Taiwanese society?  Do certain forms of Buddhism tend to dovetail with 
environmentalism more than others?  How do they intersect with each other and 
with other discourses and practices?  What historical factors have influenced the 
rise of environmentalism and Buddhism in both locations?  These questions are 
tied up with issues of Chinese society and modernity and so it might seem best to 
approach the issues historically and so begin with China (as do many studies do), 
but considering Chinese Buddhist environmentalism as a hypothetically singular 
entity, we should begin with Taiwan, since that is where environmentalism and 
contemporary Buddhism have developed longer. 
 5.1.1 Taiwan and China  
 Environmentalism and Buddhism in the context of Chinese and Taiwanese 
modernity are heavily influenced by the way these trends developed and were 
understood in a modern Western context.
377
  Robert Weller, Judith Shapiro and 
others observe that despite the idea that Chinese views of the nature/human 
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relationship are characterized as harmonious, the dominant view of nature in the 
twentieth century for both China and Taiwan was the view that nature was a 
resource to be used and controlled for the development of the nation.  They link 
this view to the adoption of a Western-inspired process of scientific and cultural 
modernization that peaked once with the May Fourth Movement of 1919.  Part of 
this process was also the modernization of religion, which favored rationalism 
over superstition and privatized individual belief.  Buddhist modernism in China 
and Taiwan is most readily reflected in the movement known as “humanistic 
Buddhism” (renjian fojiao人間佛教).378  But both environmentalism and 
Buddhism have also developed based on the interactions between the particular 
political and social contexts in each place.  Moreover, there have developed 
multiple responses to environmentalism and Buddhism in both China and Taiwan 
depending on whether one looks locally, nationally, or internationally.   
 Most scholars seem to agree that the lifting of martial law in Taiwan in 
1987 initiated a watershed of changes in Taiwanese society, allowing for a 
proliferation of social activism.  The environmental issues that have received the 
most attention have been nuclear power, pollution, and natural conservation, 
signaling a continuity with environmental movements in North America and 
Europe.  In addition the earliest critics of the KMT's environmental record were 
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academics, nearly all of whom were trained in the United States.
379
  Lin Yiren 
notes that critiques by academics and the media of the KMT government's 
policies towards industrialization and failure to address the ensuing 
environmentally negative consequences came to be taken up, typically by NGOs, 
in mass protests, and were often connected to pushes towards more democratic 
reforms.
380
  But there are also elements that make Taiwanese environmentalism 
particular to the Taiwanese context.  First of all, Williams and Chang note the 
somewhat unique combination of Taiwan being a wealthy nation but with a high 
population density due to a small landmass and other geographic limitations.  
Culturally, Weller points out that there is a role religion and culture play in local 
environmental practices that is uniquely Taiwanese.  Religious communities 
sometimes involve the organizing support of local temples and the intervention of 
spirit mediums to critique government and private sector development projects.
381
  
The Confucian notion of filial piety is often invoked as a value that supports 
conservation and provides a counterpoint to economic value of development 
projects.
382
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 Charles Jones's study of Buddhism in Taiwan shows that, although 
Buddhism in Taiwan did not suffer the atrocities of Buddhism under Mao, there 
was nonetheless strong hegemonic control by the KMT government and the 
Buddhist Association of the Republic of China (BAROC).
383
  Jones notes that in 
the 1970s but more so after 1987, there developed a period of pluralization of 
Buddhism, which saw a number of Buddhist organizations develop and 
aggressively promote positions that were not always in-line with policies and 
interpretations that the KMT government and BAROC had established.
384
  Among 
these organizations are Ciji, FGS, and DDM, all three of which have contributed 
to the development of Chinese Buddhist environmentalism as a carrying out of 
their vision of humanistic Buddhism.  Jones argues that, althought Buddhism in 
Taiwan possesses some characteristics that make it unique, it exhibits features that 
reflect continuity with Buddhist reform in China.
385
  
 Environmental issues in China have received much attention in the last 
decade, due to the confluence of multiple factors including: the amount of natural 
resources China needs to meet the needs of its developing economy and growing 
middle class, the increase in greenhouse gases by the Chinese industrial and 
public sector, and the pace at which China is implementing forms of renewable 
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energy.
386
  However, analyses that emphasize the state’s hegemonic influence in 
either promoting restricting environmentalism have given way to more complex 
models mapping the interaction of local, regional, national, and international 
participation in environmentalism.
387
  This complexity plays out in environmental 
terms both advantageously and disadvantageously.
388
    On the one hand, 
Elizabeth Economy notes that despite the rapid increase of environmental laws 
that are now on the books, the upgrading of the State Environmental Protection 
Agency (SEPA) to the Ministry of Environmental Protection, and the increase of 
lawyers specializing in environmental issues, there is still little enforcement and a 
lack of clarity about how to apply the laws in local contexts.
389
  On the other hand, 
the Chinese government is following the practice of other governments and 
allowing NGOs to fill the gap between its environmental goals and the lack of 
resources to do so.
390
  The increase in environmental NGOs in China allows local 
communities access to the organizational and financial resources to address 
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environmental problems.  International NGOs also provide domestic 
environmental NGOs with access to developments in the global environmentalist 
discourse, which is common throughout the highest levels of government.
391
  
These NGOs, mainly located in China’s poorer and more rural areas, then link 
local environmental concerns to avenues of recourse with the national government, 
and provide models for how to pursue such recourse.  As Chen explains:  
If the domestic discourse is framed by the norms of the international 
environmental regimes, it should be easier for compliance-promoting civil 
society actors to strengthen their positions vis-à-vis the state and achieve 
broad support for policy change.  Issue framing by using international 
standards and foreign experiences also helps NGOs’ general efforts to 
sharpen public awareness of problems and [galvanize] community interest 
in direct action.
392
        
 
The question remains how the various social actors will negotiate the 
implementation of global environmental discourse and the localized discourses 
centered on specific issues.  There is a pressing need for China’s leaders to 
maintain a path to environmental reforms that is quick and effective.  Many 
approaches are couched in the global discourse of environmentalism and 
sustainability, but those discourses have also been developed through democratic 
processes.  New possibilities have opened up to local movements in appealing to 
the government for assistance and holding them accountable, but activism and 
protest still must be tempered.  Whether a new discourse of Chinese sustainability 
will develop that is acceptable at many levels remains to be seen. 
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 Recognizing that the same multiscalar dynamics that are effective for 
environmentalism hold for Buddhism, too, has led scholars to reevaluate the 
relationship of Buddhism and the state.  Ashiwa and Wank suggest looking at the 
institutionalization of religion in contemporary Chinese society as a process of 
negotiation between religious organizations and the state.
393
   They argue that the 
discourses of modernity (or modernism, following McMahan’s disctinction) that 
China adopted and reinterpreted around the turn of the twentieth century have 
favored an interpretation of religion that sets rationalism over and against 
superstition, belief over ritual, and the private over the public (conceived of as a 
secular sphere).  The application of this interpretation of religion to Buddhism 
was not just used by elites and the state, it was also part of an internal Buddhist 
reform beginning in China, most notably, with the monk Taixu 太虛(1890-1947).  
But Raoul Birnbaum points out Buddhist reform in modern China was not simply 
engaged in by advocates of modernism, but there was a “fundamentalist” group of 
practitioner monks who advocated reform in a return to basic spiritual 
practices.
394
  But these internal reforms, although in part inspired by Western 
discourses of modernism, also sought to make Buddhism a relevant and important 
part of Chinese society.  To this end, the reforms of Taixu and his legacy lead to 
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the institutionalization of Buddhist welfare and charity work.
395
  But such changes 
bring Buddhists and Buddhism firmly into the public view.  One challenge for 
Buddhist temples and other Buddhist actors, according to David Wank, is the way 
in which these social actors rationalize their activities in terms amenable to the 
state discourse of “religion” and how their interpretation of this discourse affects 
their relationships with the other organizational actors such as the Buddhist 
Association of China and the Religious Affairs Bureau.
396
 As in the case of 
environmental groups, religious organizations can fill a gap between demands on 
the state to promote social welfare and the lack of resources to do so.  However, 
in similar fashion, there is a danger in the accumulation of social capital for filling 
this gap, although the situation, too, varies depending on the sphere (local, 
national, or international) in which an organization is engaged.
397
  
 Up to this point I have kept environmentalism and religion separate, but 
there are contexts in which they already interact; one of these contexts is tourism.  
As Weller notes, “Secular and sacred tourism in China and Taiwan both draw on a 
single experience of power.”398  In China, less so in Taiwan, popular Buddhist 
sites are often located in mountains, where appreciation of the religious 
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environment and natural environment are not readily disassociated.  And there is 
also a religious power, a numinosity that is associated with natural phenomena.  
Therefore, the goal of conservation of the area bridges religious and 
environmental interests.  But in order to maintain the funds required to support the 
area, these areas have also been marketed to appeal to consumers.  The 
combination of religion, environment, and consumerism in tourism in China and 
Taiwan does not follow Western models in which these three are generally 
separated.  The model in China and Taiwan offers possibilities for the increased 
responsibility religious organizations take towards the environment and supports 
the reaching out to religious organizations by environmental groups.  But it is also 
possible that the demands of the tourism market for accessible and enjoyable 
leisure sites could comprise efforts at conservation.    
 The above discussion has attempted to indicate the contours of 
environmentalism and Buddhism in China and Taiwan as part of the scene against 
which the rhetorical dimensions of Chinese Buddhist environmentalism play out.  
Next I will look specifically at the Buddhist movement that the majority of the 
organizations advocating Chinese Buddhist environmentalism participate in.  
5.1.2 Humanistic Buddhism 
 As Birnbaum observed, Buddhist reform in twentieth century China can 
be divided between a “conservative” approach and a “progressive” approach.399  
The former insisted on a return to basic fundamental practices, often located in a 
limited collection of Buddhist sutras.  The latter interpreted Buddhism through the 
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discourse of modernity, aligning it with attendant discourses of science, 
technology, rationalism, democracy, and social progress.  The most prominent of 
the progressive reformers was Taixu, who developed his program of reform in 
response to critiques of Buddhism as irrelevant to modern society and concerned 
only with funerary rituals.
400
 But Buddhist reform was also necessary in the face 
of threats to Buddhism as a consequence of political reforms in the Republican 
period aimed at modernizing China as a whole.
401
  Taixu’s phrase “Buddhism for 
human life” (rensheng fojiao 人生佛教) sought to encapsulate his vision of 
Buddhism as “a tradition that transforms both the self and the world, that 
transcends local culture, and that is in harmony with science” and promote 
Buddhism as a form of moral reasoning that draws on and transcends both 
scientific knowledge and Buddhist understanding.
402
  Furthermore, Taixu 
reinterpreted the term “bodhisattva” to refer to the kind of person who takes on 
the challenge of transforming the world according the ideals of compassion and 
wisdom.
403
  This move demonstrates his criticism of devotional Buddhism 
(focused on devotion to various celestial buddhas and bodhisattvas) as a 
hindrance to the task of reform, and his desire to make Buddhism more accessible 
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to average Buddhists.  In addition, these conceptual innovations, Taixu also 
proposed many changes to the Chinese sangha and Buddhist monastic education. 
 Taixu’s legacy and influence can be seen in China and other countries in 
East and Southeast Asia, but nowhere is it greater than in Taiwan.  The reason for 
this is simple: when the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the monk who has 
developed Taixu’s vision more than anyone else, Yinshun 印順 (1906-2006) went, 
too.  Yinshun was not the activist monk that Taixu was, but his contributions to 
the systematization and further elaboration of Taixu’s thought have had an equal 
and perhaps even greater influence on the development of humanistic Buddhism 
in Taiwan.  Although considered somewhat reclusive, Yinshun is considered a 
rather controversial figure in Taiwan due to his criticisms of Pure Land Buddhism, 
particularly in his “New Treatise on the Pure Land” (jingtu xinlun 淨土新論).404   
 Several scholars have addressed the question of the significance regarding 
Taixu’s preference for the term rensheng fojiao “Buddhism for human life” and 
Yinshun’s preference for renjian fojiao “Buddhism for the human realm.”405  
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Charles Jones states, “In changing rensheng (human life) to renjian (the human 
realm), Yinshun expressed the primary difference between his and Taixu’s 
diagnosis of the source of Buddhism’s degradation.  Whereas Taixu thought that 
Buddhism concentrated too much on spirits and the dead, Yinshun thought the 
problem had its roots in the history of early Indian Buddhism.”406  “Buddhism for 
human life” is intended to emphasize that Buddhism should be concerned more 
about the condition of humans presently living.  “Buddhism for the human realm” 
is intended to emphasize that Buddhism is primarily concerned with the human 
realm as the most auspicious of the six realms of existence in Buddhist cosmology.  
Along these lines, it is clear why Yinshun would have preferred renjian 
nomenclature.  Since his reform of Buddhist thought was based on a return to 
Buddhism’s Indian roots, particularly in the philosophy of the Madhyamaka 
school, the meaning of renjian as the human realm in contrast to other realms, 
such as the realms of ghosts and gods, would have had traction.  Regardless of 
these semantic differences, Marcus Bingenheimer argues cogently that there is 
little reason to distinguish between the two terms, especially since Taixu himself 
used both in his career.
407
  Also Stuart Chandler points out that presently, although 
renjian fojiao is preferred by Taiwanese Buddhists, rensheng fojiao is more 
common in China, where Yinshun has had much less influence.
408
  In English the 
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translation one sees most often is “humanistic Buddhism,” which is most likely 
developed by one of the organizations.  Since the groups I will be looking at all 
prefer the term renjian fojiao, this is the usage I will follow along with the 
commonly accepted English translation of humanistic Buddhism. 
 Bingenheimer suggests that renjian fojiao is generally used as a normative 
term among contemporary Buddhists in Taiwan and China: “In Chinese 
Buddhism on Taiwan renjian fojiao is often used as a motto to justify the 
expansion of the group and the branching out of its activities, not merely a 
statement about Buddhism…It is generally seen as positive and often seems to 
imply novelty, a progressive force [vis-à-vis] an older ‘traditional’ Buddhism.”409  
He goes on to explain renjian fojiao as one expression of Buddhist modernism, 
following as David McMahan does, the definition of Buddhist modernism 
proposed by Heinz Bechert, which Bigenheimer argues can be used to describe 
other movements, such as engaged Buddhism.  Bigenheimer’s argument is correct, 
especially when we consider the popularity of the phrase “humanistic Buddhism” 
among the contemporary Buddhist groups that claim to follow this form of 
Buddhism (renjian fojiao).  Humanistic Buddhism not only reflects the meaning 
of renjian as “human realm,” but it evokes notions of humanism as a modern, 
progressive philosophy that is focused on the welfare of individuals and 
supportive of science and democracy.  Also, humanistic suggests the related term 
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“humane” which capitalizes on the notion of Buddhist compassion (cibei 慈悲), a 
virtue embodied by Guanyin bodhisattva (guanyin pusa 觀音菩薩) who is central 
to both Ciji and DDM.   
 However, humanistic Buddhism is not simply indicative of Buddhist 
modernism in opposition to Buddhist tradition.  Scott Pacey notes how the 
discourse of humanistic Buddhism addresses modernization and globalization and 
weaves these trends together with an appeal to Buddhist tradition, which presents 
Buddhism as an alternative to the kind of modernization that is associated with 
Westernization.  Pacey states, “The popularity of renjian fojiao therefore arguably 
derives more from the concept’s successful merging of tradition and modernity 
than it does from its meaning in a semantic sense.”410  Chandler observes the way 
that both modernists and traditionalists refer back to the past to strengthen their 
position.  In the rhetoric of both camps there is an appeal to a revival, relying on a 
common assumption that the tradition has deteriorated and must be restored.
411
  
The difference lies in how to carry out the revival or restoration.  For 
traditionalists, the goal is to go back to a point before the tradition was polluted by 
modern influences.  Modernists seek to restore the tradition’s original spirit 
(effectively predating the traditionalist camp) but incorporate it with the 
characteristics of the modern social context.  Chandler shows how Xingyun 
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argues that the Buddha was a “modern” during his time and “took advantage of 
the latest technology.”412  Likewise Shengyan argues that “spiritual 
environmentalism” (his particular interpretation of humanistic Buddhism) is 
nothing other than what the Buddha practiced in India.  Moreover, in some 
respects the tradition that is valued in humanistic Buddhism is not the Buddhist 
tradition alone, but the Confucian tradition of ethics.  Both Xingyun and 
Zhengyan value Confucian notions of family and filial piety.  In fact, Zhengyan 
has added filial peity (“Be filial to your parents and be moderate in speech and 
attitude”) as one of five precepts Ciji members observe in addition to the five 
traditional Buddhist precepts.
413
  Richard Madsen and Stuart Chandler also point 
to the blurring of the secular/sacred and public/private divide instituted by the 
increased participation of the laity and the social concerns of the monastics in 
humanistic Buddhist organizations as characteristic of a Confucian worldview.
414
   
The appeal to Confucian virtues as a hallmark of the two largest 
humanistic Buddhist organizations raises an interesting point of comparison 
between humanistic Buddhism and other forms of Buddhist modernism.  How 
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does humanistic Buddhism compare with engaged Buddhism?  Engaged 
Buddhism has received increasing attention from scholars, not least because of the 
broadness of the term. Engaged Buddhism most generally refers to Buddhist 
social activist movements.  Christopher Queen, editor of several volumes on 
engaged Buddhism, works gradually towards a definition in his various 
introductions, but never firmly sets one forth.  He claims that engaged Buddhism 
is a form of Buddhism that participates in social welfare and political activism, 
maintains an ecumenical attitude, and seeks to reformulate Buddhism by a 
reinterpretation of Buddhist scriptures.
415
  Humanistic Buddhism would appear to 
share these concerns in degrees depending on which organization one looks at.  
For example, Ciji avoids politics completely, while FGS has even had its own 
presidential candidate.  So we might say that a comparison between engaged 
Buddhism and humanistic Buddhism would fruitfully highlight the different ways 
in which Buddhist groups and organizations have attended to the challenges and 
promises of various discourses of modernity.  But there might be cases in which 
these two fail to capture the engagement of Buddhism with modernity.   
Honk-yok Ip in an article entitled “Buddhist Activism and Chinese 
Modernity” distinguishes Buddhist activism from engaged Buddhism and 
humanistic Buddhism, arguing that these two latter terms are, among other 
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difficulties, vague.
416
  He notes that the movements associated with the label 
engaged Buddhism are always associated with reform, whereas the term 
‘Buddhist activism makes space for individuals who have been actively engaged 
with Buddhism’s interaction with modernity, without necessarily seeking to adapt 
Buddhism to modernity or reform it.  Ip’s choice of the term ‘Buddhist activism’ 
rather than ‘engaged Buddhism’ or ‘humanistic Buddhism’ is probably less based 
on semantics than on a reluctance to throw more fuel on the academic fire of 
engaged Buddhism.  But it also reflects a concern that Bingenheimer voices 
regarding the terms rensheng fojiao and renjian fojiao, which is that these are 
emic terms.
417
  They are terms that are meaningful to those who identify with 
humanistic Buddhist organizations (or engaged Buddhist movements).  Ip’s 
preference for a term that is no more well-defined than the two he rejects 
illustrates the difficulty in establishing any firm definition of these movements, 
especially given that he stretches “activism” beyond its typical range of meaning 
rendering it equally vague.   
Nonetheless, the comparison between humanistic Buddhism and engaged 
Buddhism is useful in clarifying the ways in which an analysis of Buddhist 
environmentalism must take into account the social and cultural contexts of the 
community one is analyzing.  For example, Christopher Queen states that one 
unifying concern among all engaged Buddhist movements is the overcoming of or 
liberation from oppression, which is reflected in his description of engaged 
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Buddhism as a way to refer to Buddhist liberation movements.
418
  This orientation 
towards liberation is more focused on social freedom, though liberation can be 
read as having a transcendent counterpart in the liberation from suffering (i.e., 
nīrvāna).  The main focus of humanistic Buddhism, however, is on purity.  There 
is still a mundane, this-worldly emphasis in humanistic Buddhism, exemplified in 
the goal of “establishing a Pure land on earth” (jianshe renjian jingtu 建設人間淨
土).  The implication of this difference is that the ways in which social issues are 
framed spiritually will differ and so then will the ways in which adherents or 
members of these groups (humanistic Buddhist and engaged Buddhist alike) 
understand the issues in Buddhist terms.  In the case of Buddhist 
environmentalism, engaged Buddhist approaches will tend to emphasize justice 
issues (as in the case of Buddhism in Thailand), either aimed at ending the 
oppression of people affected by environmental degradation or the oppression of 
the natural world itself.  In the case of humanistic Buddhism, whose primary 
metaphor is purity, environmental issues will emphasize the stability and 
cleanliness of the natural world as an indicator of the degree to which a “Pure 
land on Earth” is being established.  The success of Ciji’s recycling program 
attests to this difference.       
 Before moving on, I would like to raise the issue of environmentalism in 
the light of Yinshun’s justification for preferring renjian fojiao.  For the most part, 
environmentalism in contemporary Chinese Buddhism is linked with humanistic 
Buddhism, even though the two most influential advocates of humanistic 
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Buddhism, Taixu and Yinshun, never mentioned environmentalism.  But it goes 
without saying that nowadays any organization that advocates humanistic 
Buddhism must express some environmental position, at least in order to claim a 
public stance on the issue.   The three major organizations that advocate 
humanistic Buddhism—Ciji, FGS, and DDM—all pay attention to 
environmentalism as a particular area of social and religious concern, but each in 
its own way.  Their different approaches reflect each founder’s own interpretation 
of humanistic Buddhism and the character of the organization as a whole.  Stuart 
Chandler highlights general differeneces among these three organizations: 
The differences in method employed by Vens. Xingyun, Zhengyan, and 
Shengyan are a matter of emphasis rather than of clear-cut distinctions.  
Foguangshan, Ciji Gongde Hui, and Fagushan all engage in chariable and 
educational efforts….The differences in focus nonetheless set the tone for 
each organization: Ciji Gongde Hui is the Buddhist group famed in Taiwan for 
its compassionate service, Fagushan is regarded as the foremost place to learn 
meditation, and Foguangshan is known for its educational endeavors.  Having 
staked their claims in the spiritual marketplace, these organizations staunchly 
guard their domains.  There is little cooperation or even interaction between 
the three communities. They are rivals more than allies, generally polite rivals, 
but rivals nonetheless, for they are all vying to attract a limited population: 
those Buddhists on Taiwan who find the rhetoric of [h]umanistic Buddhism 
appealing.
419
 
 
And Richard Madsen further locates these organizations in the context of Chinese 
culture by pointing out the Confucian character of these organizations, 
particularly emphasizing the Confucian focus on family that is a central metaphor 
for Ciji and FGS.
420
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When discussing Buddhist social action, the majority of cases pertain to 
human welfare.  Environmental issues are unique in the sense that the emphasis is 
equally or more greatly placed on nonhuman welfare.  Yinshun has stated that the 
focus of Buddhism should be on the human realm (renjian), since this is the realm 
in which Buddhas achieve enlightenment and is the realm to which most Buddhist 
teachings are relevant.  But taking this strictly, Buddhist environmentalism would 
be only of peripheral concern, since humans are not the main focus.  Among the 
six realms of existence, animals and plant are separate and lower than humans.  
Such a view of renjian fojiao suggests that technological approaches to 
environmental problems are perhaps the best if they are the most efficient.  But 
this approach does not necessarily address the root causes of environmental 
deterioration and might be seen to ignore conservation.  However, the 
environmental practices of humanistic Buddhist groups do not reflect this 
interpretation of “human realm.”  The fact is humanistic Buddhist organizations 
tend to consider humanistic Buddhism as a form of Buddhism that addresses 
problems in and of human society.  Among these problems are environmental 
issues, not only because they affect humans but because so many environmental 
problems are anthropogenic.  Thus, it seems reasonable that rather than reading 
renjian fojiao simply as humanistic Buddhism or “Buddhism for the human 
realm,” it should be elaborated to “Buddhism as a conceptual and practical source 
of solving social and environmental problems facing the humans and nonhumans 
in the modern world aimed at the goal of spiritual and social purity, a goal that is 
realized in correct ethical action based on Buddhist and Confucian ethical 
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guidelines.”  In light of the unwieldiness of this explanation, I will simply use 
‘humanistic Buddhism.’ 
In the following sections, I will introduce the humanistic Buddhist 
organizations already mentioned and examine the scholarly discourse of Chinese 
Buddhist environmentalism. 
 
5.2 Chinese Buddhist Organizations and environmentalism 
It can be said that many temples practice a minimal environmentalism to 
the degree that the members are encouraged to observe a vegetarian lifestyle.  
Whether this should qualify as environmentalism is not as important as the fact 
that some temples hold up the practice as in accordance with environmental 
principles.  For the temples and organizations that make this moderate shift in 
rhetoric, adding to the justification of vegetarianism its environmental benefit, 
demonstrates that some Buddhists are keen to adapt to social currents and not 
simply confine their discourse to traditional topoi (compassion in the case of 
vegetarianism). Below I will look at the environmental approaches of several 
Chinese Buddhist organizations to construct a fuller picture of the ways in which 
contemporary Chinese Buddhism is responding to and reframing environmental 
issues.  Since I will be treating the environmentalism of DDM, Ciji, and FGS 
from a rhetorical perspective in chapter five, I will not discuss them. 
5.2.1 Zhongtaishan 
Zhongtaishan (中台山) is not commonly considered to promote 
humanistic Buddhism, but as Guo Chengtian notes, “Ven. Weijue’s惟覺 theology 
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is much like humanistic Buddhism.  Weijue has proposed to transform Buddhism 
into an academic, educational, scientific, artistic, and humanistic discipline.”421  
However, the founder of the organization, Ven. Weijue, does not acknowledge 
either Yinshun or Taixu in Zhongtaishan’s lineage.  Rather, the lineage is traced 
through Ven. Xuyun 虛雲, a monk renowned for meditation.  Another way in 
which Zhongtaishan stands apart from the other three major Buddhist 
organizations is with respect to environmentalism.  Weijue has never offered a 
stance specifically on environmental issues, and in the literature of the 
organization there is not much in the way of explicit reference to 
environmentalism.  But that is not to say that there is no concern, much less 
awareness, regarding environmental issues.  There is a strong emphasis on 
vegetarianism throughout the organization, which is linked to environmental 
concern.  And on the grounds of the main temple in Puli, Taiwan there is an 
organic farm which supplies produce for the monastic meals.  Even at a branch 
temple in Taizhong, Puming jingshe普明精舍, members of the staff pointed out 
that every effort was made to use locally grown organic produce for meals.  They 
even acquired some of the produce from the main temple’s garden.  But there is 
not an emphasis on environmentalism as a separate practice that is on its own 
relevant and important to Buddhist practice, as we find in Ciji, FGS, and DDM. 
5.2.2 Protecting Life: LCA and Zhaohui 
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 In Lin Yiren’s study of Buddhist environmentalism in Taiwan, he 
discusses three organizations: Ciji, DDM, and the Life Conservationist 
Association (Guanhuai shengming xiehui 關懷生命協會, LCA).  The LCA is not 
a Buddhist organization in the way that Ciji and DDM are, but it was begun by 
the nun, Ven. Zhaohui 釋昭慧 (b. 1957), in 1993 following a successful campaign 
to pass legislation making a form of fishing, known as “baitless fishing” (cuoyu
挫魚) illegal.422  Zhaohui served as the head of the LCA until 1999.  LCA’s 
mission is based around the objective of “protecting life” (husheng 護生), 
although the organization’s literature does not mention Buddhism as a basis of the 
LCA.  The activities of the LCA focus on campaigns to care for stray dogs and 
protect other animals and ecosystems, education, and political lobbying.  This last 
activity sets the LCA off from the other organizations we listed above.  The LCA 
frequent involves NGOs and governmental organizations in its campaigns and 
does not shy away from protest.   
 Despite the lack of Buddhist discourse in LCA’s communication, it has a 
strong connection to humanistic Buddhism.  For example, LCA is connected to 
the Hongshi Buddhist College (fojiao hongshi xueyuan 佛教弘誓學院), begun in 
1989 by Zhaohui.  Zhaohui claims Yinshun as her mentor and identifies closely 
with humanistic Buddhism.
423
  The mission of LCA based on husheng is part of 
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Zhaohui’s articulation and description of Buddhist ethics.  She argues that the 
basis of Buddhist ethics is dependent origination, which refers to the idea that all 
phenomena come into existence based on various causes and conditions.  We saw 
in the previous chapter how this doctrine has been appealed to to link Buddhism 
with Western notions of interconnectedness.  Zhaohui tends not to use the 
doctrine in this way, though.  She argues that given the fact that all things exist 
based on the same ontological process, there is an inherent equality to all beings 
(zhongsheng pingdeng xing 眾生平等性).424  And she adds that husheng is the 
necessary unfolding of depedent origination, since in the concept of husheng is 
realized the values of mutuality and equality among all beings.
425
  The means by 
which this realization is attained is based in the “method of self-understanding” 
(zitong zhi fa 自通之法), which she defines as the law of the mind’s functioning 
according to conditioned arising.
426
  Therefore, for Zhaohui Buddhist ethics and 
particularly the practice of husheng is a method of self-cultivation following the 
traditional Buddhist goal of the realization of “non-self.”  She finds affinity with 
Deep Ecology and draws many parallels between its focus on a transformation of 
consciousness and Buddhist self-cultivation.
427
  But she argues that Deep Ecology 
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can be enhanced by the way in which Buddhist ethics, based on dependent 
origination, offers a way to negotiate the “is/ought” dichotomy.428    
 Zhaohui’s is a highly respected scholar, holding several academic 
appointments, recently serving as the chair of the Taiwan Association of 
Religious Studies, and publishing two volumes on Buddhist ethics and metaethics.  
But she is perhaps better known for her social activism.  In addition to 
environmental issues, she has aggressively promoted gender equality.  Her brand 
of humanistic Buddhism challenges the notion that humanistic Buddhism is 
inherently nonconfrontational.  Her efforts are often considered grassroots, 
drawing comparisons with the monk Ven. Zhuandao 釋傳道 (b.1941).  The 
environmental advocacy of both Zhaohui and Zhuandao criticizes the push 
towards development and economic growth when such forces lead to adverse 
environmental results.  Were it not for Zhaohui’s clear promotion of humanistic 
Buddhism, her social activism would invite consideration of the difference 
between humanistic Buddhism and a Taiwanese case of engaged Buddhism.  Her 
advocacy of “protecting life” instead of “purity” also signals an interesting 
distinction between her brand of humanistic Buddhism and that of other leaders.  
But what these differences seem to point to is the openness of how humanistic 
Buddhism is interpreted and the way that interpretation is dependent on an 
organization’s leader’s own history and the way they use the concept of renjian 
fojiao to anchor a discourse and set of practices that make Buddhism meaningful 
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for a contemporary audience.  Moreover, she is sometimes critical of the 
approaches by Shengyan and Zhengyan as too disengaged with the political 
establishment in Taiwan.
429
  Despite the highly philosophical nature of her 
environmental philosophy, she is the most politically engaged monastic in Taiwan.   
 
5.3   Chinese Buddhist environmental discourse 
 Following the beginning of the environmental campaigns by DDM, Ciji, 
FGS, and LCA, Buddhist studies scholars in Taiwan joined the discussion and 
began offering critiques and interepretations of these campaigns.  Part of this is 
due to the public nature of these campaigns, following the lifting of martial law in 
1987.  But the scholarly response can also be situated in the tradition of 
Taiwanese scholars taking activist positions on environmentalism.  In the 
following section, I will highlight three terms in the scholarly discourse of 
Chinese Buddhist environmentalism: environment (jing境), land (tu土), and 
ecology (shengtai生態).  By analyzing the operationalization of these terms in 
Chinese Buddhist environmental ethics, I hope to illustrate that the essential 
project of environmental ethics in the Chinese Buddhist context cannot converge 
with what is commonly considered to be the mainstream position supporting 
environmental ethics, a nonanthropocentric worldview that seeks to establish the 
intrinsic value of nature, unless Chinese Buddhist environmental discourse 
actively adopts the terms and concepts of Western environmentalism.  While there 
is nothing inherently objectionable in Buddhist organizations adopting this 
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position, it echoes concerns raised over a decade ago by Ian Harris that ‘eco-
Buddhism’ is not Buddhist as such, but more a globalized environmental 
discourse.  Or, using the dichotomy I offered in chapter four between eco-
Buddhism and Buddhist environmentalism, for Chinese Buddhist organizations to 
adopt the mainstream approach to environmental ethics would be to align 
themselves with a decontextualized eco-Buddhism.  In the course of analyzing 
these three terms, this section will also examine the idea that Chinese Buddhist 
environmentalism, having roots in humanistic Buddhism, is related to a discourse 
of purity, with particular focus on Pure land (or at least renjian jingtu人間淨土 
“Pure land in the human realm”) discourse, and critique the notion that a Chinese 
Buddhist environmental position can be established on the basis of the ecological 
notion of interrelatedness.  This latter is generally unconditionally accepted by 
most contributors to the discussion.  The comparison between the Buddhist 
emphasis on interconnectedness and the idea of interconnectedness in ecology 
(shengtai 生態), a comparison which demonstrates an over-reliance on Western 
environmental discourse (particularly favoring the term ‘ecology’) and also tends 
toward a positive appraisal of Deep Ecology, suffers from two flaws: 1) the fact 
that the natural world is also the object of analysis and categorization, so 
interconnectedness is not primary, and 2) that interconnectedness in Buddhism 
participates in an epistemological/soteriological discourse, not an ontological one 
(as is the case in ecology).  The elements of Chinese Buddhist environmentalism 
that adhere best to Buddhism are the multivalent notion of environment (huanjing 
環境) and purity (jing淨).  Finally, the lack of the use of the term ziran自然 
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suggests that Chinese Buddhist environmentalism is not very compatible with 
Western discourses arguing for intrinsic value of nature, but that shouldn't 
necessarily prevent Buddhists from advocating an intrinsic value position, just 
that doing so would tend towards a hybrid Chinese Buddhist-Western 
environmental discourse. 
5.3.1 Chinese Buddhist Understandings of “Environment” 
Robert Weller discusses the various terms that can be translated into 
English as “nature,” including da ziran大自然 (nature), tian天 (heaven/nature), 
tianran天然 (natural), huanjing環境 (environment), and shanshui山水
(landscape),
430
 but then takes up another way of seeing the problem of ‘what 
“nature” means in Chinese culture’ by looking at ways of conceptualizing 
relations to the environment.
431
  Mark Elvin has noted that “[t]here was no one 
view of nature that can be called the ‘Chinese’ view.  There was not even a 
spectrum.  Rather a kaleidoscope of fragments most of which reflected something 
of most of the other fragments.”432  What this observation suggests is that Chinese 
conceptual resources can support just about any view of nature available: there is 
no singular Chinese view of the environment.  The question for environmentalism, 
then, is what resources support environmental goals, which leads to the question, 
what environmental goals are most important? If the preservation of ecosystems is 
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primary, then the view to be supported is going to need to emphasize the holism 
of the natural world.  If species preservation is the goal, emphasizing biodiversity 
or biocentric egalitarianism, then one should find resources that highlight the 
value of plants and animals.  But this approach still begins with the categories of 
environmentalism as they exist in Western environmental discourse.  Such an 
approach will fail to recognize any unique characteristic of Chinese discourses of 
nature.  Thinking about the problem of Chinese Buddhist environmentalism using 
Western categories can help us refine our inquiry, but we cannot simply seek one 
to one correspondences (a point we have already seen made by Toulmin and 
Kirkman).  Additionally, how are we to navigate the possible incompatibilities of 
‘Chinese’ views compared with ‘Buddhist’ views?  Or should we take ‘Chinese 
Buddhism’ as a singular entity?  As we are talking about people’s beliefs and 
understandings of nature, it is not as simply as establishing what is ‘Chinese’ and 
what is ‘Buddhist’ and finding the common denominator.  Different people 
(Chinese Buddhists) will view nature and environmental issues differently 
depending on how these identity markers influence their values.  As evidence of 
this fact, several scholars have pointed out that despite religious worldviews that 
seem to take a positive view of nature (Daoist and Neo-Confucian, mainly), these 
have hardly ever resulted in positive behavior.
433
  So we should be wary of 
suggestions that deal only in ideas and leave out actual human communities. 
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5.3.2 Jing境 and Huanjing 環境 
The first term we identify is jing.  Jing itself means “border” or 
“boundary,” but it is more commonly used in the compound huanjing, which 
means “surrounding area” or “environment.”  Like the English “environment” it 
has a similar generality which does not specify the character of the space or area 
under concern.  Huanjing is the term usually used to mean natural environment, 
sometimes further defined as ziran huanjing, “natural environment”.  But the term 
for environmentalism—huanjingbaohu環境保護 or huanbao (literally “protecting 
the environment”)—results in the tendency to construe huanjing simply as natural 
environment.  However, as Bryan Tilt mentions from his research into 
environmental consciousness in southern China, it is sometimes necessary to 
clarify what kind of environment one is referring to, as the term huanjing can be 
modified by social, personal, political, spiritual or any other such qualifier.
434
  
Another example of the broad application of huanjing has been popularized by 
Shengyan in his coining of the terms xinling huanbao 心靈環保 (spiritual 
environmentalism or protecting the spiritual environment) and sizhong huanbao
四種環保 (fourfold environmentalism).  Of the four kinds of environment to be 
protected, only one refers to the natural environment of ecosystems and ecological 
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science, the other three being spiritual, social, and living.
435
   
            However, in literature on Chinese Buddhist environmentalism, jing is 
often used to mean “external environment” as the counterpart to the “internal 
environment” of xin 心 or mind.  In this construction, the terms are portrayed as 
both contrastive and complementary.  Several scholars debate the 
mind/environment problematic in xinling huanbao.  The issue was first raised by 
Yang Huinan楊惠南.  He critiques the environmentalist projects initiated by 
Shengyan and Zhengyan, arguing that they emphasize mind to the detriment of 
environment and so constitute an easy path, a romantic approach to Buddhist 
environmentalism.
436
  Although not mentioned by Yang, Xingyun also refers to 
the mind/environment connection in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra as exemplifying the 
Buddhist position on this issue: “In addition to protecting the physical 
environment, we have to take good care of our internal spiritual environment. The 
Vimalakīrti Sūtra says, ‘If one wants to be in a pure land, one should purify the 
mind. When the mind is pure, the land is pure.’ What this means is that the 
environment we live in is a reflection of our state of mind. To be successful in the 
movement to improve the environment, we must not neglect our inner spirit.”437 
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            Yang focuses primarily on the passage from the Vimalakīrti Sūtra—“When 
the mind is pure/purified, the Buddha lands will be pure/purified” (sui qi xin jing, 
ze fotu jing 隧其心淨則佛土淨)—cited by Shengyan (and quoted by Xingyun, 
above) to create a dichotomy between mind and environment, but he also refers to 
statements by Zhengyan claiming that it is more important to dispose of mental 
garbage (xinzhong de lese心中的垃圾) than external garbage (waimian de lese外
面的垃圾).438  He argues that prioritizing mind, which is inner, deprioritizes the 
outer, which in the case of environmentalism is the environment, or jing.
439
  Yang 
believes Buddhist environmental responses, exemplified by Zhengyan and 
Shengyan, do not address environmental issues directly enough, because they rely 
too much on the inner or mind aspect and not enough on the external or 
environmental aspect of the problem.  He critiques them for seeing the natural 
world as a “surface reality” and not as a central concern.440  Yang’s distinction is 
picked-up by other scholars, notably Lin Chaocheng, and the problem of “zhong 
‘xin’ qing ‘jing’ 重‘心’輕‘境’ (emphasizing ‘mind’ and so eclipsing 
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‘environment’)” becomes a central problem in Chinese Buddhist 
environmentalism.
441
 
The contrast between mind and external environment as two separate areas 
of environmental focus is addressed by Shi Zhuandao釋傳道, who critiques the 
idea of a “mind-only Pure land” (weixin jingtu唯心淨土).  Zhuandao claims that 
“protecting life” (husheng) encompasses the basic Buddhist teaching.442  Caring 
for, protecting, or honoring sentient beings implies extending the same 
consideration to those beings’ environments.  Purified environments have a 
significant impact on the bodhisattva’s practice of purifying self and others.  He 
sees the environment as the basis for practice and therefore advocates the 
expression “environment can transform the mind; the mind follows the 
transformation of the environment.”443  On this basis he rejects the relevance or 
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importance of the concept of a “mind-only Pure land,” preferring a “Pure land in 
the human realm” (renjian jingtu) and argues that the meaning of renjian jingtu 
“points to when beings purify and honor the space around them, their lives 
achieve dignity and purification.”444  Whether the natural world is the prime 
representative of his understanding of jing is not clear, although most of his 
discussion refers to pollution of the natural world.     
            But these two foci of concern need not be set in opposition, and there are 
three interrelated ways (hermeneutical, doctrinal, and phenomenological) in 
which mind and environment are explained as mutually implicative.  First, Yang 
Huinan, in fact, advocates a Buddhist environmentalism centered on “the mutual 
emphasis on mind and environment” (xinjing bingjian心境並建).  Returning to 
the Vimalakīrti Sūtra, he argues that the passage “When the mind is pure, the 
Buddha lands will be pure” is to be read as a “biconditional sentence (shuang 
tiaojian ju雙條件句),” which is to say that neither mind nor external 
environment can be purified in exclusion to the other.
445
  Yang uses the example 
of direct karmic retribution (zhengbao正報) and circumstantial karmic retribution 
(yibao依報) as mutually dependent to explain how mind and environment cannot 
be separated, as one needs the other to arise or be purified.
446
  Lin restates the 
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argument by stating that Buddha lands are the cause (yin因) of purified minds, as 
much as they are the result (guo果) of minds being purified.447 
 Lai Xianzong expands on Yang’s notion of xinjing bingjian.  He focuses 
on Tiantai philosophy and reviews the critiques of Yang and Lin particularly.  He 
argues that the split between mind and environment is not pertinent to Tiantai 
thought as expounded by it most influential thinker, Zhiyi 智顗 (538-597), and he 
elaborates on numerous aspects of Tiantai thought that he believes illustrate that 
Tiantai is not subject to this dichotomy and is therefore a natural conveyer of 
Deep Ecology thought.  Lai discusses the mind-environment dichotomy from the 
perspective of Tiantai metaphyics.  He argues that Shenyan’s xinling huanbao 
does not ignore environment, but is an example of “true mind-only (zhenchang 
weixin真常唯心).”448  This position is different from the position that Yang 
attributed to xinling huanbao, which Lai labels “consciousness-only, absent of 
external objects” (weishi wujing唯識無境), in that it encompasses all Buddhist 
“realms (jie界)” of mind, environment, and the dharmadhatu (fajie法界). 
Therefore, the Tiantai approach allows for the mutual establishment of a mind-
oriented and environment-oriented ethic (xinjing bingjian心境並建).   
            Furthermore, Lai examines Zhiyi’s position on jing and concludes that, 
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although to some degree he places greater emphasis on mind, he also advocates a 
harmonizing and assimilation of mind and environment.  Lai states that Zhiyi had 
two interpretations of jing: the external environment (waizai huanjing外在環境) 
and boundary (jingjie境界).449  The former is relevant to conditioned arising 
(yuanqi緣起), in which case Lai claims environment (huanjing環境) is more 
important than mind.  Lai argues the latter meaning illustrates the unity of humans 
and nature (ziran自然), but it not clear how Lai makes this connection.  Finally, 
Lai argues that Zhiyi’s view of jing can be illustrated by looking at Zhiyi’s 
threefold division of worlds (sanzhong shijian三種世間): “root world (genben 
shijian根本世間),” “world of meaning (yi shijian義世間),” and “world of affairs 
(shi shijian事世間).”450  I will return to this division below, but with respect to 
jing Lai’s point is that for Zhiyi there is a continuity of all boundaries, thus 
demonstrating continuity between mind and environment, internal and external.  
However, it should be noted that the subject of Zhiyi’s concern is not jing as such, 
but rather “body (shen身),” so we should be cautious whether Zhiyi’s use of shen 
can be equated with jing in the way Lai suggests.         
            The second way in which mind and environment are construed as 
complementary is through the doctrine of two kinds of karma mentioned above—
                                                 
449
 Ibid., 249. 
 
450
 Ibid., 249-250. 
 
  277 
direct and circumstantial.
451
  Shengyan gives two interpretations of natural 
environment (related to his fourth kind of environmentalism, “protecting the 
natural environment” ziran huanbao自然環保).  On the one hand the environment 
is the natural environment of Western environmentalism.  On the other hand, the 
environment is the environment of practice, and it encompasses the two types of 
karmic retribution Yang mentions: “A person’s body and mind are direct karmic 
retribution and the environment she lives in is circumstantial retribution. Direct 
and circumstantial retribution form one’s place of practice. Every person uses her 
direct retribution to practice within her circumstantial retribution. Thus one must 
care for the environment just as one would for her own body.”452  We can better 
see how mind and environment imply each other by looking at Zhuandao’s 
suggestion that “protection of life” is the essence of Buddhist environmentalism.   
            If husheng is of primary importance in Buddhist practice, in terms of 
refraining from causing harm, it must relate to one’s direct retribution (zhengbao
正報), one’s own intention and actions.  The protection of the environments in 
which sentient beings exist would also be a factor relevant to direct retribution.  
But the underlying justification for observing this teaching as primary would be 
understood in terms of one’s own salvation, that is, the overcoming of ignorance, 
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or in other words, the purification of the mind.  In this way, we can read the 
passage of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra to mean that one must first focus on purifying 
mind, only then can one turn one’s attention to purifying the world.  This is 
different from the interpretation that the world is purified when the mind is 
purified and avoids the biconditional reading argued for by Yang.   
 Zhuandao, Lin, and Yang all advocate a balance of mind and environment.  
Yang further argues that the connection between ecology and Buddhist thought 
lies in Madhyamaka thought and particularly dependent origination (yuanqi緣起), 
but he claims that Shengyan and Zhengyan base their ideas on Yogacāra.453  The 
content of his criticism here is that the Yogacāra tradition takes the mind as the 
source of phenomenal manifestation, subordinates the external world to the mind, 
and thus obviates any need to engage in environmental activism.  Moreover, Yang 
expands his analysis of the Yogacāra mind/environment schemata and concludes 
that if one only advocates mental purification, then there is no possibility for 
liberation, since the mind will only be subject to the polluting fumigation (xunxi
薰習) of the external world.454  So the mind and environment must be 
concomitantly purified for liberation to be possible.  However, in a slightly later 
article, Yang claims that Madhyamaka and Yogacāra both offer interpretations of 
mind and environment that equate the two domains.
455
  This reading suggests that 
from either a Madhyamaka or Yogacāra perspective, mind and environment are 
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part of the same ontological whole.  In fact, Yogacāra offers a more constructive 
model for environmental engagement with the distinction between the world of 
sentient beings and receptacle world.  Distinguishing the two can allow us to map 
the mind/environment distinction onto the two worlds, respectively.   
 Of course all this might amount to very little if we follow the 
interpretation of Yogacāra (actually all of Buddhism) set forth by Dan Lusthaus.  
Lusthaus has argued that Buddhist soteriology is focused on the question of 
epistemology and not ontology.  He says: 
Their denial of externality does not entail the reification of that denial into 
an ontological position, it is rather an existential disruptive force.  
Yogacara attempted to do something which has not yet been successfully 
accomplished in Western thought, which is epistemo-ethics, i.e., a 
liberational ethics fully derived from a coherent epistemology grounded in 
radical experience.  They displace ontology and thus ground ethics in 
something other than metaphysics—in fact, they ground it in the very 
necessity of bracketing metaphysics.
456
 
 
If the same can be said of the Madhyamaka position, then the question of which 
philosophical school is more suited for explaining the basis of concern for the 
environment depends less on how environment is conceived ontologically, and 
more on how environment is understood (epistemologically) to participate 
meaningfully in one’s liberation.   
5.3.3 Tu 土: The land ethic in environmental thought 
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Land or tu土 might be considered an overlooked term when used by itself.  
In general, when coupled with fotu佛土 or foguotu佛國土, it is used as the 
translation for Buddha lands (Skt. buddhaksetra).
457
 There are also Pure lands 
jingtu淨土, among which there are numerous Pure lands for specific buddhas.  
The problem that arises is how to or whether it is even necessary to distinguish 
between these different “lands” when discussing Buddhist environmentalism.  
The reason it might be unnecessary is because the idea of land is not intended in a 
literal sense, but as a metaphor.  Of course, it is not a given that land would be an 
operational term in Chinese Buddhist environmentalism.  As Lin Chaocheng 
argues in his essay “A Buddhist Land Ethic,” land in terms of soil or ground is not 
something that is held in high regard in the Buddhist traditions.
458
  His essay is in 
itself interesting, as it is addressing the philosophy of one of the most influential 
American environmentalists, Aldo Leopold, and attempts to translate his “land 
ethic” into Buddhist terms.  The attempt to articulate a Buddhist land ethic 
safeguards against relying on anthropocentric discourse (though the degree to 
which Leopold’s writings are nonanthropocentric is debatable), while drawing on 
an increasingly popular environmental discourse to raise the visibility of Buddhist 
environmental thought.   
 His link between Buddhism and a land ethic lies in the idea of the Pure 
land.  He traces Pure land thought through its Indian roots and numerous texts, 
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noting that Pure land images are not related to environmentalist images of a 
healthy eco-system.  Instead, he employs a sacred/profane dichotomy to describe 
the nature of Pure land-based environmental discourse and argues that pure lands 
are not “natural” (ziran huanjing自然環境).  But this lack of connection to 
environmentalism does not make Pure lands irrelevant.  Lin states that according 
to the logic of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra, “Adorned and pure Buddha lands are not 
without any purpose, rather they establish a field of practice upon the empty plots 
occupied by sentient beings.”459   
 Lin further discusses Shengyan’s concept of “spiritual environmentalism” 
and Shengyan’s renjian jingtu thought and argues that Shengyan is not much 
concerned with actual environmentalism, but, as his focus on purification might 
suggest, the religious goals of the practice. He concludes by discussing the 
purification of guotu國土 and mind based again on the passage from the 
Vimalakīrti Sūtra.460  But his discussion of a Buddhist land ethic interpretation of 
“purification of the country” (guotu jing) returns to passages from Carson and 
Nash, which belies the dependence of the Buddhist land ethic discussion on 
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Western discourse and claims that “a sustainable society is the basic requirement 
for purifying the land.”461   
 At this point we must stop and ask whether we still in the realm of 
Buddhist Pure land thought or has qingjing guotu now taken on a totally secular 
meaning in the same way Yang’s use of jing does.  In Lin’s defense, he clearly 
admits that creating a real Buddhist environmentalism will require looking outside 
the tradition, which is the very reason he gives for turning to the land ethic idea. 
The project of creating a Buddhist land ethic is a step in the process of developing 
a position of mutually promoting mind and environmental protection, though 
ultimately, he is still seeking to articulate a Buddhist Deep Ecology.
462
 
 In the article “From Liberation of the Environment to Liberation of the 
Mind,” in which Yang examines the passage from the Vimalakīrti Sūtra often 
cited by Shengyan (“When the mind is pure all the Buddha-lands will be pure”), 
the difficulty of establishing a clear term for environment in Chinese Buddhist 
discourse is made clear by the multiple terms used in the text.  He begins with the 
passage from the first chapter of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra entitled “Buddha lands 
(foguo佛國).”  In a previous article he states that the passage relating the mind’s 
purification to the purification of the Buddha lands is a biconditional sentence, so 
that the purification of mind and environment are mutually inclusive stipulations.  
He justifies the same reading here by interpreting the passage regarding the 
                                                 
461
 Lin, “Fojiaotu,” 87. 
 
462
 See Ibid., 86 and 90. 
 
  283 
seventeen practices of a Bodhisattva, beginning with zhixin直心 (“a mind 
characterized by straight forwardness (or sincerity)”) and moving to xinjing心淨 
(“a pure/purified mind”), to show that the mind is the ultimate goal of 
purification.
463
  But within that passage lies the intermediary link of fotujing 佛土
淨 (“purified Buddha lands”), which suggests to Yang that before the mind is 
purified, Buddha lands must be purified.  This reading rests on an understandable, 
but perhaps incomplete reading of the passage as a causal sequence rather than as 
a description of the centrality of mind in Pure land thought.  The Buddha is asked 
“how one can purify the Buddha lands,” (yuanwen de foguotu qingjing, weiyuan 
shizun shuo zhu pusa jingtu zhi xing 願聞得佛國土清淨, 唯願世尊說諸菩薩淨土之
行), and proceeds to list seventeen actions or practices with the syntax “P shi pusa 
jing tu 是菩薩淨土,” which seems to mean something like “P is the Pure land of 
the bodhisattva.”  This is how Yang appears to interpret it.  Following the initial 
presentation of these seventeen, the Buddha lists them in a condensed sequence, 
culminating with the passage: “Therefore Jewelled Accumulation, if the 
bodhisattva wishes to acquire a [P]ure land, he must purify his mind.  When the 
mind is purified, the Buddha land will be pure.”464  The question that is relevant to 
the discussion here is: what is meant by jing tu 淨土?  It seems as if Pure land is 
synonymous with Buddha land, and so jing tu is something to be acquired (de jing 
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tu 得淨土), as Watson translates it.  But going back to the original question, “how 
does one purify a Buddha land,” it seems better to take jing 淨 in its verbal 
form— “to purify.”465  Both Watson and Yang elide the differences between jing 
in its verbal mode and its nominative mode.  Jing as an adjective can mean “pure, 
purified, free from defilement,” as a noun “purification,” as a verb “to purify, to 
make (something) pure, to become pure.”466  In each of these uses the defilements 
can be external or internal and mind-related, e.g., purified of desire or ignorance.   
If this is the case, then we read the passage “P shi pusa jing tu” as “(doing) P this 
bodhisattva purifies the land.”  Recalling that “land” is the translation for the 
Sanskrit kṣetra, land in this sense is not physical environment but a field of merit 
from which the bodhisattva acts.  Yinshun has noted that Pure lands are only 
created when bodhisattva’s have led sentient beings to enlightenment.  The Pure 
land is a reward or beneficial consequence of a bodhisattva having achieved his 
vow.
467
  So we can read the Vimalakīrti Sūtra as clarifying the method for how a 
bodhisattva achieves this goal and not as pertaining to which comes first, mental 
purification or environmental purification.  It has already been noted that the 
Vimalakīrti Sūtra contains a vision of the Pure land quite different from other 
texts, and this reading would maintain that uniqueness in that it insists on a non-
“environmental” interpretation of Buddha land, where .    
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The case is the same regarding yanjing fotu 嚴淨佛土; it is not clear 
whether this phrase should be “adorned, pure Buddha land” or “adorning and 
purifying the Buddha lands.”  Yinshun suggests that the term zhuangyan 莊嚴 
refers to a practice (“adorning”) rather than a state (“adorned”).468  Yinshun 
further analyzes these various meanings of the term jing.
469
  Therefore, with 
respect to the idea of environment, both in its secular environmentalist mode and 
its Chinese Buddhist mode, the issue becomes less straightforward.  The 
implications of these differences in interpretation for environmentalism is that 
with respect to the idea that the dominant voices emphasize mind to the exclusion 
of environment, the most appropriate approach is not to turn one’s environment 
into a Pure land but, rather, that the work of Chinese Buddhist environmentalism 
should start with the purification of the mind.  This is to say, the purification 
advocated in Pure land discourse in the context of Chinese Budddhist 
environmentalism refers to a process of mental cultivation that seeks to develop a 
worldview that leads to environmentally-positive behavior.  Perhaps this process, 
and not metaphysical holism, the unified vision of internal and external, is the 
defining feature of Chinese Buddhist environmentalism. 
Finally, with respect to the question of Pure land discourse, the notions of 
renjian jingtu and purity raise further questions with respect to environmentalism.  
None of the authors surveyed here, lay or monastic, object to the notion that 
Buddhists today should strive to build a Pure land on earth.  A major feature, if 
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not the primary one, of renjian jingtu is the concern with purity.  Charles Jones 
has described the situation among modern Taiwanese Buddhists thus:  
Building the ‘Pure Land in the Human Realm,’ then, becomes a process 
not so much of creating a geographical zone in which Buddhist morality 
and practice prevails as Taixu defined it but of creating a ‘purity’ defined 
according to the secular agenda created by the individual’s main concern: 
purified of pollution and waste for the environmental activist, purified of 
patriarchy for the feminist, purified of political oppression for the 
dissident, and so on.
470
  
 
But just what does that mean in environmental terms?  We have seen above that 
the idea of a Pure land serving as the model for environmental conservation or 
preservation still leaves the question of wilderness unresolved (and to some 
degree threatened).  But one aim for advocating a Pure land in the human realm is 
to replace or challenge the notion of a Pure land as a scripturally defined utopia.  
In addition, we might say that a Pure land for the human realm would be different 
from a mind-only Pure land, even though the latter is related to the idea that one’s 
mental purity is a factor conditioning the arising of a Pure land.   
5.3.4 Ecology/Shengtai 生態 
The metaphysical approach to Buddhist environmentalism seeks to 
address the question of how nature is described and understood, as it is important 
in establishing the intrinsic value of nature.  It is a problematic issue, since 
scholars have difficultly enough establishing the moral standing plants and 
animals, much less the ontological and ethical status of nature. This question is 
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important, though, for several reasons. As environmental ethics is generally 
considered to be a global discourse, it seems there should be some terminological 
continuity between the various religious discourses on environmental ethics.
471
  
Yet one must wonder whether what is considered a global discourse is not better 
described as a globalized Western discourse.  Kate Soper’s analysis supports this 
reading, when she argues that in all discussions of nature, there is a fundamental 
sense of separation between humanity and nature that is “axiomatic to Western 
thought.”472  But then she also refers to a discourse of “cosmological nature” in 
which “humanity is neither opposed to it [nature] nor viewed as separable from 
it.”473  In the Chinese Buddhist context, the tendency is more towards a 
cosmological discourse of nature because of the inherent holism that characterizes 
Chinese Buddhism, resulting in the fact that nature as “other” is difficult to 
establish.  This emphasis on interconnectedness (exemplified by the image of 
Indra’s net), although based on the notion of dependent origination, distinguishes 
Chinese Buddhism from other Buddhisms. Cook, referring to the Huayan 華嚴 
worldview as a “cosmic ecology,” emphasizes the notions of “mutual identity” 
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and “mutual intercausality.”474  Cook mentions that identity and interdependence 
are merely the static and dynamic modes of the same idea.
475
  Based on these 
notions of identity, interdependence, and intercausality, Cook repeatedly 
emphasizes the harmonious universal vision of Huayan.  In short there are no 
truly separate entities, as every thing is in itself is the whole.  Cook is just one of 
many scholars to make this argument.
476
 
Among Chinese scholars is Feng Huxiang, whose work on comparative 
environmental philosophy between China and the West treats Confucian, Daoist 
and Buddhist thought in turn.  His main focus is to show how these traditions 
align with the concepts prevalent in contemporary environmental philosophy, 
which he takes to be characterized by ecologism or Deep Ecology.  His section on 
Buddhism first lays out the philosophical positions of several Chinese Buddhist 
schools but chooses to focus on Huayan thought as it represents for him the 
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pinnacle of Chinese Buddhist thought.
477
  Feng looks at the Huayan view of 
nature (ziran 自然), individual beings (wanwu 萬物), and the attitude towards 
sentient beings (zhongsheng de taidu 眾生的態度).  The first section asserts the 
usual claim that the Huayan view of the universe establishes how all things are 
imbued with “life” and suggests a position similar to biocentric egalitarianism.  
While this addresses the problem of a value-neutral scientific materialist view of 
the natural world by carving out a place for the question of value, it raises other 
issues of how to adjudicate conflicts between the interests of various value-
possessing entities. He argues for a value-laden life science, but he does move 
towards arguing for an interpretation of the one true dharmadhatu world as a 
metaphor for how to approach environmental problems, and this encourages a 
comprehensive view from all angles.
478
  He concludes this section by saying that 
the most important point the Huayan jing teaches us is that we have to open our 
spirits and develop our minds so that we can see the world as a living world of 
value.  Have we come full circle to xinling huanbao?   
            Lai Xianzong’s contribution to the metaphysical basis of Chinese Buddhist 
environmentalism rests on his appropriation of Tiantai philosophy, but he avoids 
simply citing the notion of dependent origination.  Lai argues for a Tiantai-based 
Chinese Buddhist environmentalism from a predominantly metaphysical 
viewpoint, but also emphasizes the practical focus of Tiantai.  As mentioned 
                                                 
477
 Feng Huxiang (Fung Hu-hsiang) 馮滬祥. Huanjing lunli xue—zhongxi 
huanbao zhexue bijiao yanjiu (Taipei: Student Book Company, 1991), 313-408. 
 
478
 Feng Huxiang, Huanjing, 357. 
  290 
above, Lai argues that the individual (shen 身) is intimately tied to the external 
world to show that Tiantai emphasizes the mutuality of mind and environment.  
He then argues that the practical aspects of Zhiyi’s zhiguan 止觀 (a tradition of 
meditation) thought demonstrates that Buddhist cultivation attends equally to the 
world and the mind.  He finally attempts to show that Tiantai supports a view 
compatible with Deep Ecology in the explanation of how all aspects of reality are 
mutually dependent (yicun xing 依存性).  He appeals to various concepts such as 
shijie huru 十界互入 (“the mutual entry of the ten realms”), baijie qianru 百界千
如 (“hundred worlds and thousand thusnesses”), and shirushi十如是 (“the ten 
thusnesses”).  However, at the end of Lai’s discussion, one cannot help but 
wonder if this is any different from Cook’s or Feng’s attempts to relate Buddhism 
to ecology, which takes ecology as the umbrella concept and endeavors to 
articulate a Buddhist ecology.  The meaning of “Buddhist ecology,” though, tends 
to mean something like conveying a sense of the ontological interconnectedness 
of beings with Buddhist terminology.
479
  But does the soteriological aim of 
Zhiyi’s metaphysics problematize the parallel with Western scientific ecological 
discourse?  I will return to this question below.         
 In addition to these solidly metaphysical articulations of Buddhist ecology, 
there is one last approach to consider regarding the theme of Buddhist and 
ecological interconnectedness.  Shi Zhuandao states that “the most important tool 
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for realizing Pure land in the human realm is [the doctrine of] ‘dependent 
origination.’”  Zhaohui takes dependent origination as the basis of Buddhist ethics, 
but her use of the concept finds its ethical expression in the idea of husheng, and 
she does not seem to follow other scholars in emphasizing the metaphysical 
interconnectedness that the doctrine implies (although she does not totally 
disregard it, either). 
Although it may seem uncontroversial that interconnectedness is the link 
between Buddhism and ecology, the relationship is, in fact, quite problematic.  
Scholars have already expressed reservations regarding the ethical and 
philosophical problems that pertain to ethical decision-making when one 
advocates an extreme form of interconnectedness as the basis of a Buddhist 
environmental ethic.  The question this section seeks to address is whether 
scientific ecology is relevant for Chinese Buddhist environmentalism.  Although 
ecology is a metaphor itself, even when modified by “scientific,” is it necessary or 
even feasible to use “ecology” to define the character of a Chinese Buddhist 
environmental ethic?  
Scientific ecology makes claims about the relationship of aspects of the 
natural world, typically for the purpose of description; it is purely ontological.  
Buddhist interconnectedness pertains to epistemological/ soteriological issues: 
what kind of knowledge is liberating?  What sorts of views must one cultivate in 
order to live an unconditioned life?  Interconnectedness is certainly a way to 
describe the kind of vision liberation requires, and in this respect it is a view of 
“the way things are.”  But the reality that Buddhist thought ascribes to 
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interconnectedness is described in numerous ways.  What does interconnectedness 
mean in terms of Chinese Buddhist environmentalism? That the human and 
natural worlds are not distinct, but hang together in a web of interrelatedness is 
one answer. However, it seems difficult to argue that this is how most Buddhists 
experience the world.  How then is the environment experienced?  What does it 
require to realize the doctrine of interconnectedness?  Experience of environment 
as interrelated might be the ontological reality, but it is not how the world is 
experienced generally.  The emphasis on this ontological interrelatedness is 
perhaps the result of imposing an objective view of the world on the canvas of 
practice.  From a rhetorical viewpoint, how we understand our experience of 
nature is more relevant to environmentalism than establishing the ontological 
character of an entity (although this is not to suggest that the two are unrelated).  
Thus, Chinese Buddhist articulations of a Buddhist environmental philosophy, 
should be structured upon soteriological and epistemological bases, and not 
ontological or metaphysical ones.  Recalling Andrew Light’s useful distinction 
between “rationalist motivational internalism” and “methodological 
environmental pragmatism,” Chinese Buddhist environmentalism will be more 
effective if it follows the former model.  The ways in which complex and highly 
intellectual Buddhist ontology and metaphysics have been employed to articulate 
the environmental basis of Chinese Buddhism will simply not resonate with a 
large audience.  Light’s distinction challenges the efforts of those who believe that 
if Buddhism’s holism can be amply demonstrated, and Buddhists “see” that all 
beings are one, then Buddhists would cease to act in ways that harm other beings 
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(sentient or not) because to do so would cause harm to oneself and refraining from 
self-harm is a universally accepted axiom. 
One thing to note about the discussions of Chinese Buddhist 
environmentalism is that rarely do the contemporary scholars use the term daziran
大自然 (nature).  The exception is Feng, but his work comes earlier than any 
others and so it is conceivable that the problems with the term had not been 
considered.  But of more consequence is that nearly all of these scholars prefer 
shengtai生態 (ecology) when they are speaking generally.  Huanjing is less 
directly implicated in environmentalism due to the possibility of a variety of 
huanjing.  The implications of preference for shengtai are not only that the term 
invokes Western notions of the environment, but that there is a connection with 
ecological science.  Thus, the prominence of the term shengtai orients discussions 
of Buddhist environmentalism around a scientific term.  Such a choice reflects the 
concern of modern Buddhists with aligning Buddhist cosmology with natural 
science.
480
 
Because of the emphasis on ecology, or perhaps influencing it, there is 
among almost all Buddhist thinkers writing about Chinese Buddhist 
environmentalism an affinity with a Deep Ecology model—the ideal ecological 
stance is nearly everywhere affirmed to be in line with Deep Ecology (shengceng 
shengtai xue 深層生態學).  What is immediately interesting is that, although Deep 
Ecology is often promoted as reflecting a philosophy based on the interrelated 
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functioning of the elements of an ecosystem, it is also conspicuous in its 
condemnation of Western scientific dualisms, which are said to lead to 
instrumental views of nature that lie at the heart of environmentally destructive 
industrialization.  As with the link between Buddhist and scientific notions of 
interconnectedness, the link between Buddhism and Deep Ecology is often 
considered rather unproblematic, especially given the fact that Arne Naess wrote 
two articles making explicit reference to the influence of Buddhism on Deep 
Ecology.  But not only is the actual Buddhist content of Deep Ecology suspect 
(Gandhi was perhaps a greater influence), the notion of interconnectedness is not 
where Naess draws the connection.   
 Moreover, the direct connection between Buddhist and ecological notions 
of interconnectedness is immaterial because ecology is based on empiricism and 
Chinese Buddhist environmentalism is normative.  Suggesting that Buddhist ideas 
of interconnectedness coincide with concepts in ecology does not mean that these 
Buddhist ideas justify environmentalist engagement on the part of Buddhists.  
Comparisons between Buddhist metaphysics and ecology center on the 
relationship of the individual to the world/universe, but can this comparison be 
the basis for why an individual as a Buddhist would engage in environmental 
activism?  Discussions of interconnectedness are meant to show that humans are 
not other from the world—to combat anthropocentrism.  Perhaps because of the 
dominance of anthropocentrism in Western environmental philosophy, this 
concern has been central in debates on Chinese Buddhist environmentalism.  It 
implies that if the individual sees him or herself as part of the universe, in 
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ontological unity with the world, then he or she will be inclined to act on its 
behalf (whatever that means), but this explanation turns into a form of enlightened 
self-interest and would thus seem to contradict the development of an 
understanding of no-self that an increasingly enlightened and compassionate 
being would be assumed to possess.  So the discussion of metaphysics should be 
better understood as a form of strategic speech which augments or inspires one to 
achieve this realization of emptiness which allows one to experience 
interconnectedness.    
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter argues that Chinese Buddhist environmentalism is a category 
in need of clarification.  Despite the formal and historical similarities between 
Buddhism in China and Taiwan, political differences affecting religion and 
environmentalism demonstrate the value, if not necessity, of using the phrase 
Chinese Buddhist environmentalism contigently.  If sufficient similarities exist 
between Chinese and Taiwanese Buddhist approaches to environmentalism can be 
illustrated, and we can speak meaningfully about a phenomenon called Chinese 
Buddhist environmentalism, then scholars can begin to explore broader categories 
of Buddhist environmentalism (Southeast Asian, Euro-American, etc.)   
 Another distinction that I explore is between humanistic Buddhism and 
engaged Buddhism.  This distinction does not provide much analytical guidance 
for distinguishing between the environmental activities of Taiwanese Buddhists 
and other Buddhists.  But the discursive difference, namely the emphasis on 
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oppression in engaged Buddhism and purity in humanistic Buddhism, encourages 
us to look more closely at the rhetoric of various Buddhist environmentalisms as a 
way to better understand how Buddhists link theory and practice and avoid the 
oversimplifications of eco-Buddhist discourse. 
 I also analyzed the way in which Buddhist studies scholars (mainly 
Taiwanese) have examined the discourse of Buddhist environmentalism, 
considering both scholarly critiques of how contemporary Buddhist leaders have 
articulated environmental concern and how the scholars themselves have 
attempted to articulate a Buddhist environmental ethics.  This Chinese Buddhist 
environmental discourse accentuates four concepts: environment (huanjing環境), 
land (tu土), purity (jing淨), and ecology (shengtai生態).  Environment is a very 
ambiguous term; like the word in English it has a wide range of semantic 
applications.  Only when coupled with “ecology” or “natural” does it clearly 
equate with natural environment.  Buddhist construals of environment add to the 
ambiguity of the term, since these often carry highly metaphysical or 
cosmological undertones that might not be made explicit.  Land is equally 
ambiguous, although for humanistic Buddhist discourse the notion of Pure land 
(or a Pure land on earth) usually contextualizes references to land.  Nonetheless, 
there is no agreement on exactly what a Pure land on earth entails.  Purity is a 
term that seems quite particular to Chinese Buddhist environmental discourse, as 
opposed to global eco-Buddhist discourse, mainly because it is the operational 
term for humanistic Buddhism which accounts for the majority of Chinese 
Buddhist environmental movements.  The fact this is the case proves that an eco-
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Buddhist approach to Chinese Buddhist environmentalism would likely fail to 
create meaningful connections since it does not operationalize purity like 
humanistic Buddhism does.  Alternatively, purity would be a persuasive concept 
in eco-Buddhist discourse, since it is not a term that is used in secular 
environmental ethics, from which eco-Buddhism largely derives. 
 Having made this point, it is interesting that ecology is given such 
precedence.  As mentioned previously, this can be accounted for by noting the 
scientific air that ecology imparts.  The scholars who work on Chinese Buddhist 
environmentalism are very familiar with authors like Commoner, Leopold, Naess, 
Nash, and others.  As Lin Yiren points out in discussing the development of 
environmentalism in Taiwan, these Taiwanese scholars have incorporated the 
Western discourse of environmentalism, which values ecology as a philosophical 
and scientific concept.  Also, scholars like Yang, who advocate a radical change in 
consciousness, or Lai Xianzong, who emphasize the radical interrelatedness of 
Tiantai Buddhism, find in Deep Ecology a well-established Western 
environmental discourse that Buddhism can be partnered with.  This preference 
for ecology and more particularly Deep Ecology serves as a reminder that 
intellectual environmental discourse is unlikely to be unaffected by dominant 
Western concepts.  And while fantastic and thought-provoking work has been 
done to draw connections between Buddhist and Western concepts, such work 
does not fully capture the practical nature of environmentalism.  The intellectual 
depth required to make these philosophical connections clear results in a 
persistence of the theory/practice gap that renders much environmental 
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philosophizing unenvironmentalist.  Thus we can argue that the environmental 
aspects or potentials of a tradition do not lie primarily in its philosophies, but in 
the communities of people who identify with the tradition.
481
  Turning to the next 
chapter, we will look at three Buddhist communities who all consider 
environmentalism to be of importance to Buddhism.  We will look at the ways in 
which this meaning is constructed and argued for. 
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Chapter 6 
PURIFICATION OF MIND AND NATURE
482
 
This chapter will examine in detail the environmental rhetoric of three 
Taiwanese Buddhist organizations: DDM, Ciji, and FGS.  All three promote a 
form of Buddhist modernism known as humanistic Buddhism.  Each organization 
also presents its interpretation of Buddhism as the unique vision of the 
organization’s founder.  In addition, Shengyan and Xingyun are dual lineages 
holders for the Caodong 曹洞 and Linji 臨濟 lineages of Chan Buddhism.  The 
Chan tradition, which at least ostensibly is the primary tradition of Buddhism in 
China and Taiwan today, is crucially important for these two leaders and their 
organization’s identity and practice.483   Chan is a highly rhetorical tradition, in 
the sense that its teachings and discourse rely on a view of language that 
emphasizes change and transformation.  Therefore, in this chapter I will begin by 
looking at the rhetorical tradition of Chan Buddhism.  This initial review attempts 
to show that rhetoric is a strong part of the Chan tradition.  Undoubtedly, other 
traditions such as Pure Land, Tiantai, and Zhengyan (or esoteric Buddhism) are 
present in and contribute to the tapestry of the modern Chinese Buddhist world, 
though it can be argued that Chan Buddhism is the core of contemporary Chinese 
Buddhism.  Then, I will look at each organization to highlight and examine the 
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ways in which environmentalism is made meaningful and the ways in which the 
organization’s environmental rhetoric seeks identification with its audience.  
 
6.1 Chan discourse and rhetoric  
There is an undeniably strong rhetorical character to Chan discourse.  This 
can be illustrated in two ways.  Chan discourse is performative.  Instead of 
describing what the individual, nature, reality is (or is like), Chan rhetoric seeks to 
engage participants in a manifestation of reality, using the practitioner’s own 
mind as its stage.  According to Bernard Faure, “Chan discourse is not simply 
reflecting realities or expressing truths; it is actively producing them, ‘impressing’ 
them on an audience.”484  
Chan discourse is also perlocutionary.  The “goal” of Chan discourse lies 
in what it does to its participants.  In other words, Chan discourse is not 
concerned as much with doctrine as it is with insight.
485
  It is the transformation of 
                                                 
484
 Bernard Faure, Chan Insights and Oversights: An Epistemological Critique of 
the Chan Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 149. 
 
485
 A good example of this is the controversy surrounding Dahui 大慧 and 
Hongzhi 宏智.  Morten Schlütter concludes that the attacks on the Caodong 
tradition made by Dahui were not directed at the practice of meditation or at the 
doctrinal position of either Hongzhi nor the Caodong tradition, but rather at the 
way in which Caodong teachers during the Song  emphasized silent illumination 
(mozhao 默照).  Dahui criticized this approach for its failure to bring about 
realization.  See Morten Schlütter, ‘Before the Empty Eon’ versus ‘A Dog Has No 
Buddha-Nature’: Kung-an Use in the Ts’ao-tung Tradition and Ta-hui’s Kung-an 
Introspection Ch’an,” in The Kōan: Texts and Contexts in Zen Buddhism, eds. 
Steven Heine and Dale S. Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 171-
79.  As a reaction to this, perhaps while he was in Fujian, Sclutter suggests, Dahui 
conceives of the kanhua 看話 style of gongan 公案 use as a more expedient 
means to realization.  Robert Buswell suggests that the kanhua style of Zen 
associated with Dahui was the culmination of a long development of how 
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our ontological perspective from being to becoming, where there is neither one 
point of being, nor two, but rather a continuous flow of becoming in which the 
participant and the participation are mutually dependent.
486
  The dependence of 
the participant on language and the dependence of language on the participant is 
realized.  For there to be any actualization of truth, there must be an audience 
upon which the actualization is “impressed.”  Likewise for the audience to 
experience the actualization or production of truth, there must be something to 
represent that truth.  In Chan discourse the truth claimed by Chan is given not 
only form, but also function.  Chan truth without the perlocutionary aspect of 
Chan discourse lacks the transformative quality imparted by this aspect.   
In his work, Philosophical Meditations on Zen Buddhism, Dale S. Wright 
divides Chan rhetoric into four styles—“the rhetoric of strangeness,” “the rhetoric 
of direct pointing,” “the rhetoric of silence,” and “the rhetoric of disruption.”487  
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He explains that each form is an “instrument of awakening.”  The rhetoric of 
strangeness is intended to shake the hearer out of conventional modes of thinking.  
Direct pointing refers to gestures made by Chan adepts that circumvent linguistic 
discourse, “leaving the recipient dumbfounded and out of place.”488  Silence is 
exactly what it means.  The rhetorical strategy of silence shows up frequently in 
Mahayana literature, the most familiar examples being Vimalakīrti, Bodhidharma, 
and the exchange between the Buddha and Mahākāsyapa.  However, encounters 
of silence are usually accompanied by a gloss that clarifies whether it is 
“enlightened silence” or just bewilderment.489  Finally, the rhetoric of disruption 
serves to disorient the hearer.  Like the rhetoric of strangeness, disruption knocks 
one out of the sphere of conventional language in order to bring into focus one’s 
previous self-understanding.  All four rhetorical styles aim to set the hearer 
against the hearer’s own identity, separating the hearer from the ground that had 
previously seemed so solid.  In so doing, the hearer must confront a radically new 
situation, not in thought or reflection, but in immediate experience.  All of the 
preconceptions and manners of thought are simultaneously brought to the fore and 
rejected. 
But the development of Chan discourse is not simply about enlightenment.  
As scholars like John McRae and Morton Schlütter have shown, representatives 
of the Chan tradition have recognized the need to gain support from the throne 
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and literati.  Schlütter shows that during the Northern Song dynasty, in response 
to a surge of interest in Buddhist practice by laity, Chan masters made calculated 
appeals to the elite and literati: “the more literati could be persuaded that a 
particular tradition of Chan held a special claim to authority and orthodoxy, the 
better the lineages of that tradition would fare.”490  The methods advocated by 
various lineages and teachers were coupled with the image of the teacher as an 
authoritatively enlightened master.  These rhetorical concerns regarding appealing 
to an audience are active today, too.  From the lifting of martial law in 1987 in 
Taiwan to the increase of a wealthier middle-class in both Taiwan and China, 
Buddhist organizations have both a greater opportunity to obtain support from a 
wider segement of society and more competition for that support.     
  In the following analysis of the environmental rhetoric of Shengyan, 
Zhengyan, and Xingyun, there are gongan like aspects to their discourse, 
particularly those of strangeness and disruption, but these figures do not use 
traditional gongans in the way that I have outlined above.    
 
6.2   Dharma Drum Mountain 
 
Of the three organizations under examination, DDM has offered the most 
systematic incorporation of environmentalism into its mission.  Shengyan founded 
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DDM after having been abbot at Nongchan si農禪寺 for several years.  Since 
1989, the mission of DDM has been “to uplift the character of humanity and build 
a Pure land on earth” (tisheng renjian pinzhi, jianshe renjian jingtu提升人的品質, 
建設人間淨土).  The way in which this mission is to be realized is through the 
practice of xinling huanbao 心靈環保 (‘spiritual environmentalism’ or ‘protecting 
the spiritual environment’).  Shengyan began to think about “spiritual 
environmentalism” in response to problems he had heard about some 
environmental organizations achieving their goals.  Spiritual environmentalism is 
also a stage in the development of Shengyan’s thought, following the ways in 
which he worked out the implications of humanistic Buddhism for Pure land and 
Chan thought and practice.  Shengyan coined the phrase “spiritual 
environmentalism” and has made that the basic concept upon which his renewal 
of Chinese Buddhism rests.  The importance of the term huanbao signals that 
environmentalism is a central aspect of DDM’s mission.  However, the focus on 
humanity in the mission seems rather anthropocentric.  Also recognizing that 
DDM is a Chan Buddhist organization, Shengyan’s understanding of the Chan 
tradition reveals an anthropocentric focus.  Regarding Chan, Shengyan states, 
“The core teachings of Chan Buddhism are centered on human capacities and are 
characteristically down-to-earth,” and that “it centers on the human capacity to 
genuinely attain freedom for oneself and benefit society as a whole.”491  The 
anthropocentrism here, though, is what Norton calls “weak anthropocentrism” and 
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this can be said of humanistic Buddhism in general.  From the idea of spiritual 
environmentalism, a number of campaigns have blossomed, but all can be traced 
back to spiritual environmentalism.  In this section, I will situate spiritual 
environmentalism in the context of the doctrinal and rhetorical system Shengyan 
has developed.  Then I will look at the rhetorical characteristics and effect of 
spiritual environmentalism.    
6.2.1 Major campaigns 
 
There are three campaigns that intersect with spiritual environmentalism 
in some way: Fivefold spiritual renaissance campaign, three types of education, 
and fourfold environmentalism.  In 1999 Shengyan developed what he labeled the 
“fivefold spiritual renaissance campaign” (xinwusi yundong 心五四運動) as an 
expression of the tradition of humanistic Buddhism he worked to promote.  This 
campaign was a re-envisioning of Buddhism to address the conditions and meet 
the needs of contemporary society:   
The Fivefold Spiritual Renaissance Campaign transforms the abstruse and 
difficult terminology and doctrines of Buddhism into a set of ideas and 
methods that the average person can understand, accept and use in their 
daily lives. It is the fruit of many years of effort at Dharma Drum. 
Although the terms it uses are new, its essential spirit and substance 
remains the Dharma.
492
  
 
The five elements of this campaign are each subsets of four “methods” or 
guidelines for daily life.  These are: the “four fields for cultivating peace” (sian四
安), “four guidelines for dealing with desires” (siyao四要), “four steps for 
handling a problem” (sita四它), “four practices for helping oneself and others” 
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(sigan 四感), and “four ways to cultivating blessings” (sifu 四福).  According to 
Shengyan, these five sets of guidelines comprise a comprehensive “proposition 
for living in the 21
st
 century.”493  Bhikshuni Guo Jing traces the five sets of four 
to the text Erru sixing lun 二入四行論 by Bodhidharma.494  She argues that the 
four practices espoused by Bodhidharma (“acceptance of retribution of enmity,” 
“acceptance of circumstances,” “absence of craving,” and “accordance with the 
Dharma”)495 are all based on “pacifying the mind” (anxin 安心), and Shengyan 
takes this goal of pacifying the mind as the basis of his set of “four fields for 
cultivating peace,” the first of which is pacifying the mind.  Guo Jing then maps 
the four practices onto the remaining four sets of five in the xinwusi: “acceptance 
of retribution correlates with the “four steps for handling a problem”; “acceptance 
of circumstances” with “four practices for helping oneself and others”; “absence 
of craving” with “four guidelines for dealing with desires”; and “accordance with 
the Dharma” with “four ways to cultivate blessings.”  The value of Guo Jing’s 
analysis is that, if correct, it demonstrates what Shengyan has said about the value 
of Chan to contemporary societies.  He believes that one of the strengths of Chan 
is its adaptability to a wide variety of cirumstances and contexts.  Shengyan 
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argues that one aspect of the fivefold spiritual renaissance campaign is its 
“watered-down religious character,” reflecting an interpretation of Buddhist 
teachings in context.
496
  He claims that the teachings he offers can be applied in 
any religious context.  Whether these teachings would still be recognized as 
Buddhist by Buddhists, or whether their identity as Buddhist teachings would 
make them acceptable to adherents of other traditions is a valid question.   
 In addition to this campaign DDM promotes what Shengyan calls the 
three types of education (sanda jiaoyu 三大教育): education-based, culture-based, 
and care-based.  The fourfold environmentalism falls under this third rubric.  
The fourfold environmentalism takes the term “environmentalism” and 
applies it to four separate “environments”—spiritual, social, living, and natural.497  
The organization describes the four in the following way:  
The ‘spirit’ spoken of in the protection of the spiritual environment 
[xinling huanbao心靈環保] refers to the mind, which is the essence of the 
Buddhadharma. As for the protection of the social environment [liyi 
huanbao禮儀環保], Buddhism places great emphasis on etiquette, 
including following the vinaya, maintaining deportment, and keeping 
precepts. It can even be said that observing rules and etiquette is the basic 
foundation of Buddhism. Protecting the living environment [shenghuo 
huanbao生活環保] is part of making Buddhism relevant to daily life. 
Turning to protection of the natural environment [ziran huanbao自然環
保], we find that, according to Buddhism, a person’s body and mind are 
direct karmic retribution and the environment she lives in is circumstantial 
retribution. Direct and circumstantial retribution form one’s place of 
practice. Every person uses her direct retribution to practice within her 
circumstantial retribution. Thus one must care for the environment just as 
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one would for her own body. Thus the fundamental essence of each of the 
four kinds of environmentalism is Buddhism.
498
   
 
Before moving on with an examination of what spiritual environmental means, I 
will first discuss what Shengyan’s idea of protecting the natural environment to 
see in what ways it coincides with secular environmentalism and how where it 
diverges. 
6.2.2 Protecting the natural environment 
 
 The natural environment is the focus of what is normally referred to as 
‘environmentalism.’  Counter intuitively, the description here of “protecting the 
natural environment” diverges from common concerns of wildlife conservation, 
recycling, or pollution-reducing policy initiatives, all of which would fall under 
the common rubric of environmentalism.  So if this is not typical Euro-American 
contemporary environmentalism, what kind of environmentalism is it?  As we can 
see from this short explanation, the concept of environmentalism is based on an 
understanding of environment broader than the natural environment.  Huanbao 環
保 is the reduced version of the term huanjing baohu 環境保護 which describes 
the protection (baohu) of an environment (huanjing).  However, the term 
huanjing for environment can have multiple referents, just as the English term 
‘environment’ can.  Sheng Yen evokes this concept of environment-as-context in 
order to show that human life is multivalent and dynamic.  According to 
Shengyan, both one’s body and one’s surroundings are the result of karmic 
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retribution.  Based on one’s past actions, one exists with this body and all its 
conditions.  When Shengyan states that one’s environment is the circumstantial 
retribution, the place of practice, we can surmise that there is a tension between 
the body and its environment which provides the ground for practice.  Attempting 
to relate this interpretation to the concept of protecting the natural environment, I 
suggest what is implied here is that we should maintain a stable environment in 
which this creative tension can allow for spiritual maturation or the working out 
of karmic obstruction.  However, when we turn to other descriptions of 
“protecting the natural environment” 自然環保, we find a much more mainstream 
reading of environmentalism.   
Shengyan frequently speaks about maintaining a healthy ecosystem, 
practicing traditional Buddhist burials for their low environmental impact, 
significantly reducing the use of incense and paper money, etc.
499
  There is, 
however, a common thread in both descriptions of ziran huanbao.  This is the 
claim that people should “realize that they are a part of the natural world (體認人
是自然的一部分),” and so “one must care for the environment just as one would 
for her own body.”  It is worth noting that the reference to recognizing one’s 
identity (to a certain extent) with the natural world and the admonition to care for 
the world as one would one’s own body is a concept that is not uncommon in 
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Western environmental discourse, particularly among the proponents of deep 
ecology. 
One final point regarding Shengyan’s understanding of Buddhist 
environmentalism is that, in terms of protecting the environment, it is not 
something that can be confined to contemporary times.  He states, “Since its 
earliest times, Buddhism has worked on protecting the environment.  From the 
time of Sakyamuni Buddha, [Buddhism] has paid careful attention to the 
orderliness, cleanliness, and sanitariness of the living environment (shenghuo 
huanjing生活環境).  Within the Buddhist monastic code and scriptures, we can 
see the maintenance of cleanliness, order, and sanitation, simplicity and protection 
of the natural environment, even that plants need protection…”500  Elsewhere 
Shengyan argues:  
Buddhism is a religion that places great emphasis on environmental 
protection. Sakyamuni Buddha was born at Lumbini Garden. He engaged 
in spiritual practice in the forest, attained Buddhahood under a tree, and 
first began preaching at Deer Park. The major monasteries where he taught 
his disciples were all gardens or woods, such as Jeta Grove, Bamboo 
Grove, Amravana Garden, and he passed into parinirvana between two Sal 
trees near Kusinagara. He exhorted his monastic disciples, when spending 
the night under a tree, to regard that place as his home and take loving care 
of it.
501
 
 
Whether or not scholars would find this interpretation convincing (a review of the 
literature on Buddhism and ecology would likely show opinion to be evenly split), 
the thrust of Shengyan’s observation is surely that environmentalism has a long 
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history within Buddhism, as long as any other aspect of the tradition.  But there is 
an important rhetorical aspect to this claim that I will return to below.    
6.2.3 Protecting the spiritual environment 
 
The Chinese term ‘xinling huanbao’ is a multivalent term that Shengyan 
discusses in a variety of contexts.  It is translated as both “spiritual 
environmentalism” and “protecting the spiritual environment.”502  The latter term 
better approximates the way the other three ‘environmentalisms’ are translated, 
whereby the first phrase xinling modifies the type of ‘environment’ (huanjing) 
and this kind of environment is ‘protected’ (baohu).  The translation “spiritual 
environmentalism” maps onto the syntax of xinling huanbao better, whereby 
spiritual equates with xinling and environmentalism equates with huanbao.  But 
both translations are used and generally considered to be equivalent.  I will use 
“spiritual environmentalism” for consistency, but I think that there are rhetorical 
differences between the two which I will discuss later.  To return to the larger 
question: what is spiritual environmentalism?   
According to Shengyan, he created the term in 1991 as a way to encourage 
people to focus on creating happy, healthy, and peaceful minds, which would 
result in the renewal of society.  He says, “When the human mind is purified, only 
then can society be purified.”503  Because of this interpretation of xinling huanbao 
and purifying the mind, Shengyan argues that, though the term is new, the concept 
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is not.  In fact, the above quotation is nearly identical to the passage from the 
“Buddha lands” chapter of the Vimalakīrti sūtra, “If the mind is pure, then the 
Buddha lands are pure” (suiqixinjing, zefotujing隨其心淨, 則佛土淨).504  In 
Shengyan’s interpretation of the concept, since the cultivation of the mind has 
been central to Buddhist practice since the Buddha’s time, then, in the sense that 
this cultivation is what the term xinling huanbao refers to, xinling huanbao has 
been an element of Buddhism since the tradition’s inception.  Xinling huanbao is 
simply the practice of Buddhist meditation and ethics, the Eightfold Path.  Also 
central to his explication of xinling huanbao are the ever-important Mahāyāna 
concepts of compassion (cibei慈悲) and wisdom (zhihui智慧).   
Throughout the literature discussing xinling huanbao, Shengyan makes 
clear that we can think of the concept in terms of altruism, acting in the interest or 
for the benefit of others, including the needs of non-human others.  In a 
presentation to a Western audience in 2000, Shengyan describes ‘spiritual 
environmentalism’ thus: “Instead of considering everything from the standpoint 
of one person, one race, one time-period, and one place, we should consider it 
from the standpoint that all humankind of all time and space should be protected 
in their existence, possess the right to live, and feel the dignity of life.”505  In 
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elaborating on what altruism means in a Buddhist context, Shengyan turns to 
compassion and wisdom.  To act selflessly is compassionate.  To handle affairs in 
the proper manner requires wisdom.  There is an intimate relationship between 
xinling huanbao and traditional Buddhist concepts.  But the degree to which 
Shengyan emphasizes traditional concepts is in part based on the audience he is 
addressing.  Nonetheless, the uniqueness of the term, as we will see below, lies 
not in what it means but in the rhetorical force it carries.        
 Another way to understand what xinling huanbao means is to look at the 
two different bifurcations Sheng Yen has applied to the term.  The first is between 
a Buddhist interpretation and a contemporary, non-Buddhist interpretation.  This 
distinction is described in the following passage: 
Environmental protection must be combined with our respective religious 
beliefs and philosophical thinking into an earnest mission, so that 
environmentalism will not become mere slogans. So, strictly speaking, the 
purification of humankind's mind and heart is more important than the 
purification of the environment. If our mind is free from evil intentions 
and is not polluted by the surroundings, our living environment will also 
not be spoilt and polluted by us. However, for ordinary people, it is 
advisable to set out by cultivating the habit of protecting the material 
environment, and go deeper step by step until at last they can cultivate 
environmentalism on the spiritual level.
506
 
 
With reference to the Buddhist meaning of the term he states that it refers to 
“cultivating the body, cultivating the mind, or cultivating one’s actions (xiushen, 
                                                                                                                                     
deserves attention is whether Shengyan’s experience in New York in the eighties 
had a determining influence on Shengyan’s decision to promote spiritual 
environmentalism as a central teaching of DDM.  While this is a logical 
assumption, there is no indication in any of his accounts that he was significantly 
drawn to environmentalism while in the United States.  By all accounts, 
Shengyan’s main focus was the propagation of Chan Buddhist meditation. 
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xiuxin huo xiuxing修身, 修心或修行).”507  This process of cultivation is based on 
the practice of meditation (chanxiu禪修), a practice which closely follows his 
teachings on moving away from ignorance towards a realization of no-self or 
awakening.
508
  So, the term is meant in one respect to refer to a Buddhist (more 
specifically, a Mahāyāna Buddhist) worldview.   
However, Sheng Yen also explains the term in a way that it can be made 
meaningful to non-Buddhists.  In this vein he offers the following: “Xinling 
huanbao is psychological cleanliness and health (weisheng yu jiankang衛生與健
康).”509   Sheng Yen links this level of xinling huanbao to the fourfold 
environmentalism and the “fivefold spiritual renaissance” (xinwusi yundong心五
四運動), emphasizing the benefits to be gained from protecting the various 
environments of human life, as Sheng Yen lays them out.
510
  The term xinwusi 
yundong clearly evokes the May Fourth Movement, a point I address below in 
section 6.2.5.    
The way Shengyan uses “environmentalism” reflects a broad construal of 
environment.  The environment that accompanies xinling huanbao in some cases 
refers to the mind’s environment, whether the mind is pure or impure, or the 
degree to which the mind is possessed of selfishness and ‘unskillful’ (Skt. 
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akauśalya; Ch. feiqiao非巧) states.  In other cases the term refers to the 
connection between the mind and society or one’s external environment.  Thus, 
Sheng Yen proffers another bifurcation of interpretations of xinling huanbao, one 
which establishes the mind-oriented and the socially-oriented aspects of the term.  
The first of these is based on the basic Mahāyāna concept that mind is the source 
of all conditions.  He uses passages from a number of sutras—the Huayan jing華
嚴經, Lengqie jing楞伽經, the Jinggang jing金剛經, and Liuzu tanjing六祖壇
經—to illustrate his point that the work of “environmental protection”” begins 
with the mind.
511
  That is to say, spiritual environmentalism is the basis of the 
fourfold environmentalism.    Perhaps the central text supporting the Buddhist 
nature of xinling huanbao is the Vimalakīrti sūtra’s “Buddha Lands” chapter.  In 
fact, Sheng Yen devotes an entire essay to spiritual environmentalism and the 
Vimalakīrti sūtra.  The focus of the essay is to demonstrate that Buddhist practice 
is based on understanding the nature of the mind.  If the mind is the progenitor of 
the external environment, it makes sense that approaching the cultivation of the 
mind gets at the root of environmental problems.  According to Sheng Yen, 
“Therefore, even if we want to discuss protection of the living or natural 
environments, we must still begin with the mind.”512   
In chapter five, I introduced a critique of Shengyan’s distinction between 
mind (neixin 內心) and environment (waijing 外境).  Shengyan claims that his 
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teaching is essentially Chinese Chan and the mind is the basis of Chan teaching.  
Chan is the practice of cultivation of the mind to achieve “realization of no-mind 
(wuxin 無心), the mind free of self-attachment.”513  Towards systematizing the 
practice of cultivating the mind, Shengyan refers to four types of mind: scattered 
mind, concentrated mind, unified mind, and no-mind.
514
  The mind that Shengyan 
is referring to and the mind that Chan takes as the focus of cultivation is what 
Yang referred to as neixin.   We also see the centrality of mind in xinling huanbao 
and the xin wusi yundong.   But with respect to the concept of xinling huanbao, 
the distinction between mind and environment is a false one.  Xinling is not the 
same as mind in the sense of neixin.  It is not an issue of inner versus outer.  
Xinling describes the kind of environment to be protected, the relevant form of 
huanbao.  In the term itself, inner and outer are already resolved (xin in xinling 
and jing in huanbao).  Moreover, the mind is the seat of cultivation in Buddhism, 
so altruism or activism would have to be related to the mind in order to have a 
religious connotation.  Thus, the critique that Shengyan emphasizes cultivation of 
the mind is correct, but not to the extent that the external environment is ignored.  
It was noted above that Sheng Yen claims it is appropriate for some people to 
begin by carrying out environmental practices before turning to the cultivation of 
the mind.  Mental cultivation in Shengyan’s interpretation of Chan practice is the 
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means by which concern for the external world is carried out.  It is similar to the 
protest tactics of many environmental groups, intended to raise awareness and 
coordinate further action.    
The term xinling is a composite of two terms meaning mind and spirit.  
Thus, spiritual environmentalism is, in a way, an incomplete translation of xinling 
huanbao, since the Buddhist context of the term refers to protecting the 
environment of the mind and the spirit.  But what Shengyan means by spiritual is 
the mind; he wants to emphasize that the mind is the source of Buddhist 
spirituality.  But the flexibility of the term, that it can refer to Buddhist spirituality 
of the mind or spirituality in general, suggests that it can be deployed with 
reference to the mind as the source of being, as the psychological constitution of 
the person, and as the mind itself.  In this respect, ‘spiritual environmentalism’ 
can serve as a common point of reference in discussions of religion and the 
environment.   
The second aspect of this delineation of xinling and huanbao, the mind’s 
relationship to the external environment, builds off the first.  Since the mind is the 
basis of the purity of Buddha lands (fotu佛土), one should be aware that through 
the practice of purifying the mind is one is also benefiting society.  Shengyan 
makes the claim that pollution of the environment is due to pollution of the mind, 
“‘Spiritual environmentalism’ expresses the fact that because our minds are 
polluted the natural environment will be polluted.  If our minds were not subject 
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to pollution, the environment would, likewise, not be polluted.”515  So the 
purification of the environments (living, social, and natural) begins with the 
purification of the mind.  To clarify, Sheng Yen’s concept of purity is generally 
the overcoming of vexations, the absence of the three poisons: avarice, aversion, 
and ignorance (but primarily avarice), and the realization of no-self (wuwo無
我).516  Thus, we should read the claim that the pollution of the environment arises 
from the pollution of the mind to be a way of attributing the causes of human 
behavior that lead to material pollution (an overdevelopment of pollution-creating 
industries, overproduction of waste products, and an overproduction of 
greenhouse gases) to mental defilements like desire and ignorance.  The practice 
of xinling huanbao is the process of moving from self-interest to acting in the 
interest of others.
517
   
Another example of the link between the individual and the society can be 
found in the influence that one person can have on others.  Shengyan notes that if 
one person can overcome one’s selfish orientation and purify one’s mind, then 
that can cause a ripple effect throughout society.
518
  Here we can see an aspect of 
religious environmentalism that is rare in environmental activism.  In religious 
environmentalism more emphasis is placed on the individual’s ability to 
overcome a selfish worldview, rather than engaging in social change through 
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collective campaigns.  Spiritual environmentalism on its own terms follows the 
individualist approach typical of most religious environmentalism, but in the 
context of the other three environmentalisms, particularly “protection of the social 
environment” (liyi huanbao), the cultivation that is central to spiritual 
environmentalism will inevitably find expression in social engagement.  
Practicing spiritual environmentalism is intended to aid one in realizing the 
importance of participating in environmental action campaigns. 
 Thus, we can see that spiritual environmentalism, on the level of the 
individual, is an ethical teaching and religious program based on Chan Buddhist 
ontology, an ontology in which the quality of an individual is determined by the 
degree of purity of their mind—a term that is used in Chan Buddhism to refer to 
one’s basic essence.  This approach is a break from the majority of environmental 
ethics discourses which, if excluding religion, base their arguments on 
deontological or utilitarian moral reasoning, and if including religion, typically 
base their argument on the human-nature-God relationship.  Certainly, 
Shengyan’s ideas are religious, in that they are Buddhist, but what connection 
might they have to the field of ecology?   Is there a corollary in environmental 
ethics for Shengyan’s system that might help us see how he makes the ontological 
and ethical connection? To answer these questions, we will need to understand 
how the term xinling huanbao functions as a rhetorical device to entice others to 
reorient themselves as Buddhists vis-à-vis environmentalism and how it provides 
a ground for discussing the relationship between religion and the environment. 
6.2.4 Spiritual Environmentalism as Religious Environmental Rhetoric 
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 I should begin by stating that although ‘spiritual environmentalism’ and 
the fourfold environmentalism carry great rhetorical significance, they are by no 
means solely rhetorical.  In fact, Shengyan points out that these ideas are not 
meant to be used as slogans or catchphrases.  But the practical and philosophical 
effects of these terms are bound up with their rhetorical aspects.  I would be 
hesitant to claim that Shengyan’s promotion of the concept of ‘spiritual 
environmentalism’ is purely based on its rhetorical force. But when we ask what 
Shengyan’s intention is in coining a phrase such as ‘spiritual environmentalism,’ 
certainly one reason must be to change people’s behavior.  This should not come 
as any surprise, since most Buddhist leaders would admonish their adherents to 
act in a kinder, more compassionate, and socially responsible fashion.  But what 
catches our attention is this very term ‘spiritual environmentalism’.  As we saw 
above, spiritual environmentalism can be understood with reference to the notions 
of compassion (cibei 慈悲) and wisdom (zhihui 智慧), but then why does 
Shengyan not rely on traditional terminology, terminology considered quite 
common in contemporary Chinese Buddhism?  He does not employ these 
concepts precisely for the reason that the situation he is addressing is not a 
“traditional” situation.   
Environmental concern has only very recently been viewed as a religious 
issue.  It is still far from being part of mainstream belief and practice.  Thus, in 
order to address this new situation, Shengyan brings forth a new term.  As 
Shengyan clarifies, “‘xinling huanbao’—this is a new term that we will have to 
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help people understand.”519  Since people are not accustomed to thinking about 
environmental and religious practice as of the same kind, a creative use of 
language can help entice critical thought about their interrelatedness.  Certainly 
‘spiritual environmentalism’ is a new term, but then we are confronted with the 
difficulty of resolving this point with Shengyan’s assertion quoted above that 
environmentalism in Buddhism can be traced back to the Buddha himself.
520
  One 
the one hand, environmentalism is a contemporary response to a contemporary 
problem, and on the other hand, it is part of Buddhism from the earliest days.  
While in terms of defining what environmentalism is this contradiction may be 
problematic (is Shengyan serving as Buddhist innovator or traditionalist?), if we 
consider the context of the two statements, a different view emerges.  To be sure, 
the term is certainly new.  Shengyan’s recognition of this affirms his intention to 
relate Buddhism to environmentalism, or in other words, to couch 
environmentalism in terms meaningful to Buddhists.  But the claim that 
environmentalism is as old as the Buddha is meant to encourage those Buddhists 
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who are contemplating what spiritual environmentalism is to think further about 
what the term environmentalism really means.   
By extending the idea of environmentalism beyond its contemporary 
context, Shengyan can better “spiritualize” environmentalism.  It is not only 
concern for pollution and deforestation, but addresses the religious implications of 
nature’s role in confronting and overcoming suffering.  This way of understanding 
the term ‘spiritual environmentalism,’ as a basic Buddhist practice, is intended to 
raise one’s awareness of the soteriological importance of one’s interaction with 
the natural world. 
6.2.4.1 Relation to the Other Three Environmentalisms 
 
 To be sure, there is a similar rhetorical thrust to the other three types of 
environmentalism.  They challenge the hearer to question just what it is we are 
talking about.  We can take the case of “protection of the social environment” (liyi 
huanbao) as an example.  Liyi is a compound of “li” meaning “etiquette” (as in 
limao 禮貌 “polite”) and “yi” meaning “ritual” or “rite” (as in yishi 儀式 
“ceremony”).521  As is implied in the dual meaning of liyi as etiquette and ritual, 
this type of environmentalism addresses two spheres: the individual and the social.  
Shengyan mentions that this form of environmentalism concerns the observance 
of rule and etiquette.  It is concerned with the relations between individuals and 
one’s own behavior towards others, which depends upon one’s maintaining a 
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respectful attitude in speech, action, and mind.
522
  The social aspect of liyi 
huanbao refers to DDM’s reformulation of social rituals, namely weddings, 
funerals, and “releasing life” rituals.  Lin Yiren refers to liyi huanbao as “ritual 
[huanbao].”523  Lin observes that the reform of the ceremonial practice of these 
ritual events “addressed issues of over-consumption and non-environmentally-
friendly Buddhist rituals and were justified in the name of [huanbao].”524  Liyi 
huanbao might sound parochial to a contemporary audience, and Shengyan’s use 
of the phrase is meant to evoke that reaction.  But the reforming of traditional 
Buddhist ceremonies as part of liyi huanbao also exhibits a modern character in 
line with a humanistic Buddhist vision, especially when the justification of 
making the rituals more environmentally-friendly is provided.  It creates a 
dialectic between tradition and modernity, whereby the former is advocated as a 
means of realizing the latter, and the value of the latter is strengthened by building 
on the former.   
The protection of the living environment (shenghuo huanbao) operates 
with a similar logic.  The essential thrust of shenghuo (“daily life”) is to advocate 
a simplification of one’s lifestyle.  In environmental terms, Shengyan asks people 
to reduce the “waste and pollution” in their daily lives that accumulates from not 
only work and family responsibilities, but from leading a consumer lifestyle.  The 
appeal to one’s desires through advertising, for example, is a source of suffering.  
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Connected with this environmentalism, Shengyan advocates “cherishing blessings 
[or fortune]” (xifu 惜福), a term that is central to Ciji’s environmental rhetoric.525  
The meaning of xifu for Shengyan lies in being content with what one already has.        
The fact that all four are types or loci of environmentalism can lead one to 
explore the connection among them.  This ontological query on the mind is 
intended to lead to a consideration of ethics, norms of action.  As one 
contemplates the meaning of spiritual environmentalism, one is encouraged to 
participate in recycling campaigns, social volunteerism, and consider other 
lifestyle changes that one thinks consistent with the carrying out the “fourfold 
environmentalism.”  I would contend that the success of this program is in large 
part dependent on the success of its rhetorical aspects.  Were one not to perceive a 
connection between Buddhist practice and environmental concern, I believe it 
would be difficult to make the case that one approach the latter with the 
seriousness that one attends to the former.  The rhetoric of spiritual 
environmentalism challenges the Buddhist to explore that connection.  
6.2.4.2 Dialectic 
 
Another way we can fruitfully explore the relationship between the two 
components of the term xinling huanbao is by looking at them as a dialectical 
pair.  We saw in chapter three that dialectic is an integral part of environmental 
rhetorics and this will allow us to unlock additional dimensions of the term.  We 
will begin by asking: What kind of environmentalism entails spirituality?  What 
approach to spirituality would entail an environmentalist position?  How can 
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attention to language and rhetoric strengthen this connection?  Answers to these 
questions will lead one to consider what particular norms/actions encompass.  In 
context of Shengyan’s thought, the question can be clarified further. 
We saw above that the term xinling pertains to the mind; however, the 
mind in Buddhism is not just our psyche, but also the basis for one’s 
consciousness.  So the term xinling suggests that the issue not only concerns 
nature, but in fact begins with our self.  When we move from xinling to huanbao, 
another question arises.  As mentioned earlier, huanbao can be translated as the 
protection of an environment.  What exactly is meant by the protection of the 
mind’s environment?  For Shengyan the quality of the mind is its environment, 
therefore we should take care of the mind’s quality, just as we would take care of 
the natural environment.  We do not readily see the pollution of the mind, but if 
we draw an analogy with pollution of the natural environment, we can have some 
understanding of what it means to pollute the mind.  Likewise, we know that by 
not polluting the natural environment, we contribute to a cleaner and more livable 
environment.  This is beneficial to not only ourselves but to future generations as 
well.  So the common understanding of huanbao, initially enigmatic in its place in 
the term ‘spiritual environmentalism,’ becomes again quite commonplace.  In 
order to contribute to a positive living environment for ourselves and future 
generations, we should not pollute the mind (which in the Buddhist sense would 
be with aversion, greed, ignorance, and selfishness).   
Further analysis of the metaphor of the mind’s environment is revealing 
with reference to environmental policy.  Environmentalist positions advocating 
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preservation, biocentric, or ecocentric positions would agree that a natural 
environment should be allowed to maintain its original state.  In the case of 
‘spiritual environmentalism,’ what does this mean?  Should the mind be allowed 
to maintain its original state?  If we look at what Chinese Buddhist traditions say, 
the original mind is the Buddha mind.  It is the mind of enlightenment.  Just as a 
mirror’s original function is to reflect clearly, the mind, when free of pollution, 
sees the world clearly.  Shengyan takes two positions to the original nature of the 
mind.  He says, “The original quality of the mind is unpolluted, but being subject 
to environmental influences and desire for material things, it becomes 
polluted.”526  However, he also states, “Buddhism understands the human mind to 
be originally polluted because when we are born, vexations are carried over.  We 
planted karmic seeds in our past lives, which are carried over into this life, which 
become mental vexations taking, in the mind, the form of joy, anger, sadness, 
happiness, greed, hatred, delusion, arrogance, jealousy, and so on.”527  Are these 
two conflicting interpretations?  It is possible, but it is also likely that Shengyan is 
speaking from two perspectives—essence and function (ti yong體用).  The 
essence of mind, beyond the context of an individual’s experience is one of purity, 
while the mind functioning as an individual’s experience of the world should be 
understood in the context of one’s past lives.  This latter context entails the karma 
of past lives and thus leads to the assessment that any individual’s mind from 
birth has been influenced by external conditions (i.e., polluted).  To answer the 
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question posed above (Should a mind be allowed to attain its original state?), we 
might conclude that Shengyan advocates obtaining a mind free from karmic 
obstructions (the originally pure mind), while acknowledging that environmental 
influences are an unavoidable condition of living.  
6.2.4.3 Audience  
 
 How does this term operate as a way of communicating with the members 
of the Dharma Drum organization?  As scholars have noted, the main focus of 
DDM is on Chan practice, which reinforces the focus on the individual, as it is the 
individual who is responsible for his/her practice.  Spiritual environmentalism 
zeros in on the individual and the process of purifying one’s mind.  But as 
spiritual environmentalism is only one part of the fourfold environmentalism 
Sheng Yen developed, the individual cannot avoid his/her social presence.  So the 
altruistic interpretation of spiritual environmentalism demonstrates that it is a 
practice or concept which aims to improve the individual’s ability to respond to 
spheres of society, family, and the natural world.  Julia Corbett claims that 
“participatory problem solving and the joining of altruism and self-interest holds 
great promise in making behavior changes more sustainable and satisfying.”528   
From the foregoing descriptions, we can see that spiritual 
environmentalism engages in the discourse of bettering or purifying the self.  The 
link between environmental concern and Buddhist practice or observance is 
meaningful in the sense that environmentalist practices help one deepen one’s 
understanding of the self and in so doing enable one to work on moving beyond 
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the self, although by so doing one is acting in one’s own best self-interest.  
Moreover, engaging in environmental practice is linked with altruism.  Thus, by 
combining altruism with the purification of the self, spiritual environmentalism 
seems to offer a successful formula for the development of environmentally-
positive behaviors. 
The upshot of this discussion is that Shengyan’s use of the term ‘spiritual 
environmentalism’ is intriguing, inviting, and perplexing.  These characteristics of 
the term derive from his rhetorical use of the term.  He offers the term as a 
response to changing social contexts, and he attempts to merge religious thought 
and environmental thought.  Spiritual environmentalism is one attempt to 
articulate this confluence.  But as rhetoric it is intended to provoke a response, to 
decenter the individual’s conception of what spirituality or religion is, and what 
one assumes the sphere of environmentalism is.  That spiritual environmentalism 
is the basis for the other three is certainly in part due to its focus on the mind and 
the role the mind plays in Shengyan’s teaching of Chan.  But there is another 
aspect of spiritual environmentalism that sets it off from the other three.  All four 
terms are comprised of a term (spiritual, living, social, natural) that modifies 
environmentalism, but, in fact, as we see with the way these terms are translated 
on page 305 above, each term is better understood as the protection of a kind of 
environment.   
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As Bryan Tilt argued, the term ‘huanjing’ by itself is nebulous; the type of 
environment must be further delimited.
529
 So although huanbao is generally 
understood to equate with the Western use of the term ‘environmentalism,’ 
specifically it is still easily rendered as the protection of an environment, which 
environment requires further clarification.  So each type of environmentalism 
should be understood to mean the protection of a kind of environment, a sphere 
defined by qualitatively identifiable entities, concerns, or relationships.  In this 
sense, the protection of the social environment (liyi huanbao) means protecting, 
attending to, and caring for the rules of social interaction, with an emphasis on 
Buddhist moral injunctions.  What makes spiritual environmentalism semantically 
unique, and another reason for its central importance within the fourfold 
environmentalism, is that we can conceive of it not only as the protection of the 
mind’s environment, but as a way to approach Buddhist practice itself.  It a form 
of environmentalism with clear soteriological implications.  By practicing 
spiritual environmentalism, one is better able to protect the other three 
environments.     
6.2.5 Relation to DDM’s Other Campaigns 
 
 There is an additional way in which Shengyan seeks to identify with an 
audience of Buddhists and that is in his use of a fourfold and fivefold taxonomy.  
The fourfold environmentalism (along with the fourfold divisions of the fivefold 
spiritual renaissance campaign) can call to mind any group of four in the Buddhist 
tradition.  Of course the most well-known set of four is arguably the four noble 
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truths (sidi四諦).  There is more than a surface connection between these two sets 
of four, since, if we consider environment to be any context in which we are 
located, then the four noble truths characterize the quality of any environment we 
might be part of.  No matter where we are, there is dukkha and the possibility of 
extinguishing that dukkha.  The fivefold taxonomy relates to the five precepts that 
form the basic ethical orientation of a Buddhist to the world.  As this directly 
impinges on how we live, then the fivefold spiritual renaissance campaign as a 
“proposition for living in the 21st century” would be a new formulation for what is 
essential for living today.
530
 
To give further support to a rhetorical reading of the spiritual 
environmentalism, we can look at the concept that the fourfold environmentalism 
falls under—the fivefold spiritual renaissance.  While the English translation may 
not be particularly eye-catching, the Chinese term ‘xinwusi yundong’ 心五四運動 
speaks volumes.  The term immediately calls to mind the May Fourth Movement 
of 1919 (wusi yundong), a watershed event in Chinese intellectual history.  The 
May Fourth Movement serves as an emblem for Chinese modernity, the 
beginning of a new phase in Chinese cultural and political history.  In the sense 
that the May Fourth Movement was one that engaged and accepted modernity, it 
would seem a fitting term to adopt for Shengyan’s re-envisioning of Chinese 
Buddhism’s role in contemporary society.  Moreover, the association between 
Buddhist concepts of enlightenment and the term qimeng啟蒙 suggests a further 
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connection.
531
  Shengyan, in fact, refers to his renaissance campaign as a 
“spiritual enlightenment” (jingshen qimeng 精神啟蒙).532  To the contrary, one 
may think that the anti-traditionalism, which was a hallmark of the May Fourth 
Movement, would hamper Shengyan’s efforts to argue for environmentalism as a 
historical aspect of Buddhism (even though this anti-traditionalism was directed at 
Confucianism).  Of course, it is difficult to know how Shengyan perceived the 
historical event of the May Fourth Movement.  As Vera Schwarcz shows, the 
reference has been reworked, rebranded, and reinterpreted through the last century 
so that it possible Shengyan was employing it purely to get the audience’s 
attention.  However, Shengyan does not refer to his movement or campaign as a 
new (xin新) May Fourth, but as a May Fourth of the mind (xin心).  His 
reinvention of the term not only gives it a Buddhist twist and aligns it with 
spiritual environmentalism, but he also manages to deflect attention from the 
social upheaval of the original May Fourth Movement.  While the terminology of 
the fivefold spiritual renaissance campaign has not received the attention spiritual 
environmentalism has, it is an important discursive innovation in strengthening 
the rhetorical force of Shengyan’s particular discourse of humanistic Buddhism.     
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Buddhist scholars and leaders have made many efforts at articulating 
Buddhist environmental ethics and how Buddhism can or should contribute to 
environmentalism.  Scholars struggle in their attempts to make environmentalism 
intelligible and meaningful within the Buddhist context largely because the 
environmental discourse and Buddhist philosophical/ethical discourse rarely have 
direct correlates.  Without attending to the rhetorical issues in addition to the 
philosophical ones, the full implications of the disparity between Buddhist 
ontology and metaphysics, on the one hand, and Buddhist ethics, on the other, are 
obscured, opening their work to the sort of critiques made by Ian Harris and 
Christopher Ives.
533
  By elucidating the rhetorical aspect of spiritual 
environmentalism, we find the articulation of a Buddhist environmentalism that 
addresses both ontology and ethics in an effective manner.  To better understand 
how this is the case, let us look briefly at a secular environmental philosopher’s 
attempt to do just the same.  
6.2.6 Deep Ecology and Spiritual Environmentalism 
  
One way of fitting Shengyan’s spiritual environmentalism into the field of 
environmental philosophy and ethics is by comparison with the philosophy of 
Arne Naess.  The connection between Shengyan’s ‘spiritual environmentalism’ 
and Naess’s philosophy helps highlight how rhetoric can function as an aspect of 
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understanding.  If the understanding we are seeking to cultivate is environmental 
or ecological in nature, then it behooves us to consider ecological rhetoric or the 
rhetoric of environmental concern.  We can explore ideas for the contribution they 
might make towards aiding the articulation of an environmental philosophy.  This 
is the eco-constructivist position.  The difference between the two approaches, 
though, attests to the need to make each articulation relevant to its linguistic, 
religious, and cultural context.  This is somewhat similar to what Donald Swearer 
terms the “eco-contextualist” position of eco-Buddhism.534  
As we saw in the case of Naess’s philosophy, ecology can address issues 
of ethics and ontology within a single discourse and this discourse can employ 
rhetorical elements strategically to lead one to an epistemological realization of 
the nature of this onto-ethical position.  Such a realization can be deeply 
transformative.  Within both Naess’s philosophy and the Buddhist context, that 
kind of transformation leads to a fuller, more beneficial life.  Shengyan’s xinling 
huanbao helps one navigate the divide between Mahāyāna Buddhist ontology and 
ethics, for example.  The claim that all things possess Buddha Nature complicates 
ethical decision making.  How do we justify placing greater moral considerability 
on one entity over another without violating the fact that both are, in essence, 
ontologically indistinguishable, not only from each other, but from us, the 
decision maker, as well?  Other philosophers have opted for criteria of sentience 
or consciousness, but these would both be inconsequential in the context of 
recognizing Buddha Nature.  The same conundrum obtains if we replace Buddha 
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Nature with emptiness.  It is basically a problem of recognizing how different 
levels of discourse are deployed.  The rhetorical aspects of xinling huanbao lead 
one to examine the divisions of self and other, mind and the external environment.  
Achieving clarity on the semantic scope of xinling huanbao allows us to be 
clearer about how the other environmental spheres interact.  The fourfold 
environmentalism offers a way to move, as Naess suggests we should, “from 
ethics to ontology and back.”   
We can address the environmental crisis by attending to our actions as 
they impact the external environment, which includes both the natural world and 
society, but Shengyan argues that one can also address environmental issues to 
the degree that one’s actions are based on the quality of one’s mind (regardless of 
whether one is a Buddhist).  The former derives insight from more traditional 
ethical discussions; the latter is deepened by ontological and metaphysical 
arguments.  These spheres are linked but remain separate.  Thus it is important to 
recognize the environmental context we are working from.  Although this 
stretches a bit what I think Swearer intended, this separate but interrelated nature 
of the fourfold environmentalism is “eco-contextualist.”          
My point is to demonstrate that the rhetorical basis of spiritual 
environmentalism allows us to see how Shengyan brings together theory and 
practice, ontology and ethics.
535
  The use of language to affect change is not new, 
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but it has been an underemphasized aspect of environmental philosophy.  As 
Jenkins notes, “By treating environmental strategies as adaptive discursive 
practices rather than deployments of a comparative code or expressions of nature-
related spirituality, they can help stimulate an initiative’s strategic rationale 
toward further ethical production and revision.”536   
 
6.3 Ciji 
 
Ciji is the largest Chinese Buddhist organization in Taiwan.  It is officially 
registered as a charity organization in Taiwan and other countries, and this 
moniker is certainly accurate.  But it more than that; Ciji is a transnational secular 
organization with a sophisticated bureaucracy.  There are four main missions Ciji 
promotes: charity, medical, educational, and cultural, each with its own 
supporting institutions run almost entirely by laity.  But it is also a Buddhist 
organization in which all authority and decision making power rests with the 
founder and head of Ciji, Ven. Zhengyan 證嚴 (b. 1937).537   Julia Huang outlines 
the complex development of Ciji from a grassroots to a transnational NGO, a 
transformation that has both expanded Ciji’s image but simultaneously reified the 
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Taiwanese and Chinese identity of its membership.
538
  Ciji’s success has been 
achieved through maintenance of a social image of moral certainty and the ability 
to efficiently address specific welfare needs in numerous locales.  But, as Julia 
Huang points out, the organization’s success on these fronts is likewise rooted in 
the charismatic leadership of Zhengyan which anchors the “shapeless 
bureaucracy” of the organization and supports the commitment and collective 
identity of its members.  Huang notes:  
Tzu Chi has succeeded in perpetuating its emotional form of 
commitment, though not without tension, by expanding the 
compassionate-sorrow emotion of charisma to a general emotion toward 
the experience of suffering built into its humanitarian practice, and by 
paralleling its original charismatic ecstasy of crying to the collective 
effervescence of sign language song.  Such transformation not only 
perpetuates commitment in its emotional form but also rekindles the 
interplay between emotional experience and subsequent meaningful 
symbolization.
539
  
 
Huang’s analysis emphasizes the role that identity construction plays in Ciji, not 
only the identity of the members but of the organization as a whole.  The ritual 
acts of crying and sign language song serve as means of persuasion in the sense 
that they create emotional and bodily forms of identification that creates 
community from among the audience.  This strong communal identification 
facilitates the carrying out of welfare projects which not only resolidifies Ciji’s 
public image, but provides a concrete experience which can be contextualized in 
line with Ciji’s ideals of compassion and working towards a Pure land on Earth.  
This is the basis of the environmental work Ciji does, too. 
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 When one mentions Buddhist environmentalism in Taiwan, most 
Taiwanese immediately think of Ciji.  This is not without reason.  Ciji’s recycling 
program is a trademark practice for Ciji members.  Ciji’s recycling program 
began around 1990, following a speech Zhengyan gave in Taichung.  As the 
audience was clapping, Zhengyan reportedly said, “If you take your two 
applauding hands and pick up garbage, sweep the thoroughfares, and practice 
recycling, this would help this piece of land become a Pure land; turn the garbage 
into gold and that gold into love.”540  Given this linkage, Zhengyan’s advocacy of 
environmentalism is focused almost completely on recycling, but it is carried out 
on a scale that flows into many other areas. 
6.3.1 Fu 
 Lin Yiren identifies three environmental practices of Ciji: recycling, 
cleaning public places, and planting trees.  From an examination of Ciji literature 
and fieldwork, he argues that these activities all turn on what he identifies as 
Ciji’s main environmental belief, the image of “cherishing fu” (xifu 惜福).541  Fu, 
meaning fortune or wealth, is widely valued in Chinese culture and is interpreted 
in both quantitative and qualitative terms.  Lin rightly observes that by 
emphasizing “cherishing fu” as the basis of environmental practice, Zhengyan 
draws on both its meaning as a material value and Buddhist value.  In Buddhist 
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terms, fu means the merit one gains from performing good deeds.
542
  However in 
juxtaposing these two interpretations of fu, it is clear which one is of greater 
value.  The accumulation of merit through good deeds will aid one in the next life 
and can benefit one’s living relatives.  In addition to “cherishing fu,” Zhengyan 
speaks about “making fu” (zaofu 造福).  Like cherishing fu, the expression 
“making fu” blurs the lines between material wealth and karmic merit.   
6.3.2 Recycling and Huanbao 
While fu is an unarguably central concept, as Lin explains, the notions of 
huanbao 環保 and recycling (huishou 回收) themselves are equally central to 
Zhengyan’s environmental rhetoric.  Ciji’s recycling campaign represents its first 
efforts at environmentalism.  In 2009, Ciji reported collecting 125, 561, 560 kgs 
of recyclable materials.
543
  The largest portion of this is paper.  Zhengyan was 
influenced by a follower to support recycling, and the campaign can be said to 
have officially begun in 1990 following a speech in Taizhong.  In response to the 
audience’s applause, Zhengyan suggested that everyone take their two clapping 
hands and use them to collect garbage.  Since then Ciji has established recycling 
stations throughout Taiwan and 16 other countries.  The income from recycling is 
quite substantial and funds many of Ciji’s other projects, such as disaster relief 
and medical care.   
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Zhengyan has expanded the meaning of recycling, taking it well beyond 
the material sense of the term.  Her reframing of recycling is linked to her 
interpretation of fu.  In the famous admonition in Taizhong in 1990, where she 
asked everyone to use their clapping hands to collect garbage and recycle, she 
states that “trash can be turned into gold and the gold transformed into merit.”  
She links the practice of recycling to the notion of rebirth (lunhui 輪迴), 
cherishing life (zhenxi wuming 珍惜物命), and maintaining a sanitary, pure 
environment.  Zhengyan explains that after an object has been used or broken, it is 
typically discarded.  But this practice leads to the accumulation of garbage.  
Following the garbage wars that Weller documents, where trash piled up around 
Taipei, this image likely resonates with Taiwanese.  In order to prevent this from 
happening, we must practice recycling.  In addition, the practice of recycling can 
give new life to discarded material.  If we do not recycle, Zhengyan says, we 
waste precious resources.  She uses the four seasons to symbolize for stages of 
existence: birth, life, decrepitude, and death (cheng 成, zhu 住, huai 壞, kong 空).  
Recycling captures objects at the stage of decrepitude and returns them to the 
stage of birth.
544
  By recycling we demonstrate our compassion towards resources 
(zhenxi ziyuan 珍惜資源), and contribute to the renewal of life: “Things all have a 
life.  The longer you can use something, the more of its life you can extend.  
When something has reached the end of its life, it returns to the souce.  Huanbao 
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recycles discarded things, remakes them, turns them into something new, and this 
gives the thing a new life.”545 
This notion of giving something a new life is the basis of a new slogan 
Zhengyan has created: “Purity is found in the beginning” (qingjing zai yuantou 清
淨在源頭).  The phrase is less straight forward than “recycling” and so conveys a 
sense of vagueness.  In places she interprets this expression to mean that recycling 
begins not with collecting garbage and getting it to a recycling center, but in 
practicing recycling correctly to begin with.
546
  But she also uses the expression 
wugui yuantou 物歸原頭 (“things return to their beginning) in conjunction with 
the idea that environmentalism begins with the purification of the mind.  In the 
Ciji literature we find statements such as, “regardless whether it is the human 
body, or the great earth and its myriad beings, who are afflicted with illness, for it 
to recover its health and the four elements to be in harmony, it is necessary to 
begin from the mind.”547  Recycling is a purification ritual that gives the 
individual a context for the practice that purification of the mind entails.  Thus, in 
the same way that recycling reduces garbage and pollution by returning things to 
there source of production, individuals must return the mind to its source of 
compassion and get rid of mental garbage and pollution.  Here we can see how 
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not only recycling has been sacralized, but the concept of garbage and pollution 
have been reinterpreted to complete the dialectic.  She further expands on this 
imagery by referring to recycling centers as places of spiritual practice or 
“meditation halls” (daochang 道場), “Recycling centers are not only for recycling 
materials or protecting the earth, they are also spiritual centers for practice.  
Everyone’s mind is calmed and thoughts are right.  Doing this work makes it 
so.”548   
In addition to recycling, Zhengyan, like Shengyan, has expanded the 
meaning of huanbao from a Western secular sense of environmentalism, to a 
spiritual sphere.  She offers seven transformations of huanbao that she encourages 
Ciji members to undertake: making it relevant to youth, making it applicable to 
daily life, increasing knowledge about environmentalism, practicing it within the 
family, viewing it spiritually, making it more refined, and recognizing the health 
benefits.
549
  Some of these seven transformations pertain to a reinterpretation of 
traditional environmentalism, some of them seek to expand the number of people 
practicing environmentalism, and some seek to make it a more popular notion.  
There is an obvious lacuna when compared with secular environmentalism, 
though, and that is that there is no mention at all of protests or political 
involvement.  I have noted that Zhengyan dissents from any idea that Buddhists 
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should be involved in politics, but this incongruity with secular environmentalism 
demonstrates that there is clearly more than one huanbao that is operative in 
Taiwan.  The degree to which Ciji promotes its nonconfrontational vision of 
huanbao reflects a challenge to how not only environmentalism is to be 
represented in Taiwanese society but also to the process of social change itself. 
Furthermore, there are a few cases in which meaning is not only created 
through reinterpretation of ideas, but also through a unique juxtapositioning of the 
traditional and the contemporary.  One example is Ciji’s theatrical performance of 
the “Water Repentance,” an adaptation of the text entitled “Compassionate 
Samadhi Water Repentance” (cibei sanmei shuichan 慈悲三昧水懺).  This is 
similar to a more widely practiced rite known as the “Liberation of water and land 
ritual” (shuilu chanhui 水陸法會).550  Both are Chinese Buddhist rituals that aim 
at the creation of merit for all beings (zhongsheng 眾生), all beings that live in 
water or upon land, what can be referred to as a “universal salvation rite” (pudu
普渡).  Daniel Stevenson remarks that the shuilu ritual has been, since the Song 
dynasty, one of the most elaborate rituals in Chinese Buddhism, requiring an 
enormous amount of paraphanelia and human participation.
551
  This ritual is 
performed elaborately and with significant publicity by many Buddhist 
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organizations.  In light of this characterization, one might wonder why 
organizations devoted to environmentalism and simplicity would consent to 
holding the rite with equal embellishment.   
The text the ritual is based on discussed various mental and karmic 
obstructions.  The karmic obstructions play out through the various realms of 
existence, relying heavily on Buddhist cosmology.  But the Ciji performance 
reenacts these in contemporary scenes, accentuating the humanistic Buddhist 
practice of demythologizing Buddhist cosmology.  The concerns are all about the 
human realm.  With this as a basis, the Ciji adaptation depicts two scenes: the first 
showing natural disasters and the second a scene that is specifically about the 
consequences of anthropogenic climate change.  These two scenes link the 
consequences of desire and “unwholesome” actions (e ye 惡業) to current 
environmental degradation.  The theatrical effect of the performance augments the 
ways in which Zhengyan challenges her followers to reconceive of recycling and 
environmentalism as spiritual practices.  Desire not only gives rise to individual 
suffering, but this suffering is already manifest in the negative environmental 
consequences we see around us.  The point being made in the performance is that 
the mind is the source of affliction and so we must purify the mind, in this case 
through the practice of repentance and vow.  Although such reinterpretation might 
seem discontinuous with the traditional rite, if we rely on the similarity with the 
shuilu rite, we can argue that it is carrying on the history of such a rite.  Stevenson 
notes how the ritual manuals for shuilu rites were as centered on their 
performance as on their textuality.  Moreover, the use of specific ritual manuals 
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were normative documents used as guides “to correct practice.”552  If Stevenson’s 
point can be extrapolated to the “Water repentence,” then we can interpret Ciji’s 
adaptation as another in the tradition of interpretations whereby the Buddhist 
authority uses the rite to educate its audience on what proper Buddhist belief and 
practice constitute.  In the case of the rite at hand, this involves environmental 
karmic concern no less than cosmological karmic concern.       
6.3.3 “Regulating oneself, returning to propriety” 
In 2007, Zhengyan promoted a campaign titled keji fuli 克己復禮 
(Regulating oneself, returning to propriety).
553
  The phrase comes directly from 
Confucius in the Lunyu 論語.  Keji means to control or regulate one’s self, 
especially with regards to one’s desires.  In the Confucian context, fuli means to 
renew the practice of rituals.  Zhengyan reinterprets fuli as a renewal of civility 
that is connected with a sense of respect (zunzhong 尊重) and benefiting others 
(lita 利他).  This latter idea is common in Buddhist discourse as part of the phrase 
zili lita (自利利他), which refers to two goals of Buddhist practice: seeking own’s 
own benefit (enlightenment) and seeking the benefit (enlightenment) of others.  It 
is connected to both Pure land thought and the figure of the bodhisattva.  
The term keji can likewise be read with reference to Buddhism, in the 
sense that controlling one’s desires is a way to reduce desire and therefore cut-off 
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the cause of suffering (dukkha).  The interpretation of keji that Zhengyan 
advances ties in with her calls for individuals to lead a simpler and more frugal 
lifestyle.  Controlling one’s desires is a form of mental cultivation that can purify 
the mind.  Keji corresponds with Zhengyan’s emphasis of the fact that the kind of 
social reform that is esteemed in humanistic Buddhism must begin in the mind.  
That the mind is the seat of change can be supported with Confucian texts, as 
well.  The Confucian text known as the Daxue 大學 (“Great Learning”) offers a 
vision of setting the world in moral and political order by beginning with the 
individual’s mind, though Zhengyan does not mention this text.  Perhaps this is 
because the sequence of cultivation laid out in the Daxue does not make 
cultivation of the mind (xin 心) its basis.  The Daxue takes the cultivation back to 
the “investigation of affairs” (gewu 格物).  Nonetheless, there is recognition of a 
correlative cosmology that is common to both Confucianism and Chinese 
Buddhism.  Zhiru Ng refers to this correlative cosmology as central to the way in 
which Zhengyan relates mental cultivation to social activism and how Ciji 
simultaneously represents its local and global identity.
554
  Regarding the scope 
and meaning of keji in contemporary society, Zhengyan states: 
Other than regulating excessive pleasure and consumer desires, we must 
also control our emotions and our bad habits.  Everyone has the same 
originally pure nature as the Buddha; it is just that it has been polluted by 
the external environment. If we can always wash away every impurity and 
change our [bad] habits, the bright luminosity of the mind will emerge.  
When the mind is bright the world will be bright.
555
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This passage demonstrates that the practice of keji pertains not only to the mind, 
but to our actions as well.  It could be argued that the emphasis of mental 
cultivation is more deeply rooted in Buddhism, while the stress on proper conduct 
and (environmentally) appropriate behavior is more Confucian. But this 
distinction need not be pressed too far.   
The latter half of the passage, though, is additionally interesting for its 
similarity to a famous passage in the Platform sūtra, but not the passage that is 
often held up as the Buddhist ideal.  In the narrative of the text, we find the well-
known “wall verse” episode.  Two verses are offered as expressions of the 
enlightened mind.  The second is recognized as more enlightened than the first 
and its author, Huineng 慧能, is recognized as the Sixth Patriarch of Chan.  The 
first, however, reads:  
  The body is a bodhi tree. 
The mind is like a bright mirror’s stand. 
At all times we must strive to polish it  
and not let dust collect.
556
 
 
In the Chan tradition, this verse is criticized as reflecting a one-sided focus on 
cultivation without recognizing the truth of sudden enlightenment.
557
  The 
connection between Zhengyan’s statement and the Platform sūtra lies not only in 
the textual similarity, but in the larger context of the allusion.  First, there is the 
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surface implication that the practice of meditation, consisting of a constant 
vigilance against mental pollution, is like environmentalism, consisting in part of 
a constant vigilance against material pollution.  However, there is a dissonance 
between the two with regard to identification.  The traditional passage alluded to 
by Zhengyan’s remarks was uttered by Shenxiu 神修.  But Shenxiu was not 
recognized as the inheritor of the patriarch; Huineng was.  Moreover, it is 
Huineng that became the ideal type for promoting a simple, down-to-earth Chan 
practice, supporting the notion that enlightenment can be found in carrying out 
everyday affairs.  This is plainly more akin to Zhengyan’s vision of humanistic 
Buddhism, which hardly makes any mention of formal seated meditation practice.  
If looked at from this angle we find that although Zhengyan’s discourse does not 
frequently make direct references to Buddhist scriptures and other texts, there is 
still a consciousness of positioning Zhengyan in the tradition of Buddhist masters.      
 Zhengyan’s interpretation of li follows more of a Neo-Confucian reading 
than what seems intended in the Lunyu.  In the Lunyu, li seems to mean the rites 
regulating behavior found in the “Book of Rites” (Liji 禮記).  But Zhengyan 
interprets li as synonymous with li 理, or the principle governing the universal 
order.  This reading, of course, supports Zhengyan’s vision of creating a 
harmonious and well-ordered society, and it is close to the context in which 
Confucius’ statement is made in the Lunyu, in which he uses keji fuli to define ren
仁, or “humaneness.”  So it could be said that Zhengyan’s campaign is to 
reestablish ren as the basis of Ciji environmentalism and perhaps even Taiwanese 
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society.  It is remarkable that Zhengyan uses the expression keji fuli as the basis of 
her campaign given the depth of meaning that the expression contains.  But 
perhaps this is the very reason she chose it.  If this is the case, then we see 
Zhengyan’s vision of humanistic Buddhism is decidedly more focused on the kind 
of society she envisions and less on the degree to which that vision is exclusively 
Buddhist. 
6.3.4 Audience 
            There are at least three ways in which Zhengyan seeks to connect 
environmentalism with her audience: one is through emphasis on family, a second 
is through the person of Zhengyan herself, and a third is through public praise of 
the Ciji environmental volunteers.  
Although Zhengyan is a Buddhist nun and the organization identifies with 
the Buddhist tradition, there is not a great deal of emphasis on doctrinal study, and 
Ciji offers a simple message where complex doctrine is largely absent.
558
  Only a 
handful of the millions of members are monastic.  In this respect, we can 
understand the importance of Madsen’s remark that “[t]he ‘family’…is a central 
metaphor in Zhengyen’s rhetoric.”559 The family metaphor is more appropriate 
with laity than with monastics, since in Chinese laity are those who are “with the 
family” (zaijia 在家) and monastics are those who have “left the family” (chujia
出家).  Moreover, emphasizing family is a powerful way to construct community 
out of the members of the organization.  What I mean is that the notion of 
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“family” evokes sentiments of familiality and familiarity, which can mediate the 
growth of an already large organization.  The rhetoric of family has an organizing 
force.   
Family as a virtue or source of virtue is a basic idea within Chinese and 
Confucian culture.  To this extent, Madsen argues that “[Ciji]’s social vision is 
largely based on classical neo-Confucian themes,” and family and filial piety are 
the basis of all other virtues.
560
  “[Ciji’s] mission makes no sense outside of the 
humanistic Buddhist vision and the Confucian ethic propogated by 
[Zhengyan].”561  In this respect, Zhengyan’s keji fuli campaign does not seem 
such an anomaly.  I have already shown how the practice of keji centers on the 
individual, from the cultivation of mental purity to outward behavior.  The 
emphasis on civility in carrying out fuli can be viewed from different scales, the 
most intimate and immediate being the family.  Therefore, family is position in an 
intermediate role between the individual and society.       
 Another way that the environmental message of Ciji is conveyed to its 
audience is through the construction of Zhengyan’s identity.  This relies on the 
process by which the audience identifies a rhetor with a set of values they hold 
collectively.  Elise DeVido argues, “Part of comprending the charisma of 
Zhengyan emanates from her multifaceted self: at once a woman with a personal 
background similar to that of many Taiwanese, and at once a woman of unique 
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and seemingly supernatural will and talents.”562  It is widely remarked how 
Zhengyan speaks in Taiwanese more than in Mandarin.
563
  This reinforces her 
identity as fully Taiwanese, in contrast to Shengyan, Xingyun, and Weijue, who 
were all born in China and immigrated to Taiwan in 1949.  DeVido states that 
“Ciji reflects Zhengyan who reflects Taiwan and its people, at once weak and 
strong, marginalized yet obliged to adapt to the challenges of globalization.”564  
A second aspect of Zhengyan’s identity lies in the identification of her 
with Guanyin Bodhisattva.
565
  This image is projected through various pictoral 
representations of her looking down upon the earth.  There is a strong likeness 
between Zhengyan in these depictions and the representation that Zhiru Ng 
analyzes of the Buddha that has been made central in Ciji publications.
566
  The 
level of respect accorded to Zhengyan is reflected in the way she is most 
commonly addressed by her followers: shangren 上人 (“supreme person”).  It is 
clear that Zhengyan is considered to be beyond a spiritual level that any ordinary 
member might attain. 
 Another identity that accompanies Zhengyan is that of a renewer of 
Chinese cultural values.  The importance and esteem for li 禮 as a source of social 
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reform conveys the idea that, despite the modernist organization and methods 
practiced by Ciji, tradition is something that must be valued and not discarded.  
However, Zhengyan’s interpretation of li is not dependent of the performance of 
rituals but on the civility of human relationships.  Nonetheless, the importance of 
li in Zhengyan’s discourse increases her sphere of persuasiveness from an 
audience of Taiwanese to an audience of all who identify with Chinese culture.        
Along with this separation of Zhengyan from the status of ordinary 
humans, there is a countermove that makes her a model for behavior.  Ng 
observes:  
Besides garbage collection and recycling activities, Ciji followers 
are expected to foster environmental consciousness in their daily attitudes 
and lifestyles.  Ciji literature frequent invokes as their inspiration for 
envronmentla practice an anecdote in Zhengyan’s daily lifestyle: 
whenever their teacher Zhengyan washes her hands, she always has a 
basin under the running tap in order to be able to reuse the water later for 
watering plants.  Emulating the lifestyle of their beloved teacher, Ciji 
followers use specially designed special portable sets of tableware for 
meals, from folding plastic chopsticks to plastic containers, as part of their 
drive against the rampant use of paper plates and bamboo chopsticks, 
etc.
567
 
 
Ng’s comment does not suggest that Ciji members try to be like Zhengyan, but 
that one should attempt to follow Zhengyan’s lead in how to be environmentally 
conscious.  This aspiration to model Zhengyan does not run counter to viewing 
her as shangren.  Rather, it reinforces the notion that such simple actions are not 
irrelevant, but teachings to be followed.     
One final way in which Zhengyan and Ciji environmental rhetoric appeal 
to their audience is through stories about huanbao volunteers.  This is a way of 
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connecting with the audience of volunteers and potential members and 
strengthening the volunteer community.  Ng notes that Zhengyan often refers to 
huanbao volunteers as huanbao pusa 環保菩薩 (“huanbao bodhisattvas”).  The 
reference to laity as bodhisattvas is not uncommon in humanistic Buddhist 
organizations, but the specific reference to these volunteers further qualifies their 
activity as essentially spiritual.  This nomenclature of huanbao bodhisattvas goes 
along with the renaming of recycling centers as daochang.   
In the Ciji literature there are numerous stories about individual volunteers 
and either their unique contribution to the environmental mission or the hardships 
they overcame through their work as a volunteer.  These stories further raise the 
visibility of the huanbao volunteers and impart a sense of virtue to what might 
otherwise be considered an unattractive and unappealing activity.        
 
6.4 FGS 
Foguangshan (FGS/佛光山 /Buddha’s Light Mountain) is one of the 
largest and most widespread Buddhist organizations in the world.  The 
headquarters for the organization are located in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, was 
established in 1967.  The organization’ founder, Master Xingyun 星雲, was born 
near Shanghai in 1926 and studied for a short period of time under Master 
Yinshun.  Xingyun came to Taiwan in 1949.  He is a prominent proponent of 
humanistic Buddhism, proffering his own interpretation labeled “Foguang” 
Buddhism.  The ethical basis of FGS, like Ciji, is rooted in humanistic Buddhism 
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and Confucian principles. “The political vision of Buddha’s Light Mountain does 
not come in the form of a comprehensive political philosophy.  It takes the shape 
of specific moral counsels aimed at giving to a broad, diverse public Buddhist and 
Confucian answers to practical moral questions.”568  Madsen characterizes the 
religious-ethical consciousness Foguangshan promotes as “light” but “thick.”  He 
explains what he means in terms that resonate with Naess’s notion of deep 
questioning:  
Because of its “lightness”—the vagueness of its strictures and their 
lack of ability to constrain any given individual’s behavior at any given 
time—it is difficult to measure the influence that Buddha’s Light 
Mountain’s humanistic Buddhist teachings may have on public opinion.  
But because of its “thickness”—its capcity to enfold a great many people 
and to mold their thinking over a long period of time—we may assume 
that the influence of Buddha’s Light Mountain is significant.569  
 
6.4.1 Environmentalism in FGS  
 
In 1992 at the General Assembly for the BLIA (Buddha’s Light 
International Association, the lay branch of FGS), there was a session on 
“environmental and spiritual” protection, followed by a campaign in 
Kaohsiung.
570
  It is likely that the environmental problems engendered by 
Kaohsiung’s industrial economy, in addition to the efforts already underway by 
DDM and Ciji, served as impetus for Xingyun’s 星 雲  incorporation of 
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environmentalism into FGS’s list of issues.  We can also see that this campaign 
followed five years after the lifting of martial law in 1987.  
Foguangshan’s position on environmentalism is summarized in a short 
pamphlet titled “Protecting Our Environment.”  Xingyun first cites sutras to show 
that Buddhism maintains a concern for the natural world from the time of the 
Buddha.  Xingyun refers to the notion of dependent origination to help explain 
how human actions are intimately connected to the environment.  He then points 
out how Foguangshan embraces environmental concerns and the relevance 
positive environmental behavior has for Buddhists today.  Much like Shengyan 
and Zhengyan, Xingyun works from the dialect of inner and outer, “cultivating 
inner peace and preserving outer ecological balance.”571  Although these seem 
like two separate milieus of environmental protection, Xingyun weaves them 
together.  Engaging in preservation of ecological balance by protecting life and 
conserving resources, one purifies one’s own karma leading to a better spiritual 
condition.
572
  By attending to our spiritual condition or caring for the mind’s 
environment, we can learn how to care for the external environment.  In fact, 
Xingyun concludes in a familiar vein, stating that purification of the environment 
begins with purification of the mind, “In order to purify the soils and rivers of our 
outer environment, we must work to purify our inner spiritual environment.”573  
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He has gone so far as to state that “spiritual environmentalism” is the basis of 
protecting the natural environment,  
Just as we get sick physically, the earth is sick too. When people 
are sick, they need to be treated and saved. When the earth is sick, it also 
needs everyone to care for it and save it. To save the earth, we must begin 
with environmental preservation. On the other hand, the protection of 
nature depends on humanity to self-awaken, which also starts with 
preservation of the spiritual environment…To ensure that environmental 
and spiritual preservation are well practiced is regarded as the most urgent 
task for humanity right now, if we do not wish to end up as refugees of 
climate and environment change.
574
 
 
It is interesting that Xingyun has even begun using the phrase “spiritual 
environmentalism,” and what he means by it is similar to Shengyan, to the degree 
that the mind and its purity is the key factor to be addressed in spiritual 
environmentalism.  However, when Xingyun discusses how to promote 
environmental behavior, his response resonates with a mission closer to the core 
of Foguangshan—education:   
To actualize environmental preservation, each person must first 
know the concept of environmental preservation. The instillation of 
environmental preservation should start with education. Adults need to set 
an example for children. For instance, parents need to teach their children 
to respect life, and cherish and care for all things. Teachers needs to teach 
their students to respect elders, treat others with manners, and so on. 
Especially in the elevation of the notion of morality and the maintenance 
of the public environment, we need to start with reinforcing awareness 
through education.
575
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There seems to be a split then between environmental and spiritual preservation.   
On the one hand, purifying the mind allows one to reduce desire, which is 
conducive to an environmentally “light” lifestyle.  One the other hand, if 
environmental preservation itself begins with education, then the need for 
spiritual environmentalism is not crucial to environmental practice.  This is not 
meant as a critique of Xingyun’s proposal.  In fact, it might be advantageous to 
offer individuals two approaches, one oriented toward spiritual practice and the 
other toward social engagement.  There are two appeals here in Xingyun’s notion 
of environmental and spiritual protection.  One is to environmentalism in the 
mainstream, secular sense with the focus on education.  The other is to the 
environmental benefits that are corollary to spiritual practice.     
6.4.2 Pure land rhetoric and environmentalism 
Despite the apparent dichotomy of environmentalist approaches here, 
Xingyun highlights a specific image—Amitabha’s Pure land—that might serve to 
reconcile this dichotomy for Foguang Buddhists.  For Xingyun, the environment 
is the natural world and the ideal to which this world should be molded is the Pure 
land of Amitabha. He states:  
From the sutras, we learn that Amitabha’s Western Pure Land is a 
land of great beauty. We can learn a lot about environmental protection 
from Amitabha Buddha. In the Western Pure Land, the ground is covered 
with gold, and pagodas rise high into the sky. The land is pure and the 
atmosphere is serene. There is no pollution of any kind; toxins, violence, 
and nuclear threats are absent. The Western Pure Land is a place that 
many of us aspire to enter.  
We can create a [P]ure land right here on Earth. Most of the 
progress we have made in environmental protection is focused externally, 
but the important work actually lies within one’s heart and spirit. Only 
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when we have a healthy spiritual environment within can we be effective 
in protecting the physical environment.
576
 
 
And:   
When we Buddhists think of a pure, clean environment, we naturally think 
of Amitabha’s Western Pure Land. On his path as a bodhisattva, Amitabha 
made forty-eight great vows. Through the strength of these vows, he 
manifested the Western Pure Land, a land of unparalleled beauty. The 
ground is covered with gold, pagodas are built with seven kinds of gems, 
and all facilities are in excellent condition. In the Western Pure Land there 
is only public good, no public harm. There is only beauty, no toxin, noise 
or pollution. The weather is cool and pleasant, and the water has eight 
wonderful qualities: clear, cool, sweet, soft, soothing, peaceful, cleansing, 
and nourishing. Everyone in the Western Pure Land is kind, physically 
and mentally healthy, long-lived and free of the three poisons. None of 
them would ever consider chopping down trees, and the landscape reflects 
such thoughtfulness. This is why we say Amitabha Buddha is our good 
teacher on how to maintain a sound mind and a healthy environment.
577
 
Xingyun’s description of this connection, which is similar to some of the ways 
Zhengyan has used Pure land discourse to advocate environmental practice, 
makes a direct appeal to what is arguably the most powerful Buddhist concept 
among contemporary lay Buddhists.  Chandler notes that the Western Pure Land 
of Amitabha Buddha, among others is an image that Xingyun relies on in 
conveying his understanding of Buddhist practice.
578
  But we must wonder 
whether Lin’s claim that Pure lands are not natural in the environmentalist sense 
of the term makes this a problematic connection.  In each case in which authors 
speak about creating a Pure land as an act of environmental concern or activism, 
what is the “nature,” so to speak, of the Pure land they are imagining?  How does 
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the Pure land of Buddhist scriptures relate to a contemporary understanding of a 
pure natural environment?  In the case of Xingyun, how can his vision of a Pure 
land based on traditional scripurtual depictions be squared with preserving 
ecosystems that are not “cool, sweet, soft, soothing,” etc.?  And if guotu is not 
meant to refer to the natural environment, then what relevance does this have for 
Buddhist environmentalism?
579
  These questions suggest that there is not as 
concerted an effort to promote environmentalism through rhetorical appeal as in 
DDM and Ciji.   
However, as Chandler points out, Xingyun’s commitment to a humanistic 
Buddhist vision also is a factor in how he situates Pure land rhetoric.  According 
to Chandler, Xingyun emphasizes the importance of one’s quality of mental 
cultivation as crucial in “whether a person finds himself or herself in a [P]ure 
land…”580  Viewed in this way, Xingyun agrees with Shengyan that one must 
purify the mind as a necessary component of achieving a pure external 
environment.  For, as Xingyun elsewhere notes, “Today there are many Buddhists 
who wish to be reborn in the Sukhavati Pure Land, but I think that this is not as 
good as putting one’s energies to changing today’s world into a Buddhist [P]ure 
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land.” 581  While this may seem to contradict the very concrete references to 
scriptural Pure lands Xingyun references in his comments on environmentalism, 
the unenvironmentalist character of the former comments can be viewed 
rhetorically, as a way perhaps to create a sense of the work that needs to be done 
to achieve an ideal of a clean environment.  There, thus, is a dialectic between 
ideal and reality that highlights the difference between our world and a Pure land, 
and an attempt to persuade Buddhists to not identify with a degraded environment 
in order to inspire action.  
The lack of a systematic discourse on environmentalism does not mean 
that FGS does not promote environmentalism, but that it does not appear to use 
rhetoric as strongly as DDM or Ciji.  As mentioned in chapter five, FGS has been 
active in environmental campaigns in Kaohsiung, one of the most polluted cities 
in Taiwan.  Recently, Xingyun has combined the Buddha’s birthday and ritual 
bathing with Mother’s day and Earth Day.582  From the coverage of the events in 
2010 and 2011, there is more emphasis placed on the ceremony of bathing the 
Buddha and paying respects to one’s mother.  But the combination of these three 
links the notions of purification (bathing the Buddha) with mother images which 
invoke the image of “Mother Earth.”  The implication is that the purification of 
the earth is both a Buddhist and filial concern.  In addition, the topics of the 
FGS/BLIA international members conference for 2010 and 1998 were on 
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environmental protection and spiritual protection (huanbao yu xinbao 環保與心
保) and on nature and life (ziran yu shengming 自然與生命), respectively.583  
Nonetheless, environmental concerns do not appear to be as important as FGS’s 
educational and cultural campaigns.  Admittedly, an organization like FGS, 
DDM, or Ciji cannot address all issues equally.  Their resources are ultimately 
limited.  Being located in southern Taiwan means the audience that FGS is 
immediately in contact with will differ from the audiences in northern Taiwan.  
FGS has made efforts to present environmentalism as a Buddhist and spiritual 
concern.  But the dialectical structures of its rhetoric simply repeat the inner/outer 
dichotomy of mind and environment.  There are no novel reinterpretations of 
basic concepts.  The appeal to Pure land imagery seems to be the heart of FGS’s 
environmental rhetoric, but from the passages cited above, these do little in the 
way of resolving a practice/theory dichotomy.   FGS’s environmentalism seems to 
be carried out with and relies on the notion that environmental problems are 
sources of suffering in the human realm and in order to realize a Pure land on 
earth, they must be ameliorated and addressed.    
 
6.5 Monastic Grounds 
Before concluding this chapter, there is one aspect of each of these 
organization’s rhetoric that is neither textual or oral but physical—temple 
building.  Each of the three organizations discussed here have all constructed 
                                                 
583
 “Foguangshan,” accessed February 28, 2012. 
http://www.fgs.org.tw/events/web/index.html. 
  361 
monastic complexes that are large in scope and scale.  They are all located in 
quite rural settings where the tranquility sometimes associated with a Buddhist 
monastery is somewhat achievable.  All three are modern constructions with 
modern conveniences.  DDM and FGS are also equipped to hold conferences and 
welcome moderate to large groups of visitors.  How are these places examples of 
rhetoric, though? 
In one respect, each of the three monasteries serves as the headquarters of 
the organization.  Whenever there is a major event, it is almost always held or 
associated with the monastery.
584
  But more than this, they are pilgrimage sites, 
places where members and non-members alike congregate.  They are places 
where community occurs.  Regarding Ciji’s complex, “The Still Thoughts Abode” 
(jingsi tang 靜思堂), Julia Huang notes how it is considered “home” by and for 
Ciji followers and visits to the Abode serve to renew one’s identity as a ‘Ciji 
person’ (Ciji ren 慈濟人).585 None of these are monasteries that one would just 
happen upon.  It requires a conscious effort to go there.  But they are considered 
places worth visiting.  Each monastery has made the appeal to both members and 
non-members that, in the case of members, this is where the heart of the 
organization is, and in the case of non-members, the environment offers benefits, 
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lay personnel. 
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spiritual or otherwise.  Either way, there is the expectation that one will identify 
with the location.   
According to Lin Yiren, “In the popular trend of temple building, a 
conventional unearthly and socially-disengaged ‘pureland’ is transformed into a 
‘here and now’ and socially-engaged Buddhist organization with a substantial 
material basis.”586  In the case of environmental rhetoric, the message begins with 
the beauty of the monastic environment.  The rural setting and size of each 
monastery results in a certain serenity that Taiwanese, who are generally from 
large cities, appreciate.  Moreover, each place makes an effort to observe 
environmental practices.  There are often no disposable tableware, lights are used 
only when needed, most buildings are well-ventilated and do not require air 
conditioning, and efforts are made to maintain flora.  This is especially true in the 
case of DDM.  Part of this reason is because DDM is the newest of the three 
complexes, and so was able to take advantage of new environmental technologies.  
But another part is due to Shengyan’s strong commitment to environmentalism.   
The building of the new DDM monastery (officially called the Dharma 
Drum World Center for Buddhist Education) broke ground on a mountain slope in 
Jinshan, north of Taipei.  Building such a large complex might raise questions 
over the impact on the flora and fauna, and such questions are legitimate.  
However, attempting to uphold DDM’s commitment to environmentalism, the 
development process (still on-going) has been well-documented.  Great effort has 
been made to preserve as much of the local habitat as possible and the architecture 
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was designed so as to have minimal contrast with the mountain aesthetic.  Two 
well-fed streams were maintained that contain local fish species.  In addition, 
there is a hiking trail with dense coverage that offers and even heightened sense of 
seclusion.  These elements combine to make DDM a place that offers visitors a 
chance to engage both their religious and naturalist inclinations.  This 
combination serves as a source of persuasion that Buddhism and environmental 
concern are connected by demonstrating the identification of the two in the very 
experience of the monastery.  An alternative viewpoint might question whether 
such construction is even necessary for a Buddhist monastery, which encourages 
simplicity, and highlighting the amount spent to create such a place, label it 
extravagant and opulent.  Depending on one’s reaction to places like DDM and 
FGS, we can determine the degree to which the rhetoric of place was successful.            
 
6.6 Characteristics of Chinese Buddhist Environmentalism 
            In this chapter my goal was to highlight the deep rhetorical currents that 
move the rhetoric of DDM and Ciji and account for the shallower currents in FGS.   
At the outset it is important to note that there is a rhetorical tradition in Chinese 
culture that each of the organizations we will look at are embedded in and perhaps 
draw upon.  Xing Lu’s studies of ancient Chinese rhetoric and the rhetoric of the 
Cultural Revolution build on the the fact that “sinologists have noted the striking 
similarity between Maoism and Confucianism in that both emphasize the role of 
ideology, conformity, and the moral integrity of the individual,” a similarity that 
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finds expression in the rhetoric of Maoism and Confucianism.
587
  In addition, both 
traditions of rhetoric appeal to the cultibation of the individual as a part of one’s 
responsibility to contribute to the public good.  Maoism’s inheritance of 
Cofuncian ideals and rhetoric helps us situate the rhetoric of humanistic 
Buddhism in the context of Chinese rhetoric.   
There is indeed an emphasis in humanistic Buddhism on the individual’s 
cultivation of his or her mind as the basis upon which social improvement can 
move forward.  But one significant difference between the Maoist rhetoric and 
that of humanistic Buddhism is the consequences of the use of language, often in 
the form of slogans.  Lu notes with reference to the Cultural Revolution that “the 
heavy-handed and pervasive use of political slogans in both public and private 
settings has contributed significantly to a general thoughtlessness still evident in 
today’s China.”588  The environmental rhetoric of humanistic Buddhist groups, 
and DDM in particular, is quite the opposite.  From the discussion on Naess’s 
philosophy, we saw how some environmental rhetoric with a dialectic aspect 
promotes creative thinking on philosophical and normative issues.  The 
environmental rhetoric of humanistic Buddhism incorporates the same elements 
of discursive thought intended to move the audience (either individual or 
collective) to a deeper understanding of the way environmentalism and Buddhist 
practice are intertwined.  This kind of rhetorical practice contains the possibility 
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of challenges to authority, but it seems that so far such challenges have not greatly 
upset the direction of these organizations.   
In a previous essay, I referred to spiritual environmentalism as “purifying 
words.”589  There is the suggestion that this teaching is intended to encourage the 
practitioner to work towards purifying her mind.  But we can also understand this 
to mean that the in focus on the words used and not solely relying on ideas and 
concepts, environmental rhetoric “purifies” or clarifies religious environmental 
discourse of the oftentimes obstructive dichotomy of theory and practice, 
ontology and ethics.  I hope to have shown that spiritual environmentalism is 
more than an attempt to offer a clever term for making Buddhism seem current 
and relevant in today’s society by hitching Buddhism to the coattails of 
environmentalism’s current popularity (at least in the media, if not always in 
practice).   
The terms “spiritual environmentalism,” “fourfold environmentalism,” and 
“fivefold spiritual renaissance campaign” draw on traditional Chinese Buddhist 
notions of the mind, with its epistemological and ontological centrality, in order to 
address the role that Chinese Buddhism can play in contemporary society.  They 
give the tradition an emotive and cognitive appeal by juxtaposing the more recent 
terms ‘environmentalism’ or ‘protection of the environment’ (huanbao).  In the 
case of Shengyan’s spiritual environmentalism, the audience that is primarily 
addressed includes members of Dharma Drum Mountain, but also culturally 
Chinese Buddhists who follow some form of humanistic Buddhism.  The new 
                                                 
589
 See Clippard, “Purifying Words.” 
  366 
term “spiritual environmentalism” brings together two rarely correlated values, 
religion and protecting the natural world, in order to explore the connections 
between the two.  The relationship offers a ground for creatively reimagining both 
how one can think about and carry out religious practice, as well as how one can 
conceive of altruism and engage in environmental protection.  The way in which 
spiritual environmentalism reinterprets environmentalism allows for the further 
introduction of types of environmentalism.  Also, we have seen that Shengyan and 
Zhengyan attempted to create interpretations of spiritual environmentalism that 
would be meaningful to non-Buddhists, which provide opportunities for possible 
interreligious dialogue around the theme of religious environmentalism.  These 
are at least the possibilities set-forth by these articulations of Buddhist 
environmentalism.  What has the impact of this new discourse been, how effective 
spiritual environmentalism will continue to be, and whether the fourfold 
environmentalism or the fivefold spiritual renaissance campaign posses the 
rhetorical characteristics to make a broader non-Buddhist appeal successful are 
questions worthy of future research.  
In the section on Ciji, I identified several expressions that are used to 
promote environmentalism.  I tried to show that there is no single central concept 
that compares to Shengyan’s spiritual environmentalism (a term that Zhengyan, 
too, uses) and neither is there the systematization of concepts that Shengyan 
offers with his fivefold spiritual renaissance campaign.  But it can certainly be 
argued that environmentalism is the dominant metaphor in Ciji, as it incorporates 
Buddhist and Confucian ethical and cosmological concepts, a vision of social 
  367 
reform, and a unique interpretation of Buddhist practice.  These elements allow 
Ciji’s environmental rhetoric to construct and define audiences through 
identification among members, identification with the person of Zhengyan, and 
the framing of huanbao, recycling, and fu offers avenues of identification for non-
Ciji and overseas audiences.   Zhengyan’s rhetoric of fu, recycling, and huanbao 
simultaneously engages traditional Buddhist and Chinese ethics, contemporary 
scientific discourse, and a modern social welfare movement.  These terms offer 
paths by which Ciji members and others can identify with Ciji’s environmental 
activities regardless of their degree of religious commitment of sense of religious 
identity.   
FGS and Xingyun have expressed concern for environmental issues and 
taken concrete measures to address these problems, not on the scale of DDM or 
Ciji, nor with the degree of systemization, but they have demonstrated their 
concern in action.  In addition, we can identify the presence of environmental 
rhetoric in Xingyun’s publications.  Central to that rhetoric is the notion of the 
pureland.  The notion of a pureland is important to all humanistic Buddhist 
organizations, since they espouse the goal of establishing a Pure land on earth.  
But making this claim is insufficient as we have seen, since traditional Pure land 
images, such as those associated with the Pure Land of Amitabha Buddha, are 
idealized and unnatural places.  They cannot be easily reconciled with 
environmental conservation of ecosystems.   
 What all three of these organizations have in common is a concern to 
convey the importance of environmentalism as a value relevant to the 
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contemporary Buddhist.  Moreover, they do so in terms intended to be meaningful 
to the followers of each organization.  In the case of DDM, the key concept is 
spiritual environmentalism and this is deeply connected with environmentalist 
practices in the conventional sense.  The same is true for Ciji, where Zhengyan 
advocates recycling and cherishing natural resources for both the material and 
spiritual benefit these practices offer.  In Ciji and FGS, where there is a strong 
emphasis on traditional Chinese and Confucian values, environmentalism is 
linked to filial piety and social responsibility, either through an emphasis on the 
welfare of future generations or on environmental activities offering a way for a 
family to accrue collective merit and strengthen its bond.   
An additional element of the process of identification is the authority of 
each of these three Buddhist leaders.  Buddhism and democracy in Taiwan has 
been a topic of several studies recently.  The general conclusion is that most 
authority remains with the spiritual heads of the organizations, despite increased 
lay involvement.
590
   As Lin Yiren observes:  
The role of [m]asters in formulating [huanbao] discourse and 
convincing offers of its correctness is an important one.  Masters in all 
three organizations [in Lin’s study these three are: Shengyan, Zhengyan, 
and Zhaohui] play a ‘gatekeeping’ role both in terms of providing 
authoritative interpretations of Buddhist doctrines, and positioning their 
institutions in society.  Moreover, their charismatic personality plays an 
important role in encouraging their followers to practice [huanbao]. This 
‘gatekeeping’ role is also a crucial one for it effectively transforms the 
scientifically-dominated [huanbao] discourse of a secular environmental 
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movement to a spiritually based discourse that meets a religious purpose—
the construction of a distinctive collective identity.
591
 
 
Zhengyan is a good example of the role these leaders play.  The 
importance of Taiwanese, culturally Chinese, and Buddhist audiences is reflected 
in the way in which Zhengyan’s persona is constructed to arouse the expectations 
of the audience.  Burke refers to this aspect of rhetoric as “psychology of form,” 
whereby rhetorical form creates community by arousing desires and that are then 
fulfilled by the rhetoric.  When viewed as a bodhisattva or shangren, the audience 
expects Zhengyan to be the embodiment of compassion and wisdom.  This 
expectation is then fulfilled by spiritualizing activities that are typically 
considered mundane.  Recycling is a perfect example.  Recycling entails sifting 
through trash and collecting recyclable materials.  But when advocated by 
Zhengyan, who points out that recycling uncovers the value of discarded 
materials, one can recognize it as the work of a bodhisattva whose vow is to 
transform impurity to purity.  That a bodhisattva figure like Zhengyan recognizes 
the spiritual value of recycling confirms the essential spirituality of the practice.  
 Lin’s point also illustrates the multivalent process of identification that 
rhetoric plays. And as Burke has shown, there are processes of both identification 
and division at play.  On one level, the rhetoric of an organization seeks to offer a 
discourse that is recognizable and appealing to an audience: in terms of values, 
images, and form.  This process of identity formation gathers an audience into a 
community.  On another level, the discourse also will set this community off from 
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others.  For the very same reasons the audience identifies with the discourse, it 
will likely see these characteristics as different in degree or quality to that of other 
organizations.  In the case of religious rhetoric of DDM, Ciji, and DDM, there is a 
third level of identification, by which the expectations that the spiritual head is 
believed to be special in some sense are reinforced by the accompanying 
discourses (such as biographical narrative) and set off from the rest of the 
community.  This division between leader and community contributes to the 
authority of the leader’s rhetoric.  
Finally, we must note the dialectic that accompanies and animates each 
organization’s environmental rhetoric.  For both Ciji and DDM, 
environmentalism is sacralized or spiritualized.  Environmentalism began in 
Taiwan as a secular movement, first associated with Western-trained academics 
and then becoming a popular means by which to critique the authoritarian 
government and push for democratic reforms.  Following Lin Yiren, I noted that 
after the lifting of martial law in 1987, environmentalism became more 
formalized but Taiwanese was going through such dramatic change, social 
stability was a need that many religious leaders tried to address.  Many Taiwanese 
found the discourse of humanistic Buddhism appealing and religious 
organizations were freer to offer ways for Taiwanese to contribute to social 
reform.  These changes have been part of the humanistic Buddhist project of 
reforming Buddhism to make it more acceptable to lay devotees.  Stuart Chandler 
notes that this project has resulted in “the secularization of Buddhist practice. In 
other words, the divisions between the supramundane and the mundane and 
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between monastic life and lay life are blurred.”592  There is no better example of 
this than spiritual environmentalism.
593
  Environmentalism is a concerned with 
the natural world and very mundane social issues.  It is perhaps one of the most 
“earthly” of all social movements.  But DDM and Ciji, particularly, have taken 
environmentalism and argued that environmentalism is nothing less than pure 
Buddhist practice, the cultivation of compassion and wisdom, the accumulation of 
merit, the bodhisattva’s process of building a Pure land.  For DDM, 
environmentalism as normally understood is a process of working through karma 
and purifying the mind.  With Ciji there is a clear move to reinterpret recycling as 
a form of religious practice.  And for FGS Amitabha’s Western Pure Land is the 
ultimate goal for environmentalism. 
These reinterpretations of environmentalism are thoroughly (but not 
solely) rhetorical.  They turn on a dialectic of sacred and secular.  The way in 
which huanbao is used by these organizations challenges their audiences to step 
back and question what the goal of Buddhist practice is and what 
environmentalism “truly” means.  On page 110, I noted how, for Burke, dialectic 
is a way of establishing or addressing difference, while rhetoric is a way of 
overcoming differences and forging unities.  The dialectic of sacred and secular 
that animates spiritual environmentalism begins from the assumption that these 
two—spirituality or religion and environmentalism—are different.  The 
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environmental rhetoric of DDM, Ciji, and FGS moves on to redefine both these 
concepts and show that they are, in fact one and the same.  
Despite the many commonalities among the environmental rhetoric of 
these three organizations, there is not necessarily one interpretation of what 
Buddhist environmentalism means.  As Lin Yiren astutely observes, “the 
emergence of different versions of Taiwanese Buddhist Huan-Baos 
[environmental discourses and practices] is actually a process of contestation, 
negotiation, and sharing among different individuals and organizations that is 
dynamic and generated through particular personal experiences and social 
practices.”594  DDM’s “spiritual environmentalism” is deeply connected to the 
practice of Chan meditation, a distinguishing feature of Shengyan’s teaching.  The 
practice of mental cultivation in Ciji seems to occur mainly in the carrying out of 
recycling and is enhanced by Zhengyan’s reinterpretation of recycling centers as 
places of practice.  The emphasis on FGS seems to be mostly on education, but 
the mixture of Pure land rhetoric suggests that environmental protection is not so 
much a process of cultivation as it is a goal to be achieved.  The same can be said 
of DDM and Ciji, as well, but in the case of these two the teleological focus is 
balanced by the process of spiritual or psychological transformation.  
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this dissertation I have sought to reorient how scholars approach 
religious environmentalism.  I have tried to demonstrate that articulations of the 
environmental concern within a religious tradition will be difficult to make 
resonate with the members of that religious community, if those articulations are 
couched only in metaphysical and philosophical language.  In failing to convey 
effectively how or why environmental concerns are meaningful to one’s religious 
practice and identity, a textually-based strategy of articulating a religious 
tradition’s environmental ethics falls short of bridging the theory/practice gap 
within environmentalism.   
 I have sought to redress this gap by offering a method of rhetorical 
analysis that focuses on identification, framing, and dialectic.  Identifying these 
aspects of a religious tradition’s environmental discourse can illustrate how a 
religious tradition can make environmentalism meaningful to its members and 
appeal to a larger segment of society.  I argued in chapter four and five for the 
importance of focusing on actual the environmental rhetoric of contemporary 
religious organizations by demonstrating that various communities within a given 
religious tradition are implicated in various social, historical, political, and 
linguistic contexts.  These differing contexts make each community unique.  
Simply advocating decontextualized religious doctrines, regardless of how they 
have been reinterpreted, and expecting they will be meaningful to members of 
that tradition ignores the fact that an individual, while she may be, say, Buddhist, 
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is also Taiwanese, middle-aged, single, and a university graduate.  Her 
background and values that derive from her other identities contribute to 
determining what her environmental values are.   
Although scholars are right to recognize the potential effectiveness of 
religion in moving communities towards more environmentally sustainable 
lifestyles, it is necessary to understand religious environmentalism as a social and 
spiritual phenomenon.  Therefore, we must begin with religious environmentalism 
where it already exists.  However, recognizing the differences that exist not only 
among different religious traditions, but among communities within a religious 
tradition, scholars need a method by which larger trends can be identified and 
then applied to broader contexts.  Rhetorical analysis is able to accomplish both 
these tasks of analysis and identification.  It is a practical method of inquiry.  
Based on the research and analysis carried out in this dissertation I would like to 
offer three final observations: 1) implications for religious environmentalism, 2) 
the theory/practice gap, and 3) the scholar’s role.  
 This study seeks to illustrate that scholarship on religious 
environmentalism (or religion and ecology) must begin from a clear 
acknowledgment of the cultural context of the community of Buddhists one is 
studying.  This includes understanding the various ways environmental problems 
are perceived and discussed by members of the community.  It is important to 
recognize that environmental issues might not always be meaningful in terms of 
the Buddhist worldview, but that does not imply that Buddhists do not find these 
issues important.  For example, Bron Taylor’s critique that the current world 
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religion’s paradigm governing work in religion and ecology marginalizes non-
mainstream groups or fails to account for alternative religiosities can be read in 
another light.  Many contemporary temples, monasteries, and Buddhist 
organizations emphasize filial piety as integral to Buddhist ethics.  As we saw in 
the context of Taiwanese Buddhism, Confucian notions of filial piety are 
absolutely central to Ciji and FGS and Shengyan’s “six ethics of the mind” (xin 
liu lunli 新六倫理) seek to encompass the traditional five Confucian virtues.  
However, this virtue is rarely, if ever, mentioned in non-Chinese Buddhist 
literature on environmentalism.  This suggests that simply aligning Chinese 
Buddhism with Buddhism and treating it separately from Confucianism will result 
in an analysis that does not accurately grasp the scope and character of values 
promoted in Chinese Buddhist environmentalism.  This lacunae is uncovered 
precisely as a result of first approaching the rhetoric of the phenomenon and does 
not arise when Chinese Buddhist environmentalism is examined philosophically.  
This dissertation proposes and outlines the elements of a new hermeneutical 
approach that uses rhetorical analysis to articulate the nature of environmental 
problems, whether those problems are rendered meaningful in a religious context.   
A second outcome of this dissertation is that it offers an effective way to 
reduce, if not eliminate, the theory/practice gap that current approaches to 
religious environmentalism has inherited from its reliance on the dominant 
paradigm in environmental ethics.  Chapter two showed that environmental 
pragmatism offers a methodological stance that directly addresses the practical 
nature of environmentalism while still maintaining the relevance of philosophical 
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and ethical discussion.  Chapter three highlighted the connection between 
environmental pragmatism and strands of radical ecology based on a recognition 
of the role that rhetoric plays in making environmental discourse broadly 
appealing.   
This same emphasis on practicality lies at the heart of the turn to religion 
as a source of environmental amelioration.  When addressing environmental 
issues, many scholars seek to explore the potential of religious traditions in 
articulating a worldview or part of a worldview that might create a foundation for 
social change on a larger scale.  Even the work of scholars who appear to be 
simply exploring the environmental interpretations of a tradition’s doctrine or 
practices often include statements that express the hope that such scholarship can 
contribute to changing the way humans understand the human/nature relationship.  
And we can see that such incorporation of religion into environmentalism can be 
successful to varying degrees.  The case of Thai Buddhist tree ordinations and the 
recycling program at Ciji are popular movements and receive worldwide 
recognition.  Roger Gottlieb, Willis Jenkins, and others note similar successes in 
other traditions.   
Combining the theoretical approach advocated by many environmental 
pragmatists with a focus on rhetoric as a force for change provides a methodology 
that allows for the mutual development of, on the one hand, the philosophical 
foundations of specific religious environmentalisms and, on the other, the 
discursive elements that forge communities out of audiences which are crucial to 
carrying out substantive change. 
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These two outcomes of the rhetorical method proposed and developed in 
this dissertation can also be fit into the theory/practice mold.  The first 
observation is theoretical in nature.  It offers what is lacking in the field of 
religion and ecology, a firm ground from which to begin research into religious 
environmentalism.  This does not mean that rhetorical methodology should 
displace other approaches and become the only approach.  Rather, it suggests that 
doctrinal and philosophical and ethical approaches all benefit from a foundation 
of rhetorical analysis which clears the scholar’s vision of how the approach taken 
by a specific religious community will be shaped by the context of tradition, 
society, and values.  The elements of audience, framing, and identification 
provide specific ways to breakdown the often complex articulations of a 
community’s environmental concern, not only in verbal discourse, but in ritual 
and communal practices as well.  Introducing the dialectical aspect of rhetorical 
analysis significantly aids in discerning how values are distinguished and defined 
through the interaction of the religious leadership and lay community. 
Rhetorical analysis, though, also reveals that rhetoric is already in play 
within many forms of religious environmentalism.  The examples of Taiwanese 
Buddhist environmentalism explored here all show that rhetoric is effectively 
combined with doctrine and the specific religious identity of each organization in 
the development and promotion of environmentalism as a humanistic Buddhist 
concern.  What Lin Yiren refers to as the negotiation and contested nature of 
Buddhist environmental discourse is part of a dialectical relationship between the 
leadership of the Buddhist organizations and their audiences.  We can see the 
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results of how this relationship forms the rhetoric of the each group.  DDM’s 
focus on Chan meditation is appealing to it members, in fact, this is one reason 
people choose to become members.  The same can be said for Ciji and its focus 
on social welfare programs and lack of focus on meditation.  So the 
environmental rhetoric of each organization must align itself with the 
characteristics of the organization that are already sources of identification.  But 
how the membership responds to the environmental campaigns and the ways in 
which the organization’s seek to make the environment meaningful will determine 
what adjustments need to be made.  Is the message effective?  What are the trends 
in participation?  Addressing these elements of the dialectic between lay followers 
and religious authority would further deepen the analysis of this dissertation and 
are areas for future research.   
Recognizing and taking seriously the rhetorical aspects of religious 
environmentalism provides a common methodological ground for both scholars 
doing critical work and others who desire to make constructive suggestions to 
specific communities on how they might address environmental issues.  Since it 
has been noted that many if not most scholars working in environmental ethics or 
religion and ecology share some interest in advancing programs of sustainability 
within communities, this common ground provides a basis for dialogue among all 
the parties working in the field, regardless of one’s goals.  Moreover, viewing 
rhetorical analysis as a method of clarifying terms and identifying strategies 
would only strength the relevance of the theological and philosophical work that 
constitutes the bulk of scholarship in religion and ecology.  I noted the plethora of 
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Buddhist concepts to which scholars have appealed in attempts to articulate a 
Buddhist environmental ethics.  But mostly these attempts fall on deaf ears since 
they fail to first identify which community this ethics should or could be 
operationalized.  I have tried to illustrate that in the case of Taiwanese Buddhists, 
a meaningful environmental ethics will build on notions of purity, the 
establishment of a Pure land on earth, Confucian notions of filial piety, and the 
rectitude of one’s mind and/or spirit.  Other emphasises and how these concepts 
are related will also depend on the specific community.  But none of these 
concepts could be easily deduced from the articulations heretofore offered by 
scholars.  By building religious environmentalism on a rhetorical foundation, 
scholars and practitioners are better equipped to create the kinds of community 
required to effectively address the continuing threat posed by environmental 
damage.         
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